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ABSTRACT 
Infrastructures, being technological networks that form the structural and social 
scaffolding of cities, have been symbiotic with modern urban development. Building 
on their socio-technical character, this thesis seeks to understand the technological 
mediation of political formations and environmental knowledges that shape notions 
of urban sustainability. It takes as its point of departure the construction of reverse 
osmosis desalination plants to augment water supply in two cities across the global 
South and North – Chennai, India and London, UK. It uses the analytic of 
infrastructure to excavate the complex reasons as to why and how desalination 
plants came to be built in these cities.  
Over a period of 10 months, oral and documentary narratives were gathered from 
institutions, professionals and citizens involved in water supply and access in the two 
cities. Based on a comparative reading of these texts and ethnographic field notes, 
the thesis focuses on the state and engineering practices as significant determinants 
of urban techno-natures. It demonstrates that infrastructures provide a mode of 
articulating statehood through mediation between technology, nature and society. 
It traces how engineers and other water professionals, through their everyday work, 
socialise those water systems, cultivating popular environmental knowledges. 
Finally, through a narrative of the contestations faced by the desalination plants, the 
thesis shows that urban infrastructural transitions give rise to distinct political 
formations. 
As water becomes infrastructure engendering technological practices and shared 
knowledges over which political relations are forged, there are clear differences in 
how this is materialised in Chennai and London. Using Chennai as the point of 
reference to frame the themes and issues through which to explore the London case, 
the study identifies within those differences potential starting points for theory 
building from the global south.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In July 2010, the opening of a seawater desalination plant in Chennai, the capital city 
of the state of Tamil Nadu on India’s south eastern coast, was a big event. The state 
Chief Minister (CM) inaugurated the plant in the company of some of his trusted 
ministers and civil servants. As a journalist covering urban infrastructure and 
development for a daily newspaper, I was dispatched to report on this event to 
Kattupalli, the island 30 km to the north of the city where the plant was located. The 
media delegation did not get to see much of the plant that day as the presence of 
the CM took the press briefing in the direction of the political agenda for urban 
development and the role water projects were to play in that. The Spanish company 
Befesa, which had built the plant, was however keen to showcase its technological 
achievement and so arranged another visit at a later date for the benefit of the 
media. This time, the questions turned to sustainability of desalination – could 
Chennai afford this expensive technology? How much energy did it consume? Where 
would the power supply come from? Would this make Chennai a sustainable city or 
destroy its ecology? What message did this convey about Chennai to cities in the rest 
of the world?  
It is worth noting that urban infrastructure or development hadn’t yet become a 
regular topic of coverage in newspapers and so, most of the journalists present 
covered either politics or technology or water, which has its own news ‘beat’ in 
Chennai. Their questions, however, echoed some of the concerns raised around the 
world about the increasing use of desalination technology to address water scarcity 
and sometimes, fuel urban development. The interaction that ensued said nothing 
about whether these issues had been considered at all during the planning and 
construction of the desalination plant. Journalists did their job in asking the questions 
they were expected to ask and the answers followed an official script. Since my paper 
wanted a long feature on this rather than an immediate report of the plant’s 
inaugural I had the opportunity to explore the project further in the following days 
with a wider range of actors – engineers and bureaucrats working in urban water 
12 
supply, environmental activists, planners and politicians. What emerged from this 
was a picture of seemingly parallel registers of infrastructure development where 
policy objectives such as sustainability remained separate from everyday engineering 
practices that shaped urban infrastructure. But they responded to highly 
contextualised environmental subjectivities and contestations among urban 
residents, who negotiated with and participated in infrastructure making in myriad 
ways.  
This study was, subsequently, born out of the interest to pursue this line of enquiry 
further and develop a nuanced understanding of how urban infrastructures come to 
be conceptualised, built, used and contested (Amin 2014); and how they interactively 
shape urban political and ecological formations. It, therefore, responds to recent calls 
in urban geography to look to the ‘city’s fabric’, which includes the materiality as well 
everyday life of cities, as an important site for theorising processes of urban change 
and enable a grounded understanding of what the urban might mean (Gandy 2014, 
McFarlane 2008a, Koch & Latham 2017). By engaging with urban infrastructures as a 
set of materials, systems and practices mediating socio-natural relations, it aims to 
excavate the contingent ways in which multiple urban imaginations, techno-
environmental knowledges and political claims come together in an arc of 
urbanisation.  
Contemporary urban infrastructures have been implicated in discourses of globality 
because of the circulation and exchange of technologies and technical expertise 
between cities influencing their development (Björkman & Harris 2018). 
Simultaneously, urban water supply systems around the world are embroiled in a 
policy trajectory where the lukewarm performance of structural adjustment policies 
in the 1980s and privatisation in the 1990s was followed by an ostensible move 
towards community or environment centred models of water management. Cities 
have, hence, been increasingly expected to adopt and share novel technologies and 
decentralised governance of water infrastructure in a global drive towards 
environmental sustainability (Chasek et al 2013). Reverse osmosis desalination is one 
such mobile technology that has found its way into a wide range of water supply 
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systems around the world following unexpected geographical circulations 
(Swyngedouw 2013).  
In the same year as Chennai, London in the UK also opened a desalination plant as a 
climate-resilient back-up for any unexpected shortfall in its supply network. It drew 
water from the tidal Thames and so desalinated brackish water rather than seawater, 
and was reported widely as the first large scale desalination plant in the UK.1 Its 
opening had however been delayed by a planning challenge by the then Mayor of 
London, questioning its environmental impact and contribution to urban 
sustainability. Reverse osmosis desalination was an energy intensive process that 
distracted from the urgent need to fix the city’s massive leakage problem, he had 
contended. Urban sustainability had thus been a universal rubric on which the 
desalination project was evaluated across the global North and South, despite their 
significant differences. Chennai has never had a continuous universal water supply 
system, its network instead delivering water to households for a few hours in a day 
or fixed days in a week. Buildings and households have storage tanks in which water 
could be filled from various sources, including the public network and then piped for 
everyday use. While London has had such arrangements in the past even after the 
early 20th century universalisation of its network, the size and extent of its network 
presently means that it effectively requires continuous flow to run it. Regulatory 
backing and successive historical investments in the infrastructure have ensured 
that, for the most part,  the average resident can simply open the tap for reliable 
water supply any time of the day. Yet, the global circulation of technologies, 
knowledges and urban imaginaries amidst cities has culminated in the parallel 
building of a very similar infrastructural addition in both cities, sparking similar 
doubts about its benefit to the urban ecology as well.  
Urban theory, as Aihwa Ong (2011) contends, has tended to explain these 
interconnected transnational processes in cities as a singular condition defined in 
                                                          
1 Thames Water opens first large-scale desalination plant in UK. The Guardian. 2 Jun 2010. Available 
at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/jun/02/thames-water-desalination-plant 
Salt water plant opened in London. BBC News. 2 Jun 2010. Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10213835 
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terms of epochs – of capitalism or environmentalism. In other words, globality has 
often been equated with universality in urban theory. This is true of, for example, the 
thesis of splintering urbanism (Graham & Marvin 2001) which frames a universal 
narrative of privatisation and global capital fragmenting networked infrastructures 
and disintegrating cities. The deviation from the 20th century Northern experience 
modernist infrastructure building was equated to a splintering of the very idea and 
form of the urban. But, what does the incursion of a technology like reverse osmosis 
desalination in cities around the world mean for their ecology and sociality? How 
does this infrastructural form come to be built in a city and why does it provoke 
suspicion and contestation or acceptance and socialisation? How does this 
contingent and layered journey of infrastructure-making shape technological and 
environmental knowledges in the city? Finally, are there any common themes or 
patterns at all that can be observed across the urban infrastructural experience? In 
order to address these questions, this thesis places the study of Chennai’s water 
infrastructure alongside that of London in a ‘comparative gesture’ (Robinson 2011) 
that scholars have argued is ‘only natural’ to the study of cities (McFarlane 2010, 
Nijman 2015). 
The formulation of urban comparison as a theoretical manoeuvre and 
methodological technique was motivated by the need to decentre urban theory from 
the Euro-American axis and move towards a more global urban studies that built 
theory from the experiences of burgeoning cities in Asia and Africa (Robinson 2013, 
2014). When urban researchers started seeking out cases in the global south, they 
focused on issues of ‘development’, choosing comparative studies on the basis of 
developmental and regional commensurability (Robinson 2014). While the 
specificities of the southern urban experience have indeed been instrumental in 
formulating contextually reflexive theories like urban informality (Tuvikene et al 
2017), Roy (2014: 17) cautions that “to assert the global south as a signifier of theory 
requires constant vigilance” for the assertion could slip into essentialism of cities in 
provincial categories while leaving claims of universality built on Northern cities 
intact. This phenomenon is also common, for example, in studies of southern 
environmental politics, which are inscribed in a binary of traditional and modern 
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knowledges or local and global technologies (Greenough & Tsing 2003, Sinha et al. 
1997).    
So, this thesis follows from Roy’s (2014) suggestion to pay attention to ‘worldliness’ 
or practices of ‘worlding’ in cities, whereby the socio-technical knowledges and the 
political cultures that make up urbanisation are simultaneously situated and 
interconnected with a variety of material and imaginative geographies. The 
comparative project here starts by recognising that reverse osmosis desalination or 
other novel technologies circulating between cities today may not represent a 
paradigmatic shift in the process of urbanisation; or an essential conflict between the 
global and local. But, their geographical spread allows for an engagement with the 
‘embeddedness in multiple elsewheres’ (Mbembé & Nuttall 2004: 348) of cities, not 
least through the techno-environmental knowledges and subjectivities enlisted in 
the work of making infrastructures. In taking this approach, the cases here present 
possibilities for ‘cross-pollination’ (Furlong & Kooy 2017) of concepts, inspirations 
and theories from each other than reveal similarities and contrasts as such. This is 
because they constitute, in the global categories of the urban, two ‘most different’ 
cities (Robinson 2011) – that is, cities of different geographical, developmental and 
cultural trajectories that would not usually be grouped together, even if there are 
any similarities in governance mechanisms.  
1.1. The Case  Studies 
Chennai’s long nearly unbroken coastline, shaped as much by the construction of 
harbours, ports and roads as by geo-climactic features, is unlike any other major city 
in India. It runs the length of the city from north to south broken only by three river 
estuaries – Kosasthalaiayar, Cooum and Adyar – and is used extensively for leisure, 
fishing and harbour activity. The spectacular Marina beach (see Figure 1) with its vast 
sands forms the central feature of this coastline and is lined with important 
institutions of government and education (Arabindoo 2010). With the sea visible blue 
under the blazing sun all along its doorstep, then, it is little wonder that successive 
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governments in Tamil Nadu2 have always had an eye on harnessing it for drinking 
water supply. The city had experimented with desalination before in smaller discrete 
projects; and reverse osmosis membranes, the type of filtration technology used in 
desalination plants around the world now, were in widespread use for household 
water purification. But, the Kattupalli desalination plant, more popularly known as 
the Minjur plant after the wider area in which it was located, generating 100 million 
litres of water per day (MLD), was the first time a large scale desalination plant would 
feed into the public water network. The network’s total capacity then came to only 
about 600 MLD, depending on rainfall and other factors (CD10), for a city of 8 million 
residents3. In 2013, another desalination plant was opened at the southern periphery 
of Nemmeli, adding another 100 MLD to the network. This move was criticised by 
environmental activists who argued that the region’s ancient but fast deteriorating 
system of tanks and canals could instead have been rehabilitated to replenish the 
city’s annually recharged ground and surface water sources. This, however, hasn’t 
                                                          
2 A note on names: When India became independent from British rule in 1947, it retained the structure 
of colonial presidencies as States until 1956, when they were reorganised on a linguistic basis. The 
colonial Madras Presidency became Madras State in 1947, reduced in size in 1956 losing territories to 
the newly created states of Kerala, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. The state was renamed Tamil Nadu 
meaning Tamil Country in 1969. Tamil is the language spoken by the majority in the State. Chennai is 
the capital of Tamil Nadu. 
The city of Chennai, ever since it originated from colonial settlement in the 17th century, has been 
known by two names as Madras and Chennai. While the authenticity of its two names is hotly debated 
and has also been theorised as an indication of the city’s dual spatial and social character (Neild 1979, 
Arabindoo 2006), most Tamils  have recognised both names and used them interchangeably. Over 
time, Madras became its official name at least in English, whereas it was acceptable to refer to it as 
Chennai in some Tamil documents. In 1996, however, the city was officially renamed Chennai. 
So, in this thesis, the city is called as Chennai unless the name ‘Madras’ is required to refer to its 
existence in a specific time period or to an institution that hadn’t changed its name in 1996: for eg., 
‘colonial Madras’ or ‘Indian Institute of Technology Madras’. Most State institutions did change their 
names in 1996 from say ‘Madras Metropolitan Development Authority’ (MMDA) to ‘Chennai 
Metropolitan Development Authority’ (CMDA). The main institution of concern here – Chennai 
Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (CMWSSB), however, is known widely by its 
shortened form ‘Metrowater’ and even finds a place in the utility’s official communication. So, after 
the first reference, the thesis uses the name Metrowater to refer to this organisation. 
 
3 INDIA STATS : Million plus cities in India as per Census 2011. 31 October 2011. Available at: 
http://pibmumbai.gov.in/scripts/detail.asp?releaseId=E2011IS3 
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stopped plans to construct two more desalination plants – of 400 MLD and 150 MLD 
each to the south of the city (CD10), thus doubling the volume of supply. 
 
Figure 1: View of Chennai’s iconic Marina beach from the State Planning 
Commission offices. 
Source: Fieldwork photo. 
Networked water supply in Chennai is sourced mainly from a system of four 
reservoirs – Poondi, Cholavaram, Redhills and Chembarambakkam – which are fed 
by rain and the numerous tanks and canals surrounding them (see Figure 2). There 
were also two projects executed to draw water from far away - the Krishna river 488 
km to the north in the neighbouring state of Andhra and Veeranam lake, a reservoir 
for overflow from the river Cauvery, 228 km to the south within the state of Tamil 
Nadu. The public water utility in charge of this is called Chennai Metropolitan Water 
Supply and Sewerage Board (CMWSSB) or Metrowater for short. Metrowater 
supplements this system with water drawn from well fields in Thiruvallur to the north 
west of the city and aquifers along the southern coast, either piping them to one of 
the reservoirs or directly distributing them through water lorries.  
18 
 
Figure 2: Chennai Metrowater Supply Schematic. 
Source: Compiled from Metrowater website and research data. 
Residents further supplement their Metrowater supply, if they have one, with 
groundwater pumped from their backyards and water sold in plastic cans or by 
private lorries ferrying from the hinterlands. This disparate water access mechanism 
means that there is almost no data on how much the total water consumption of the 
city is. But, a household survey conducted for an academic project (Srinivasan 2008: 
268) estimated that an average household used groundwater for 46% of its needs 
and piped supply from Metro Water for 30%. 19% was met by public hand-pumps, 
2% each by public taps and tankers. Private water vendors accounted for 2% in tanker 
form and 0.7% as packaged water. This thesis’ focus is on Metrowater and its 
networked infrastructure; but it situates its analysis and ethnography in this ecology 
of everyday water access where engineering practices and environmental 
knowledges are mutually shaped by multiple waters and the socio-technics of 
mobilising them.  
19 
 
Figure 4: Thames Water Supply Areas.  
Source: LD8 (Thames Water, 2014. Final Water Resources Management Plan 2015 
– 2040). 
London’s water supply, in the post-war years, has been firmly tied to national water 
policy and regulation. Even after water management was privatised in England and 
Wales, the regulatory framework put in place influenced the direction taken by the 
water companies. The city is one of the zones in the Thames basin (see Figure 4), 
whose water supply and sewerage are managed by the private company named 
Thames Water. The company supplies a total volume of 2.6 billion litres per day 
through “94 water treatment works, 26 raw water reservoirs, 308 pumping stations, 
and 235 clean water service reservoirs.”4  
The river Thames here plays a similar topological role to that played by the sea in 
Chennai. Over the years, its meander and flow have been shaped by the 
embankments,  locks, barrages and bridges, as well as more recent commercial and 
residential development, that have been instrumental in the making of London as a 
                                                          
4 See: https://corporate.thameswater.co.uk/Media/Facts-and-figures 
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city. Consequently, the river has held strategic importance and sustained political 
interest (Kelly 2018). In the history of this river heavily mediated by technology and 
government, the desalination plant on its tidal parts at Beckton in east London 
presented a divergence for two reasons. Firstly, this is the first time since 1855 that 
water from the tidal Thames was allowed to be fed into the drinking water supply. 
The Metropolis Water Act 1852 enacted to ensure quality of the water supplied by 
the many water companies then, had prohibited abstraction of water from the tidal 
reaches of the Thames, defined as downstream of the Teddington Weir in West 
London (Jones 2013: 83-105). In the same decade, following the Great Stink of 1858, 
when industrial pollution and human waste dumped in the river lead to disease and 
death in the city, sophisticated sewerage systems were built separating waste from 
water supply, effectively reducing the risk of waterborne diseases. This biotechnical 
achievement of the city is still considered legendary (see Figure 3) and has lead to 
this centralised mode of handling human waste an ideal to be aspired to by many 
cities around the world.  
The Beckton desalination plant, officially called the Thames Gateway Water 
Treatment Works (TGWTW) however, building on the efficacy of reverse osmosis 
filtration, abstracts brackish water from the outgoing tide on the Thames, upstream 
of its own sewage treatment works in Beckton, so that the water has as less of salt 
and waste content as possible.5 The second divergence from previous water works is 
that this plant was explicitly positioned as a defence against climate vagaries in the 
future. Thus, it echoes what Matthew Kelly, historian of British environmental policy 
observes about the Thames Barrier:  
“…did not seek to improve living standards or economic effectiveness, but to 
counter the existential threat nature posed to London.” (Kelly 2013: 206) 
Thus it was an interesting turn of events that opposition to the desalination plant by 
the then Mayor of London called it a “retrograde step in UK environmental policy.”6 
                                                          
5 See: https://www.thameswater.co.uk/Help-and-Advice/Water-Quality/Where-our-water-comes-
from/Thames-Gateway-Water-Treatment-Works 
6 London Assembly, 2007. Seventy-Third Mayor’s Report to the Assembly – 18 July2007. 
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The planning and construction of the desalination plant in London, thus, stands at a 
clear intersection of strategic national regulatory policies and the technological 
mediation of the environment7.  
 
Figure 3: A caricature illustrating the horror of ‘The Great Stink’ in 19th century 
London.  
Source: Wikimedia Commons/ Public Domain. 
Caricature published in Punch at the time of the "Great Stink". The River Thames 
introduces his children – diphtheria, scrofula and cholera – to the city of London, 
showing some understanding that the river was a danger to health.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 A note on terminology: The framework of water privatisation and regulation governing London are 
specific to England and Wales. However, water expertise in the city is identified as ‘British’ and not 
as ‘English and Welsh’. The UK Central Government is sometimes referred to as the British 
Government here. London’s local government is comprised of the Greater London Authority (GLA) 
headed by the directly elected Mayor and the elected London Assembly. It normally has limited 
impact on the city’s water supply, except for the case of Mayoral contestation discussed in one of 
the chapters. 
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1.2. Thesis Outline 
The empirical methods this project has adopted and the arguments the thesis 
presents are guided by the following connected research questions:  
How does the conceptualisation and construction of water infrastructure shape 
subjective knowledges about the urban environment? What can this process tell us 
about the technological mediation of political relations in cities?  
These questions are explored in the two cities discussed above: Chennai, India and 
London, UK, with the reverse osmosis desalination plants they opened in 2010 as a 
common point of departure. In both cities, the socio-materiality of water as a thing 
essential to life and intertwined in their cultural histories has played a part in 
determining their infrastructural development. There was, thus, a process by which 
water became infrastructure.  
Chapter 2 engages with water’s historical trajectory through a review of academic 
literature on its multiple ontologies. It explores the origins of water’s persistent 
connections with ideals of modernity and traces the gradual unravelling of this ideal 
by a range of interconnected political and economic events around the world. In 
geography, theories inspired by political economy and structural analysis have been 
dominant in studying this change and so, the chapter delves into them in some depth. 
Such a theoretical approach however presents considerable limitations to studying 
the multivalent processes that this thesis aims to understand in order to achieve its 
research objectives. So, the chapter arrives at a theoretical framing that draws on 
interdisciplinary studies of infrastructure that pay specific attention to the 
technological mediation inevitable in urban water supply systems. Chapter 3 
identifies this as an infrastructural epistemology using which it arrives at a 
methodological approach to conduct empirical research in the two cities. It devises a 
research design that puts to use the interconnectedness of infrastructure and the 
range of people and materials involved in its coming into being. Describing the 
fieldwork process and challenges in each city, the chapter identifies the significant 
differences in the outcome from the two cities and develops a thematic analysis of 
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the data collected. It draws on the idea of an ‘experimental comparison’ proposed 
by Lancione & McFarlane (2016) to identify potential theoretical starting points for 
further investigation. The rest of the chapters in the thesis are structured around the 
themes identified here.  
Chapter 4 builds on the idea of the state that was prevalent in the data as a significant 
determinant of water infrastructures in both cities. But, the forms that the state takes 
and its everyday articulations are distinct in the two cities, which the chapter 
explores as separate narratives. It traces a broad outline of how reverse osmosis 
desalination plants came to be built in two vastly different cities across the global 
South and North. In doing this it explores how the conceptualisation of water and 
hence, the natural environment, was constantly reconfigured by technologies of 
governance or state-making. In Chennai, the long history of a distinct cultural politics 
combined with the consistent welfare populism of the state inscribes water with a 
political vibrancy. In turn, the institutional structures that have recently emerged to 
support urban development and the building of complex technological projects are 
populated by a patron network of administrators whose personal connections drive 
the techno-politics of infrastructures. In London, where water’s privatisation has 
seemingly rendered its politics static, there emerges a narrative of shifting 
conceptualisations of water as multiple  objects, the mediation of which constitutes 
the regulatory state. A narrative of the state’s articulation through urban water 
governance also offers a historical background to understand the overall mechanism 
of building water infrastructure in the two cities. It functions as the context to delve 
into the everyday practices of engineering and water management that the next two 
chapters delineate.  
Chapter 5 and 6 are both interested in the constitution of techno-environmental 
knowledges through practices of infrastructure-making. To this end, they engage 
with engineering and techno-managerial practices involved in facilitating water 
supply in Chennai and London. Findings are presented through distinct themes 
making different but interrelated arguments in these two chapters. Chapter 5 
analyses engineering practice as constantly negotiated between compartmentalised 
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individual identities, using this premise to draw out the relationalities of urban 
imaginations and shared knowledges constituting engineering expertise. It proposes 
that technological mediation of urban natures can be understood as osmotic, in order 
to explore the constant negotiation and unequal agencies involved in the process. In 
Chennai, a networked system of everyday water access is built through the affective 
labour of engineers and the techno-environmental knowledges they share with the 
local residents. London’s engineers, on the other hand, assert their expertise in the 
global forum of water infrastructure development, by mobilising the legacy of the 
city’s history and colonial imaginaries. Based on these accounts, the chapter develops 
a view of infrastructures as an ecology of practice, which works in banal ways to 
constitute shared ways of knowing urban materiality as well as socio-technical forms 
of othering.  
With this relationality of infrastructure as its overarching framework, chapter 6 
investigates the epistemological diversity of engineering disciplines involved in 
making urban infrastructures. In Chennai, while the multiple epistemologies are 
apparent in different functions of city-making and even occupy distinct institutional 
roles, in London, there emerges a calculative framework of  risk and resilience that 
attempts to reconcile these multiplicities. Since recent processes of infrastructure-
making that have adopted discrete technologies and novel institutional 
arrangements have been seen as fragmenting and splintering the very urban fabric, 
this chapter attempts to address the question of whether certain technologies of 
approaching urban infrastructure-making are more divisive than others and what 
exactly does cohesion mean in these cities.  
Chapter 7 builds on the idea that urban infrastructures are public affairs no matter 
their ownership structure or indeed their capability to fragment or generate urban 
sociality, to narrate an account of how they were constitutive of distinct political 
formations in both cities. In Chennai, it is the socio-material environment of the city’s 
long coastline that present a challenge to littoral development including desalination 
projects; whereas in London, the newly created Mayoral office presents the 
possibility for a political challenge because of the individualised power of discretion 
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it allows into the planning process. The chapter uses these two cases that 
technological projects, even in their goal of anti-politics, hold the potential to spur 
an organic politics that cannot be reduced to a pre-existing set of contestations.  
In summarising the conclusions of the thesis, chapter 8 acknowledges the limitations 
presented by the comparative framework of the study. Investigating complex 
infrastructural projects using ethnographic methods across vastly different 
geographies requires inevitable compromise on the depth of engagement with both 
cases and the possibility of generalisable findings. Instead, since the comparative 
methods were framed as ‘experimental’, this chapter discusses how some of the 
themes identified in the empirical chapters present an opportunity for further 
research.  
 
26 
2. SOCIO-TECHNICAL MEDIATION OF WATER: INTERSECTIONS 
BETWEEN THEORY AND HISTORY 
2.1. Introduction 
 “…water as such is an unrecognizable object...water is anything but singular, 
it is a multiple object…” – Samer Alatout (2010) 
The above statement could simply refer to the physical state of water: as a liquid, it 
is recognizable only by the form of its container or carrier – as river, sea, lake, tap 
water, bottled water and so on. It could equally mean that water takes multiple 
meanings based on the environment in which it exists; the social context in which it 
is used; the power structures which shape its course; the cultural context which 
determine the nature of its use (Strang 2004). Water, then, carries with it a narrative 
of the geography in which it exists, allowing its interdisciplinary study as the ‘object 
of enquiry’ (Gandy 2011). This chapter explores some of the possibilities offered by 
water’s ‘multiple ontologies’ (Barnes & Alatout 2012) for versatile conceptualisation 
and how they can be used to understand nature-society relations in cities. In urban 
areas, water is one of the inevitable ways in which the idea of the natural 
environment and how humans relate to it are formulated, whether it is through 
technologies and economies of water access or the cultural imaginations and idioms 
of power that accompany its use.  
It has not always been evident that the term infrastructure could be an analytical 
category to critically approach these socio-natural relations. Urban water systems 
came to be termed infrastructure only when they achieved seamless networked flow, 
and the term then was little more than a descriptor of the material network that 
enabled the urbanisation of nature. Urbanisation, in these studies, has largely been 
understood as a ‘conquest’ or ‘metabolisation’ of nature through circulations of 
power, knowledge and capital. The first part of this chapter will explore this 
imaginary, where networked, centralised and universalised water supply came to 
represent the 20th century ideal of modernity. The second part of this chapter will 
look at the unravelling of this ideal and the emergence of an array of discourses like 
27 
the right to water, privatisation, market environmentalism and community 
participation. Conceptual preoccupations over this period included commodification 
of an ostensible natural resource and the privatisation of an accepted public good.  
In Geography, this binary view of water as a commodity or resource and public or 
private good was bridged by the framework of Marxist urban political ecology (UPE), 
which has since been the most influential and overarching approach to the study of 
urban water systems. It conceptualised water as a ‘hybrid’ of social and natural actors 
metabolised through the circulation of capital, knowledge and power in the city. The 
notion of ‘flow’ and ‘circulation’ which are central to this theoretical framework, 
present significant limitations to water supply in the global south as this chapter will 
elaborate in its third part. This is not because of the absence of capitalist circulatory 
technologies, institutional structures or networks altogether in southern cities, but 
because of their continuously negotiated working, which from a UPE point of view is 
deemed ‘fragmented’ or ‘fractured’ circulation. The canon of infrastructure studies 
that has emerged recently through interdisciplinary interactions between 
Geography, Anthropology, STS and Sociology, however, focuses on the socio-
technical work that goes into the making of an infrastructural system (Carse 2012), 
whether it is steel and wire electric grids or the ‘social infrastructures’ of health or 
education. Therefore, rather than offer a theoretical framework to apply to the cases 
here, infrastructure offers an epistemology of approaching the relationship between 
nature, technology and society in a grounded manner.  
This thesis is concerned with water infrastructure in two very different cities across 
the global South and North, and how they relate to the global through their practices 
and imaginaries. But, as the roughly chronological review of literature in this chapter 
will show, colonial rule in the South and later, Euro-American influences in 
postcolonial development mean that water supply systems and their governance 
have long been globally connected, although this does not imply universal patterns 
or outcomes. While the broad sweep of literature presented here also serves to 
demonstrate the interwoven development of theory with history, it is important to 
keep in mind that contemporary urban water infrastructures may be shaped by ideas 
and events from multiple spatio-temporalities. After all, unlike in theory, the 
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everyday access and use of water as a physical ‘thing in the world’ (Helmreich 2011) 
often simultaneously straddles several imaginaries, contradictory discourses and 
flexible techniques of governance (Baviskar 1997, Valverde 2011).   
2.2.  Conquest of Nature 
 “The design, use, and meaning of urban space involves the transformation of 
nature into a new synthesis.” – Gandy (2003: 2) 
The dominant ideal of urban modernity is one where the networks that carry 
resources around the city remain invisible and follow a seamless circulatory logic of 
flow. The imagination of metropolitan life is ‘predicated on the technologies of the 
underground’ (Pile 2001: 269), which are in turn linked to the idea of the ‘conquest 
of nature’ in industrial Europe and North America. This, according to Maria Kaika 
(2005) is evident when the networks breakdown, revealing the ‘unnaturalness’ of the 
“intricate set of technological networks that transformed it [water] from a natural 
element into purified, commodified drinking water” (p. 4). The project of urban 
modernity, she argues, may be traced to the 17th century when the possibilities and 
attitudes towards the ‘taming of nature’ were coming together (p. 12).  
2.2.1. Negotiated modernity 
In the 17th century, the first system to pump water against gravity and supply to 
homes at a price had been built in Germany and then, in London (Tomory 2014). 
Before then, a conduit carrying water through gravity to the City of London was in 
place and ‘water bearers’ worked for some well-to-do houses fetching water 
manually from public sources. By the end of the 18th century, demand for 
convenience in obtaining water had already given rise to water companies delivering 
piped water inside homes (Jones 2013). The next important landmark in the journey 
of water infrastructure was the industrial revolution through which the city was fast 
becoming a site of deplorable living conditions, while its rivers became the source of 
disease and death (Kaika 2005). In response to this, in the later part of the 18th 
century, a sophisticated system of underground water supply was developed in 
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London, Paris, Berlin and New York (Gandy 2004, Salzman 2006). Of course, the 
process wasn’t as seamless and straightforward.  
Repeated attacks of deadly infections like Cholera, in the 19th century, precipitated 
investigation into water supply and sewerage mechanisms of the city. The slow and 
contested acceptance of bacteriology over the ‘miasma theory’ was accompanied by 
the meticulous and controversial construction of the celebrated Victorian 
underground sewers in London (Jones 2013, Hamlin 1992), creating a ‘hygienist’ and 
‘hidden city’ (Gandy 2004). A similar process in Philadelphia initiated water 
infrastructure reform in North America (Melosi 2000). This result, Gandy (2004) 
argues, cannot be contained within the narrative of ‘heroic urban history’ because 
the discourse of purification and moral reform that emerged could be attributed 
more to pre-modern religious sensibilities than to a progressive modernity per se 
(Jones 2013). Similarly, Haussmann era Paris, considered the ‘epitome of modernity’ 
was squeamish about letting human waste be carried in its great sewers. It resisted 
the onset of modernity in bathroom plumbing systems and struggled to rework its 
pre-modern beliefs about bodies and washing (Gandy 1999). Culture and religious 
morality existed in a continuous tension with capitalist industrial development, with 
any of all those factors influencing the outcome that we have come to know as 
inevitable modernist progress now.  
The London water supply system was one of the last to be centralised and 
municipalised in Britain. When cities like Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow and also 
Hamburg outside Britain had municipal water supply, London’s system was 
comprised exclusively of private corporations (Tomory 2014). The ‘network’ was a 
cacophony of pipes and connections criss-crossing the city, with adjacent homes 
often getting their piped water from completely different sources and companies 
(Jones 2013). Further, Joseph Hillier (2011: 37) argues, “It was not obvious that the 
constant system was better than the intermittent” which was prevalent until about 
1870.  The question of public or private, universal or differential, free or paid water 
supply preoccupied the London water sector for much of the late 19th century 
(Hassan 1985). There are accounts of this chapter in London history that portray a 
triumph of the welfare state over profit minded private companies (Porter 1998); and 
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there are counter accounts that credit the private companies with rational thinking 
in the face of political pressure (Hillier 2014, Sunderland 2003).  
The eventual centralisation and municipalisation of London’s water supply was, 
however, effected by a series of exigencies rather than an exclusively public health 
concern or profit motive (Hardy 1991; Gandy 2004). That the Victorian sewers and 
water supply systems were technologically capable for their time and have served 
the city well has lead to such a system becoming a ‘normative expectation’ for urban 
water supply (Hillier 2014). A parallel process of negotiation between state, society 
and private companies in evolving notions of water supply was observed in the 19th 
century in North America as well (Carroll 2012). What had till the 20th century been 
multiple ‘waters’ – water associated with different usage cultures and belief systems 
like mineral waters or well and piped waters - became ‘essentialized’ into a single 
monolithic commodity through networking and municipalisation (Hamlin 2000). But, 
the narrative of the inevitability of modernity, Marxist geographers have argued, is 
not merely a matter of simplifying history but a deliberate construction meant to 
trivialise water for the citizens of the global North (Kaika & Swyngedouw 2000). This 
‘accidental’8 flow of modernity did not quite continue into the colonial cities.  
The colonial governments, which built roads, railways, bridges and municipalities, 
were not as keen on leaving their mark in the colonised cities with universal, public 
water supply. Apart from the technical, economic and financial difficulties ‘inherent 
in the production of the bacteriological city’ (Gandy 2004: 368), the coloniser lacked 
interest in the intangible long term benefits accrued by universal and public water 
supply and sanitation as opposed to the direct trade links generated by transport 
infrastructure and the revenue necessity of administrative structure (Kaika 2005). 
Writing about the West-supported development of Greece, which at the turn of the 
century was in terms of political status more a part of the ‘orient’ than Europe, Kaika 
(ibid.) points out that the relative invisibility of underground pipes compared to 
                                                          
8 Michael Hebbert (1998) contends that London came to be the city it is today ‘more by fortune than 
design’ – stressing the ad-hoc, extraneous and evolutionary processes that shaped the city than 
visionary planning. Such a history, far from diminishing the city, gives it an organic and longer 
standing character, he posits. The same argument seems appropriate for the water supply systems 
that we’ve come to know as normal and necessary today.  
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mighty bridges privileged transport infrastructure. The project of modernising 
Greece, she contends, was the Western world’s way of legitimising its democratic 
roots. So, infrastructure was definitely a modernising tool; but, water systems 
weren’t the best exhibits of this modernity. 
2.2.2. Fragmented legacy 
The ‘infrastructure crisis’ that cities in the global South face today, thought to be 
temporary gaps in connectivity that would be overcome by planning, can be traced, 
in part, to: 
…the legacy of an incomplete modernity which rested on a brutal 
distinction between “citizens” who could lay claim to potable water 
and mere “subjects” who were left to make do as best they could. 
(Gandy 2004: 368) 
The fracturing of the colonial body politic was in contrast to the cities of England or 
Europe, which, albeit class divided, depended on a ‘militant working class to function 
effectively’. Culturally distinctive and a fragmented working class continue to be a 
feature of the cities of the global South. In the 19th century, Indian colonial 
presidencies were undergoing rapid industrialisation and urbanisation much like 
their counterparts in England. One such industrial city – Coimbatore, incorporated as 
a municipality in 1866 – required water supply desperately as it was fast becoming 
the centre of cotton mills and trade. But, the many projects devised for the city were 
dropped because of the high capital expenditure requirement (Saravanan 2007). 
Perhaps as a rebuke to the colonial government’s short-sightedness, it was after the 
construction of the first basic water supply system in 1931 that the textile economy 
of Coimbatore and the nearby Tirupur picked up at an unprecedented pace (ibid.).  
A similar narrative is told by Bombay’s water infrastructure history; despite the city’s 
rapid industrialisation, only basic water supply systems were constructed, without 
even a filtering mechanism. Combined with the city’s poor sewerage management, 
epidemics of deadly diseases like cholera were frequent and unmitigated (Klein 
1986). The political fragmentation mentioned above protected not only the coloniser 
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but also the local elites from such devastation (Lewandowski 1975), creating 
segregated ‘sanitary’ and ‘contaminated’ cities (McFarlane 2008b). The moral 
economy that drove much public health initiative in London, while very much present 
in Bombay or Madras were far less disturbed by the inequalities because of the easy 
‘othering’ of the unsanitary bodies (ibid.).  
The effect that colonial administration had on Indian rural or agricultural water 
management, on the other hand, is much more contested. Debates focus on two 
issues – whether there really was a clean break between ‘traditional’ water 
management and colonial planning; if that were indeed so, whether the shift was 
beneficial or devastating to Indian ecology and life. The vagaries of the Indian 
monsoon have always required engineering intervention from farmers and 
communities, who built systems of canals and tanks or a pattern of wells adapted to 
local conditions, in order to store water for the drier seasons and in the rainshadow 
regions (Naz & Subramanian 2010, Sengupta 1985). Colonialism introduced, in the 
words of Rohan D’Souza, a: 
“distinct hydraulic paradigm…which involved fundamentally realigning land 
and water in new sets of social, political and ecological relationships.” 
(D’Souza 2006: 625) 
Arguing that pre-colonial Indian society had ‘a significant technical sophistication’ in 
building irrigation systems for agriculture, Naz & Subramanian (2010), nevertheless, 
deem them essentially village level community organised organic projects; a view 
shared by the ‘new traditionalists’ of the present day environmental movement in 
India (Sinha et al 1997). This strand of environmentalism (see Agarwal & Narain 1997) 
contends that the traditional community managed systems worked on an inherently 
conservationist wisdom which was deliberately or ignorantly destroyed by the 
technical and administrative changes brought about by the British and the post-
colonial administration (Mosse & Sivan 2003, Sinha et al 1997). The hegemony of 
‘Western’ science, strengthened by colonialism, has also been blamed for the lower 
status accorded to traditional knowledge in post-colonial development (Sengupta 
1985).  
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On the premise of a ‘quantum leap in irrigation’ during the colonial era, as Naz & 
Subramanian (2010) put it, there have been debates on whether this change was 
beneficial to Indian agriculture, introducing a creative disruption (Stone 2002) or if it 
wreaked irreversible devastation on the Indian landscape (Whitcombe 1971). The 
colonial government has been held responsible for the ‘decline’ of the tank irrigation, 
especially by enacting the Kudimaramat or ‘voluntary labour’ act, which is considered 
simply euphemism for ‘forced labour’ (Mukundan 2005, Naz & Subramanian 2010, 
Sengupta 1985). But, this argument ignores the forms of coercion and power 
structures in the village communities which ensured a steady source of low-cost 
labour to maintain the canals and tanks (Sinha et al 1997). If the coloniser’s tactics 
failed to maintain the canals and tanks, it only means that their exercise of power 
was less effective than village hierarchies in coercing labour.  
The management of tank irrigation systems become important for urban water 
supply today as such tanks continue to serve south Indian cities like Chennai and 
Bangalore. Irrespective of the merits of the ‘traditional’ practices or the ‘modern’ 
systems introduced by the colonial regime, the idea of a paradigm shift between the 
two periods of history has been challenged. Nicholas Dirks (1986) suggests that 
cultural continuity among Indian societies and the peculiar British understanding of 
those continuities meant that the colonial regime changed far less than it lead us to 
believe. “Colonialism is no longer considered the great watershed it once was 
thought to be,” he writes (p. 307). The image of an unadultered pre-colonial 
community devastated by colonial rule may itself be an orientalist construction, 
influenced by our own post-colonial politics, reason Mosse & Sivan (2003). The first 
Prime Minister of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru, arguably betrayed his own 
post-colonial assumptions in unveiling his modernist project of building dams and 
bridges as the ‘temples of modern India’.  
2.2.3. Temples of Development 
Lauding large dams as ‘temples’ of the newly independent India represented Nehru’s 
vision of a state that was unfettered by its traditional past and whose ‘religion’ would 
only be modernism. However, he is reported to have regretted using that catchy term 
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to refer specifically to large dams, which would soon become highly contested9. The 
quote’s popularity, nevertheless, informs us of the imagination of modernity and 
development that prevailed in post-colonial India’s planning sensibilities. It was this 
imagination that was at work in the handling of water resources, primarily for 
irrigation and hydro-electric power generation.  
The primary shift observed in water projects from the colonial to the post-colonial 
period in India was from ground water to surface water and consequently, from 
hydrating dry plains to harnessing flood waters (D’Souza 2003a). As Ramaswamy Iyer 
(1998: 3198) puts it in his historical review, Indian water policy at that time was 
guided by the idea that surface water that flows into the sea is simply ‘wasted’. For 
this reason and a matrix of factors including the Fabian socialist Nehru’s influence, 
the rise of the United States as a global power and the awe it inspired through its 
Tennessee Valley Authority damming project, the seduction of technology to a new-
born nation aspiring for food security, and the sheer boldness of mega-infrastructure, 
large dams became symbolic and strategic in the blueprint for development and 
water management in independent India (D’Souza 2003a, Bottrall 1992).  
This was a phase that the countries of the global North had gone through in the early 
parts of the 20th century, and the countries of the South were following in their post-
colonial phase (Biswas & Tortajada 2001, Kaika 2005). As Karen Bakker (1999: 210) 
reasons: 
“…large-scale water development is a ‘peace time’ resource, whose 
development is dependent upon an international perception of internal 
political stability.” 
The term that she uses for mega water projects, ‘hydrodevelopment’, not only 
conjoins water with development but also references the short form for hydro-
electric power - that is ‘hydro’. Development of nations as well as the power of 
generating the modern amenity of electricity was codified in water. The word ‘water 
resources development’, Iyer (1998) points out, is indicative of the planning attitude 
                                                          
9 Guha, R. (2005). ‘Prime Ministers and Big Dams’, The Hindu. Available at: 
http://ramachandraguha.in/archives/prime-ministers-and-big-dams.html 
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towards water – to harness water using technology for the development of nations. 
Building dams represented building nations (Kaika 2005, Roy 1999), but not for long. 
The welfare state and its function of engineering large scale water infrastructure 
would be put to test in the 70s and 80s, following a series of controversies on water 
quality in the global north and a series of protests against large dams in the global 
South. 
2.3. Volatile water 
Post-war years in Europe, North America and Australia saw the emergence of water 
quality, closely following efforts at fluoridation of public water supply. In the 
wartime, addition of chlorine to water as a method of disinfection had been 
established, despite the negative association of chemicals as potential weaponry in 
destroying enemy bodies. Interestingly, at least in the UK, fluoridation initiatives 
carried the agenda of saving on dental health costs for the National Health Service; 
savings were sought to be achieved in one welfare service by public investment in a 
different welfare scheme. But, attempts at fluoridation by municipal authorities in 
London drew protests on overreach by the welfare state, infringement of democratic 
rights through ‘compulsory medication’ and the nexus between chemical companies 
and government (Jones 2013, pp. 140-160; Wright 2009). It was also the time when 
the post-war consensus of Keynesian planning was coming apart, thanks to the oil 
shocks and stagnation of economic growth in the 70s. With legacy infrastructure that 
hadn’t caught up with growth, disruptions and failures in water supply had started 
becoming common (Rydin & Thornley 2003, Wright 2009). Even then, the policy 
response was the Water Act 1973 which consolidated the previously local council 
governed water supply into Regional Water Authorities (RWAs) directly under the 
national government (Bakker 2001, Buller 1996). The RWAs were also in charge of 
overall water resource management in their respective basins, in contrast with the 
act of 1963 which had separated these two functions especially to avoid conflict and 
ensure environmental protection (Jordan 1977) . In this situation, Rachel Carson’s 
(1962) Silent Spring-inspired environmentalism started playing a part in public 
discourse (Jones 2013, Rydin & Thornley 2003: 52).  
36 
The introduction of European regulations on water quality brought to the fore a lack 
of such directives in the existing British policy framework. Public trust in tap water 
started waning, especially as indignant responses to European directives on water 
quality emphasized the non-fastidiousness of the British rather than assert existing 
safety measures (Wright 2009). The tensions in the British policy position was 
eventually sought to be settled through the privatisation of the RWAs in 1989, 
encouraged by the Reagan-Thatcher wave of market economics and the privatisation 
of other public services as well. One of the unique characteristics of the water sector 
in Britain today – complete privatisation including ownership of assets but with a 
complex and heavy regulatory framework – can be seen as a consequence of the 
simultaneous spread of neoliberal ideology and increasing pressure on 
environmental regulation from the European community (Rydin & Thornley 2003: 
59). Meanwhile, large dams and mega water projects were increasingly becoming 
controversial in the global South.  
Even in the Nehruvian era, when high modernism was said to have prevailed 
unfettered by political opposition, dam construction wasn’t as prolific as it is thought 
to be; the country’s complex administrative framework and more importantly its 
federalism slowed down planned projects with inter-state riparian disputes and 
local-national jurisdiction differences (Khagram 2004: 1-12, Wood 2007: 56-87). 
Organised opposition to individual large dams had started from affected villagers 
even in the 1940s, sometimes under the leadership of local units of the Congress 
party, which would come to plan these projects in independent India (Khagram 2004: 
36). But, it wasn’t until the 1970s that a sustained movement putting forth a 
persistent critique of the modernist project itself emerged, with the Silent Valley 
project in Kerala and the Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save the river Narmada 
campaign) in the north west. Significantly, these movements were not localised but 
rather transnational and pressurised international funding agencies to withdraw 
support for the dam projects concerned (Khagram 2004, pp. 33-65; Wood 2007).  
The influence of Silent Spring (Carson 1962) and the ensuing American 
environmentalism was felt even in India, especially as the then Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi, for all her other excesses, was known for her progressive views on nature 
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and conservation (Greenough 2003). One of those excesses, the ‘Emergency’ which 
suspended civil rights for two years, had brought to the fore political activists not 
aligned by ideology but by principles of humanism or Gandhian thought. It is these 
ideals that guided the movements against big dams and environmental activism, in 
general (Wood 2007: 132). Dams, which submerged thousands of villages in the 
process of ensuring water security and energy sufficiency, came to be called ‘tombs’ 
rather than ‘temples’ (D’Monte 1985). Even though the modernist project of building 
mega-dams stood discredited, the idea of engineering water infrastructure or what 
D’Souza (2003b) calls ‘supply side hydrology’, even at a large scale and cost, is still 
prevalent in policy and practice. The latest example is the massive river-linking 
project or the inter-basin water transfer that had been shelved but revived in the 
early noughties (Misra et al 2007). That the cities are far from reaching a target of 
universal networked water supply (Gandy 2008) and that the groundwater reserves 
that have served them well so far are getting depleted or polluted (Naik et al 2008, 
Rodell et al 2009, Somasundaram et al 1993) legitimises these projects.  
Rather than deem mega-projects fundamentally flawed, blame has been placed on 
the way they have been implemented by a flawed centralised state and attention 
turned to the governance of water (Mollinga 2005, 2008). This turn in water policy 
coincided with the advent of the Reagan-Thatcher neo-classical economics or what 
we’ve come to know as neoliberalism, which constructed a lasting critique of the 
welfare state. Consequently, the past two decades have seen the emergence and 
critique of four interconnected discourses on water supply – privatisation, right to 
water, market environmentalism and community management. Importantly, these 
ideas were now increasingly global more than defined national governments.   
2.3.1. Changing beliefs 
Given the growing acceptance of ‘state failure’ in managing water, especially in the 
global south, international development institutions and local governments 
advocated that private corporations take up urban water provision – a move for re-
privatisation (Bakker 2007, Goldman 2007). The United Nations Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG), which adopted in 2000 to “Halve, by 2015, the proportion 
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of the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic 
sanitation”10, also proposed private sector involvement, since financing those goals 
required a global flow of private capital (Winpenny & Camdessus 2003, Kurian 2010). 
Supply side solutions and mega-projects which prepare for a growing demand are 
still justified based on this discourse (Bandyopadhyay et al 2002, Vedachalam 2012). 
Goldman (2007) posits that the MDGs actually represent a goal to capitalize access 
to water, making hundreds of millions in the global south ‘dependant’ on private 
companies for their water. The surprising consensus at the turn of the century on 
privatisation of water across governments, he argues, cannot be explained by 
straightforward economic or technical rationale. It takes a slow bureaucratic and 
political process of working with local governments, NGOs, think tanks, civil society 
organisations and media to bring about an ideological acceptance of the private 
corporation as the ideal supplier and manager of water (ibid.). This process, as Karen 
Coelho (2010) observes, was called ‘reform’, ostensibly referring to a corrective 
process aimed at the erring state institutions which had failed in their mandate of 
providing water to citizens. This had started not with outright transfer of ownership 
to the private but with a change in the institutional structure of urban water 
authorities, which became autonomous executive bodies severed from the elected 
governments.  
In practice, it may not actually matter whether water resources are managed and 
households supplied by a state department or a private corporation. As has been 
pointed out by researchers studying the global south, universality and social equity 
were never realities even under public water supply; it is often the case that 
commoditised water is available free of cost, if informally, to the urban poor while 
public water remains inaccessible (Anand 2011, Loftus 2005). The language of 
commodification or commoditisation has also been found to be inadequate as the 
very act of abstracting water from the environment and supplying it in consumable 
form through pipes, buckets or trucks are acts of commoditisation (Bakker 2007, 
Page 2005). If commodification is supposed to refer to the commercialisation of 
water, that is quite independent of the private or public nature of the supplier (Castro 
                                                          
10 UN Millennium Development Goals, available at: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml 
39 
2008). What is of concern, as Erik Swyngedouw (2009: 40) puts it is the 
“corporatization of water service delivery companies and the imposed requirement 
for profitability and ‘full cost’ recovery”. It is in response to this that ‘right to water’ 
campaigns started up around the world, arguing that the treatment of water as an 
‘economic good’ was fundamentally at odds with this basic human right (Bakker 
2007).  
The special ‘human right’ status to water is predicated on its un-substitutable 
necessity for human life and the requirement of water as a pre-requisite for other 
rights like food and life. Theoretically, it has been built on the framework of Amartya 
Sen’s (1999) influential capabilities approach, which advocates the provision of basic 
infrastructure to all in order to ensure human freedom (Mehta 2006). This freedom, 
according to Sen, translates to development. In its basic goals, then, right to water 
echoes the United Nations’ and other development agencies’ views on water 
provision. This, in effect, is not really incompatible with privatisation. Nor does it 
challenge even commercial pricing sufficiently for there is no conceptual dissonance 
in guaranteeing rights to an economic commodity, especially when it happens to be 
a natural resource. Unsurprisingly, the UN, development agencies, national 
governments and private companies have found it unproblematic to engage with this 
campaign and co-opt them into their own goals (Bakker 2007). Sultana & Loftus 
(2012) mount a critique of the ‘right to water’ framework on two counts. One is its 
focus on the ‘individual’ and neglect of social inequalities and structural injustices in 
water access, quality and quantity. The second is its unwitting anthropocentrism 
disregarding the ‘rights of water’ (ibid.). 
In an attempt to balance the concerns of ‘right to water’ and ‘rights of water’, the 
water sector has turned to what has been called by a variety of epithets such as 
‘market environmentalism’ or ‘neoliberalising nature’ or ‘green neoliberalism’ 
(Bakker 2005, Goldman 2007) in the global north and south. The main problem, 
according to this doctrine, is the presumption of water to be a ‘free natural resource’. 
If users did not have to pay, at least very much, for their water, they would not hold 
it in any value and hence lead to its scarcity, the logic of this argument goes (Goldman 
2007). The market is purported to be the most effective allocator of resources; 
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hence, pricing mechanisms and efficient technologies are expected to take care of 
sustainability of urban water supply (Bakker 2005). Differential pricing was advocated 
as a means to ensure that water wasn’t wasted by consumers and to penalise over-
use. Based on the assumption that the urban poor would never consume large 
quantities of water, such a pricing was expected to bring about social equity too 
(Rogers et al 2002).  
Critics have pointed out that this, in fact, meant augmenting supply only for those 
who can pay for it and that hasn’t stopped the depletion of water resources in peri-
urban areas (Coelho 2010, Janakarajan et al 2010, Ruet et al 2007). In one of the most 
well-known cases of water access, the constitutional ‘right to water’ in South Africa 
was ruled to be unaffected by a differential billing mechanism of the water supplier, 
which disproportionately affected poor and black communities (Bond 2012). Market 
environmentalism trumped right to water or as Bakker (2001) argues, efficient 
distribution has replaced equitable access as the goal of modern water supply. But, 
in the two decades since she concluded so, the dogma has been slowly unravelling in 
favour of community management or decentralisation of water supply.  
2.3.2. Disrupting binaries 
The global push for privatising water management and supply was premised on the 
private sector’s capability to pump finance capital into large scale infrastructure, 
which was deemed necessary to meet the MDGs and connect millions in the global 
south to networked flow of water. However, it became increasingly clear that private 
companies did not have a record of investing of their own accord in long term 
infrastructure, especially in the water and sanitation sectors (Armentia & Cisneros 
2009, Hall & Lobina 2006). Private companies, despite being free to charge for water 
supply and recover the ‘full cost’ incurred to them, were discovering that it was just 
not a service that could be profitable (Swyngedouw 2009). They were certainly not 
achieving development goals of universal water access (Prasad 2006). The private 
sector was becoming unwilling to invest in water and the public sector incapable of 
doing so (Gandy 2011).  
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In this situation, campaigns that voiced for a ‘community’-centric water management 
became better heard. This campaign is many pronged insisting on varied strategies 
like decentralisation of physical and administrative structure (Baviskar 2004), 
community participation or stakeholder engagement in large scale projects 
(Bandyopadhyay et al 2002), community managed small scale projects or full-fledged 
community ownership and planning of water use (Morse 2000). Importantly, these 
strategies are also expected to work towards the objective of ‘sustainability’, which 
the previous phases of civil engineering for quantity and chemical engineering for 
quality have overlooked (Barraqué 2003). In this formulation, the dichotomy 
between the progressive ideals of equitable water access and environmental 
conservation is bridged, at least in theory. Apart from re-opening questions of 
whether water is a resource, right, commodity or public good, it also brought forth 
the question of what exactly was meant by community.  
In the global south as well as the north, centralised schemes of water management 
incorporate local level ‘stakeholder’ participation. These stakeholders can range 
from resident welfare associations to global water policy think tanks and they 
arguably do not necessarily espouse democratic ideals and even circumvent elected 
bodies (Baviskar 2004, Page 2003). The stakeholder consultation or participation 
process works more for the purpose of reinstituting a public character to water which 
is managed and supplied as a commodity by private or corporatized utilities. Whether 
the participating bodies truly represent the ‘public’ is debatable and that is why 
defining the concept of ‘community’ becomes important. Anxieties about the 
community are heightened when it is not just a participating body but the owner and 
manager of water resources.  
Building on Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) work on the ‘commons’ as a model for sustainable 
resource use and the moral argument of collective solidarity, case has been made for 
community owned and managed water resources from across the world (Bhasin 
1997, Nemarundwe & Kozanayi 2003, Potkanski & Adams 1998). Within the UK, the 
case of Wales is well known for its restructuring of privatised industry into a 
consumer cooperative (Morse 2000). But, this, Bakker (2003) argues, is in line with 
the previous policy of commercialisation as it takes water farther from public and 
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democratic accountability. Equally, the pitfalls and inequalities of community come 
in the way of an ideal commons. Lyla Mehta (2001), controversially, picks the Kutch 
region in Gujarat, a potential beneficiary of the Sardar Sarovar Dam protests against 
which have transformed much of the debate around mega water projects in India, to 
demonstrate the inequities built into traditional and community managed systems.  
The idea of community, Mosse (2008) contends, is often based on a flawed ideal of 
pre-industrial harmony rather than a progressive process of collective mobilisation. 
Additionally, it may simply be a prop in the continued withdrawal of the state, leaving 
citizens to their own means. Community engagement then becomes a one-size-fits-
all prescription and fails to be a truly socially engaging project (Mosse & Sivan 2003). 
Insistence on community management and opposition to centralisation, Page (2005) 
writes, further little more than a narrow ‘parochialism’ that precludes possibilities of 
meaningful inter-regional ecological collaboration. In other words, it is a social 
strategy which doesn’t take into account the genuine ecological contingencies of 
water management and supply.  
As Bakker (2008) argues, the community management discourse has certainly 
disturbed the binary of public and private or commodity and resource that 
dominated water management debates. It widens the scope of conceptualising 
water in more than simply economic terms, bestowing cultural and symbolic 
meanings through the construct of community. But, the model still follows a 
managerial approach to water, advocating a change in human ownership as panacea 
to ecological and political issues that cloud the water sector. The objective of such a 
model, or even the debate between private and public water provision, is to arrive 
at the best method to supply water to societies, preferably in an equitable and 
sustainable manner. Much of the narrative above was also drawn up with this focus, 
albeit considering not just techno-natural factors (Srinivasan 2008), but including 
social and political factors, in what Mollinga (2008) calls a ‘political sociology’ 
framework of water resources management. Political analysis is only a means to the 
end of management of water resources.  
43 
So, for example, Govind Gopakumar (2009) argues that politics is strategically 
important to public-private partnerships in water management; in the same vein, 
Sridharan (2008) finds specific local political reasons why community management 
of water resources wouldn’t work in particular locations and Coelho (2010) finds that 
bureaucrats and engineers in public water authorities find ways to subvert the goal 
of universal water supply. Urban water supply issues are conceptualised on a case-
by-case with attention to the role of politics. In a way, the Marxist theory of Urban 
Political Ecology (UPE) is only formalising these piecemeal studies; but what it does 
is also offer a standard way to theorise urban water, even when there are no 
problems or issues to be addressed. It pays attention to politics, not in the specific 
local sense but in a structural sense, placing water in this ecology of politics and other 
urban processes. UPE jettisons questions of water management strategy and method 
in favour of examining water projects, events and processes as a part of the larger 
rubric of the metabolic city. The following section will explore possibilities and 
limitations in this theory.  
2.4. Political Ecology 
The term political ecology refers to a tradition of simply going beyond the techno-
natural processes usually associated with the study of nature, an aspect of which is 
water, and paying attention to the forces of society and culture on the environment. 
As anthropologist Kirsten Hastrup (2013: 60) points out: “People are never simply 
placed in the environment, they actively interfere with it, and increasingly so.” While 
the statement seems fairly evident, the need to make it arises from the arguably 
Western, post-industrial revolution practice of thinking about nature and culture as 
fundamentally different things (Anderson 2003, Gold 1984). Alienated from the 
natural environment by the city and industrial technology, popular imagination of 
nature came to be constructed by romantic poets and pastoral artists of the era (Gold 
1984, Mitchell 1994).  
Nature became an external thing, not a part of society, but to be conquered by man 
(Gold 1984). This conception of nature as a homogenous thing usually referred to in 
the feminine form and as the diametric opposite to human civilisation, has been, 
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rightly, criticised as racialized and gendered (Merchant 1980, Wade 1993). The 
environmental movement in the 1970s brought questions of nature to the doorstep 
of everyday living and a radical rethinking of this nature-society relationship began. 
This occurred partly in response to the continued calls for ‘preservation’ of nature by 
society, sustaining the notion of human separation and power from society (Castree 
& Braun 1998).  
Political ecology, far from being a ‘single body of theory’, as Paul Robbins (2012: 1) 
puts it, is: “…a number of independent trains of thought colliding in the field, leading 
to a remarkable synthesis in the late 1980s.” This section will go through a couple of 
key trains of thought that have resulted in the political ecology tradition as we know 
it today. While urban political ecology (UPE), developed by contemporary Marxist 
geographers, has been at the forefront in dealing with water issues in cities around 
the world today, it is the result of a long history of engagement with ecology and the 
environment in the 20th century, in the disciplines of sociology and geography. The 
following section will take a brief detour from water and dip into this history.  
2.4.1. Human natures 
Literary critic Raymond Williams (1976: 219-224) famously problematized the 
concept of nature by simply observing that it was ‘perhaps the most complex word’ 
in the language. Etymologically exploring the word ‘nature’ as it has been understood 
over time, he made a case for a social understanding on nature rather than its 
acceptance as a given truth. Further, drawing attention to the place of man (sic) in 
nature, he pronounces, “…the idea of nature contains, though often unnoticed, an 
extraordinary amount of human history” (Williams [1972] 2005: 47). This resonated 
in an era when the effects of human ‘pollution’ of the environment were beginning 
to be painfully felt.  
In the 1990s, when the idea of conserving nature had taken root all over the world, 
the pioneering works of art historian and literary theorist W J T Mitchell (1994) and 
anthropologist Barbara Bender (1993) further strengthened the social construction 
of nature thesis through their landmark texts on the politics of personal experience 
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and socio-cultures that influence our subjective understanding of nature. While 
these arguments were powerful in contesting romantic notions of pristine nature and 
its preservation, they weren’t addressing the issue of nature’s influence on society. 
In other words, they challenged the politics of environmentalism of the age but not 
the environmental question itself. Doing that required a shift in the tenets of 
sociology, which also took place in the 1970s.  
“When public apprehension began to be aroused concerning newly visible 
environmental problems,” write Catton & Dunlap (1978: 43-44), sociologists lost out 
to biologists in ‘highlighting the precariousness of the human condition’ because they 
had been trained in the world view of the human exceptionalism paradigm (HEP) 
which did not acknowledge that the human was not only a part of society but also of 
the natural world around. The tools used to consider the social environment were 
influential paradigms like Marxism which were found to be inherently 
anthropocentric and took for granted the abundance of natural resources or the 
human capability to generate abundance. Culture was deemed capable of 
conquering nature. So, Catton & Dunlap (1978) introduced the ‘new environmental 
paradigm’ following the then short tradition of environmental sociology, which 
initially engaged mainly with environmentalists and their impact on society 
(Morrison 1973) or used environmental issues to consider traditional sociological 
questions like class and inequality (Burch 1971).   
The total separation of social processes from nature had been a response to the 
racialized scientific paradigm of the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Hannigan 1995, 
Foster 1999), including social Darwinism and biogeography, which assigned 
ecological factors to the global geographical inequities of the time (Anderson 2003). 
It was aided by economic and scientific advancement in the Western world, which 
enabled society to live without worrying about its environment (Foster 1999). 
However, later accounts of environmental sociology reconciled the apparent lack of 
environmental considerations in classical sociological theories.  
John Hannigan’s (1995: 5) comprehensive book on the discipline begins with the 
acknowledgement: “the three major classical sociological pioneers – Emile Durkheim, 
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Karl Marx and Max Weber – arguably had an implicit environmental dimension to 
their work.” This was lost in translation in the derivative works done by their 
American interpreters, he (ibid.) writes. Catton & Dunlap’s (1978) attempt at 
ushering in a ‘new environmental paradigm’ did not catch on and sociologists 
preferred to look for environmental cues in the classics. Marx’s concept of metabolic 
relationship, they discovered, pointed in the right direction. 
Catton & Dunlap’s (1978) distinction between the anthropocentric and the eco-
centric would have made little sense to Marx, contends Foster (1999), because he 
was always referring to the dialectic between man and nature; it would not have 
occurred to him to centre his theory on one or the other. Marx famously criticised 
the construction of the London sewers, exclaiming: “In London . . . they can do 
nothing better with the excrement produced by four and a half million people than 
pollute the Thames with it, at monstrous expense” ([1867] 1976: 195). He was also 
responding to the devaluing of human waste as agricultural manure, thanks to the 
cheap import of Peruvian guano (bird droppings); thereby making the construction 
of water based sewerage systems acceptable for the city of London (Penner 2013: 
240-3).  
Marx’s theory on the modes of production deals not only with class but also with 
materials. In other words, it is not a theory of social relations only. It equally 
addresses human-nature relationships too (Buttel 2002). This relationship, he called, 
the ‘metabolic interaction between man and the earth’ (Marx [1867] 1976: 637) and 
capitalism was slowly destroying it. Foster (1999: 380) argues that the concept of 
‘social-ecological metabolism’ was central to Marx’s ‘entire theoretical approach’. 
Allan Schnaiberg’s (1980) concept of ‘treadmill of production’ was neo-Marxist in its 
critique of the forces of capital working to reproduce themselves at the cost of the 
environment. Environmental sociology has, subsequently, embraced Marx’s 
metabolism in its study of the sociological processes affecting human beings and 
nature (Dickens 2000, Clark & York 2005). It may be noted here that the divide 
between society and nature or nature and culture still stays, even though the human 
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is now accepted to be a part the natural world and a concrete theory has been 
evolved to study the relationship between them.   
2.4.2. A response and an agenda 
The emergence of a specific theory of political ecology indicates the existence of an 
apolitical ecology before it (Robbins 2012: 7). As discussed earlier in the chapter, 
there was a predominantly neo-malthusian strain to ecological studies and policies, 
which built a narrative of resource scarcity owing to rising populations, particularly 
in the global south. This argument, while appearing scientific, failed to account for 
the vast inequalities in access to and consumption of resources between small 
enclaves of wealthy populations and the global poor. It failed to account for the 
economic, social and political reasons why certain sections of the population couldn’t 
gain access to resources while others living in similar bio-geographical conditions 
could (Robbins 2012: 8). In short, the natural limits argument was not merely 
apolitical, but also unjust. It ignored questions of environmental justice and in doing 
so, was ‘implicitly political, since it holds implications for the distribution and control 
of resources’ (Robbins 2012: 9). Those implications were often anti-poor and resisted 
redistribution of power and wealth.  
In response to this, political ecology was formulated as a theory with an agenda, ‘to 
think morally about a relationship we had assumed was purely instrumental’, as Low 
& Gleeson (1998: 1) put it. They center questions of distributive justice not only for 
the purpose of dealing with resource inequality but with environmental degradation 
as well: “The question of justice within the environment is enfolded in the question 
of justice to the environment” (ibid.: 18). Moreover, since political ecology begins 
with a critique of global systems of inequalities, its analysis is automatically capable 
of accommodating studies at varying scales – from the village or city to nation states 
and international relationships (Gezon 2005). It is for this reason that Bryant & Bailey 
(1997) refer to the theory itself as third world political ecology, although distinct from 
a first world or global political ecology. The focus of this approach are the regions 
historically subjugated not only by global capitalism but also by ongoing state-led 
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interventions which could destroy their environment and pressurise people 
dependent on it.  
There are also broader definitions that bring within the fold of political ecology any 
study that applies the principles of political economy to questions of ecology and 
resource management (Blaikie & Brookfield 2015). They encompass the range of 
studies sparked by the coinage of the term in the 1970s by anthropologist Eric Wolf 
and journalist Alexander Cockburn, as a way to think about environmental 
degradation through the lens of resource access and control (Peet & Watts 2004: 6). 
But, they also share the common thread of discussing the dialectic between humans 
and nature in Marxist terms (Blaikie & Brookfield 2015, Forsyth 2013). Based on a 
materialist reading of Marx, political ecology builds on the hypothesis that: “the way 
humans interact with the world of natural objects provides a “base” upon which law, 
politics, and society are founded” (Robbins 2012: 46).  
Political ecology’s connection to Marxism doesn’t end there. In the words of Alain 
Lipietz:  
Political ecology, like the Marxist-inspired workers’ movement, is based on a 
critique – and thus an analysis, a theorized understanding – of the “order of 
existing things.” (Lipietz 2000: 70) 
 So, even if the objective of the study is not a political agenda of distributive justice, 
its disciplinary history involves a critique of the status quo. So, political ecology is, at 
once, a theoretical approach and an activist movement. Perhaps, the most 
controversial aspect of the theory is Robbins’ (2012: 12) statement that it carries a 
“normative understanding that there are very likely better, less coercive, less 
exploitative, and more sustainable ways of doing things.” Vayda & Walters (1999), 
one of the strongest critics of the practice of political ecology, find this presumption 
problematic and leading up to a populist environmentalism that always opposes 
projects connected to wider economic systems, in support of local or community-led 
to solutions.  
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Further, they lament the neglect of ecological considerations by an excess weightage 
given to political factors by political ecologists. Even the politics that is considered, 
they argue, often is only tangential to the environmental issue at hand and does not 
affect ecology directly. Political ecologists, according to them, in their counter-
agenda to cover the gap in traditional ecological scholarship, have over-estimated 
the role of politics in environmental change. Their criticism, often considered 
unsubstantiated or unwarranted (Walker 2005), has nevertheless been followed by 
some refining and redefining of the political ecology tradition (Paulson et al 2003). 
One such redefined theory specifically built for the context of the city is urban 
political ecology (UPE). It did not emerge as a response to Vayda & Walters’ (1999) 
critical article. But, crucially, it theorised nature and society as both being ‘hybrid’ 
and not entirely distinct from one another. This added a whole new dimension to the 
traditional political ecology school of thought; additionally, it gave equal agency and 
importance to political and ecological factors, at least in theory.  
2.4.3. Urban ecology 
The term ‘ecology’, originating from a biological, environmental and geographical 
context, has, in the case of political ecology, also come to mean the 
‘interconnectedness of political relations’ (Forsyth 2013: 3). Those political relations 
in turn are comprised of the interactions between various political systems with 
society and the physical or natural environment. So, ‘ecology’ could be used to refer 
to the complex interrelationships between the myriad of actors that form an 
environment – the physical and social actors. This concept was used in the urban 
context way back in 1925 by the Chicago sociologist Robert Park. In his formulation 
of what he called a human ecology of the city, he used the biological model of ‘web 
of life’ to study social interaction in the city (Park [1925] 1984). The city was said to 
have its distinct ecology comprised of infrastructure, people and its modes of 
production. Park’s colleague Ernest Burgess, with whom he published the influential 
text The City and put forth the concentric zone model of city planning and analysis, 
proposes that urban growth be thought of as: “resultant of organization and 
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disorganization analogous to the anabolic and katabolic processes of metabolism in 
the body” (Burgess [1925]1984: 53).  
Decades later, Marxist scholar David Harvey (1993: 28), by remarking that ‘there is in 
the final analysis nothing unnatural about New York City” and calling the city a 
‘created ecosystem’, brought the ecology metaphor back into use. He argues that 
cities comprise a ‘second ecosystem’, the deterioration of which, even if for the 
purpose of getting back to nature, would be an ecological disaster as well. Urban 
Political Ecology (UPE) is built on this thesis of urbanisation of nature, which in turn 
evolved from a critique of the fetishization of nature in modern cities. Swyngedouw 
& Kaika (2000) trace a historical capitalist and western tendency to idealise a pre-
urban natural and ecological past, vilifying the city as an ‘underbelly’ of humanity; 
whereas, in practice, nature is the dark and monstrous thing sought to be 
domesticated and controlled for the benefit of the urban. This world view has 
spawned the imagination of what Gandy (2003: 9) calls an ‘ecological city’, some of 
its features being: 
“…an aesthetic predilection for the ‘urban pastoral’ rooted in nineteenth-
century romanticism and a belief in the ‘curative’ and ‘regenerative’ powers 
of nature; and an elision between the ecological world view and a critique of 
modernist thought and design.” (Gandy 2003: 9) 
This imagination is rooted in the lack of appreciation for the social and physical 
processes that go into constituting an urban ecology and a view of nature as only a 
commodity. Swyngedouw & Kaika (2000) posit that nature is commodified in that it 
is transformed through social and cultural processes and introduced into market 
relations. But, the process being as efficient and invisible as it has become now (Carse 
2012), the commodity has become the only form in which nature is recognised and 
fetishized. As a political project to make visible the process through which nature is 
transformed into the city, urban political ecology proposes the study of the city as ‘a 
process of transformed nature’ (Kaika & Swyngedouw 2000: 121). The urban here is 
actually a process more than a place and it is nothing more than transformed nature; 
this essentially fuses nature and the urban and posits that ‘nature’ is not something 
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found outside the city as a commodity, but is a part of what makes the city work and 
exist.  
In this framework, water is clearly ‘emblematic’. Water is undeniably a part of nature. 
It is often sought out by city-dwellers for leisure and relaxation, within and outside 
the city. But, it is also a life-sustaining essential element that has been commodified 
for ages now for the convenience of consumers. It lives a double life – in household 
taps as a mundane everyday infrastructure and in rivers, lakes, rain and floods as a 
force of nature that is a source of beauty, pleasure, awe and danger. Conceptually, 
water is an apt subject of study for political ecology, especially given UPE’s concern 
with flows or circulation.  
Urbanization, while attempting to ‘render cities independent from nature’s 
processes’, in fact, ended up tying them into a ‘socio-spatial continuum’ (Kaika 2005: 
5). That 20th century ‘temple’ of modernity – the dam, for instance, connects the city 
to natural resources essential for its existence - water. It also weaves the city 
together with the vagaries of the natural environment in which it exists, including 
droughts and floods. This connection happens through ‘flow’– of water, electricity, 
transport, people and the material networks that carry this flow like pipelines, roads, 
underground tunnels etc. It is the ‘flow’ of nature, or rather, the capital and labour 
involved in creating hose flows, that makes ‘nature as infrastructure’ (Carse 2012). 
UPE characterises these flows as circulations.  
2.4.4. Circulations and metabolism of hybrids 
Metabolism, as we saw before, has been a defining principle of political ecology. Its 
original meaning being the bodily functions that sustained respiration, the word 
came to refer to the bio-chemical interactions between organisms and their 
environment even in the 19th century (Swyngedouw 2006). In the writings of Marx, 
the organism was the human being who used labour to interact with and transform 
the environment. In UPE, the environment is not necessarily the natural environment 
but the ‘created ecosystem’ of the city which involves everything from the flow of 
money into high value businesses and the flow of electricity in the grids to the flow 
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of garbage from homes to landfills. These flows have a circular logic. But, the word 
‘circulation’ in UPE derives from the industrial revolution notion of circulating money 
and material generating further wealth. Hence, Swyngedouw (ibid.) writes: 
In the process, ‘circulation’ became less and less identified with closed 
circular movement, but identified with change, growth, and 
accumulation….Accumulation is dependent on the swiftness by which money 
circulates through society. ( Swyngedouw 2006: 111) 
It is not difficult to see the similarities with Edwin Chadwick’s formulation of 
circulating waters for the city of London. High volumes and rapid circulation were 
necessary in keeping the circulation alive and in turn, keeping the city adequately 
hydrated and sanitary (Hamlin 1992). Circulation, for UPE, is metaphor and 
hypothesis, that the flow of water resembles and follows the flow of money. So, the 
urban is a metabolic process of circulations. But, what is the urban comprised of? 
What is the nature of the materials and organisms involved in these metabolic 
processes and circulations? They are all hybrids, argues Swyngedouw (2006), none of 
them being completely natural or social, all of them being a combination of the two.   
The concept of a ‘hybrid’ comes from the influential actor network theory (Callon 
1987), which is built on the premise that the human and the non-human elements in 
society, the animate and the inanimate, the social and the scientific – are all hybrid 
‘actants’ in a societal network of production and reproduction (Latour 1991). The 
actants: 
“…whether natural or social, could at any moment redefine their identity and 
mutual relationships in some new way and bring new elements into the 
network.” (Callon 1987: 93) 
So, water, pipes, supply infrastructure, the water authority, the household user – 
they are all hybrid actants in that they are a combination of physical and social 
elements. Their make-up is not a constant and is continuously changing depending 
on the biophysical and social situation at hand.  
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The project of actor networks came about as a way of introducing the non-human 
element into sociological study, on par with human and societal actors. The non-
human ‘agency’ is critical to ANT and less important is the notion of power that one 
kind of actors could have over others. UPE uses the idea of hybrids to describe the 
‘heterogeneous’ make-up of the metabolic processes that produce urban water 
networks; but, stresses the need to consider role of power in socio-ecological 
relationships as they are never ‘neutral’ (Swyngedouw 2006).  
2.4.5. Possibilities and limitations 
One of the significant contributions of UPE is its work on the growing acceptance of 
water scarcity, especially in cities, as a matter of fact. Deconstructing this ‘fact’, Kaika 
(2003) explores how a major water scarcity that affected Athens was used to 
establish an idea of ‘nature as threat’ and the need to take ‘emergency’ measures to 
deal with it. The measures ended up benefitting the interests of private capital. On 
the other hand, Giglioli & Swyngedouw (2008) show how a water crisis failed to 
precipitate any socio-natural changes owing to the entrenched hegemony of 
historical power relations. In a similar vein, Lyla Mehta (2003) argues that although 
water scarcities are partly natural and partly social phenomenon, the actions and 
processes that follow scarcities are largely politically motivated.  
These examples, which repeatedly present ecological crises as socially constructed, 
are indeed vulnerable to the criticism of Vayda & Walters (1999) that political ecology 
is really only politics with not much ecology in it. But, Nik Heynen, one of the early 
proponents of UPE finds it problematic that political ecologists are criticised for not 
taking ecological issues seriously “due to the common failure of ecologists to take 
urban issues seriously” (Heynen 2003: 981). He argues that the study of urban 
environments necessitates an explicit focus on social processes because:  
Humans metabolize nature, as do other living organisms. However, 
economic, political, and cultural processes govern human metabolization. 
Most dominant within these processes is capitalism. (Heynen 2003: 981) 
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UPE, interchangeably called Marxist UPE, is unabashed about its economic 
determinism, from the primacy it accords to the circulation of money over other 
social processes, to its analysis of environmental change through the prism of private 
capital. As Gandy (2003: 23) puts it poetically about the formation of what is 
considered one of the world’s ‘most modern’ cities, New York: “The landscape of 
upstate New York has been sculpted into a life-sustaining circulatory system through 
the interaction of flow of water and the flow of money.” When the very premise is of 
capital’s power to shape human and natural flow, it would be a paradox to refer to 
the agency of all the ‘hybrid’ actors and the ecology they comprise.  
Amita Baviskar (2003), studying environmental change in Delhi, finds that, in her 
case, it is neither ecological forces nor financial powers that direct it but the cultural 
imagination of local residents. She calls for a rejection of the economic determinism 
of political ecology and more research on the cultural politics of natural resources. 
Donald Moore (1993) puts forth a similar criticism of political ecology, arguing that 
the ‘macrostructural bias’ that it carries, blinds it to the possibilities of micropolitics 
and cultural construction of natural resources. This bias is evident in the assumption 
of ‘invisible’ infrastructure alienating urban residents from the socio-natural 
processes that produce their environment. In the cities of the global south, to which 
political ecology is supposed to be particularly relevant, infrastructure is hardly 
hidden and seamless. There is constant interaction with natural elements, like soil, 
water, floods and drought, although rapid urbanisation is changing these interactions 
(Coutard 2008).  
Alex Loftus (2009) contends that Harvey’s theory of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ 
fails to take into account the outcome of water privatisation across the global south, 
which is that water companies are finding it very difficult to profit from their 
business. This is important because much of the Marxist political ecology of water 
critiques the neoliberal logic of privatisation of water utilities. Loftus proposes a 
Foucauldian or Gramscian approach to political ecology; to theorise the urban as a 
socio-natural process and study the circulation of power rather than that of capital 
(ibid.). He also undertakes a feminist political ecology of water, where the power 
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relationships in the domestic and the neighbourhood setting are studied (Loftus 
2007). This study is about gendered labour and gendered circulation of money – very 
much Marxist themes – but at the micro-level and gender, not money, as the causal 
determinant.  
Given political ecology’s long history with Marxist ideas and its preoccupation with 
capitalism as a prime mover of society’s relationship with nature, a reworking of the 
theory eliminating this economic determinism leaves only tenuous and fragile links 
with the disciplinary tradition. A crucial point Loftus makes in his ‘rethinking’ of 
political ecologies of water is: 
“Another implication of the production of this late capitalist waterscape is 
that non-human entities such as water meters, flow limiters and money 
acquire an alien power over people’s lives.” (Loftus 2009: 964) 
Water meters and flow limiters are technologies of water that are becoming common 
in methods of governance, the apparatus of the state and hence, in society-nature 
relationships. The tools that UPE offers are inadequate to deal with this. Technology 
can only be one of the hybrid actors in the framework; UPE deals with this actor only 
through its ties with capital. Classical political ecologists assert that there is 
something distinctive about the capitalist character of or the power of money in 
socio-natural relations (Castree 2002). But, the chronological review above of the 
debates and discourses surrounding water, from the 19th century ‘bacteriological’ 
cities of Europe to the holy dams of post-independence India and the market 
environmentalism of the present, shows that water has repeatedly been at the point 
of intersection between science, technology and government. Technology has had 
an equally distinctive role in socio-natural water and where technology and water 
are involved, governance and government come into the picture. Since the first 
rounds of privatisation of water utilities started in the 1970s, studies of water have 
also focused on the role of private capital to the neglect of the state which continues 
to exert its influence on the sphere.  
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Marxist studies on the environment and nature have been opposed to the role of 
technology in environmental action, partly because technology has been co-opted by 
the market as its tool for environmentalism (Mol & Spaargaren 2000). But, 
technology itself does not easily fit into the traditional categories of right and left. 
This makes the position of the state or government also ambivalent in the interaction 
between water, technology and society. UPE’s macro-structural bias and political 
economic backing make it ill-equipped to deal with a multi-faceted state as well 
(Giglioli & Swyngedouw 2008). Consequently, the state becomes a monolithic entity 
in UPE’s formulation. So, the state’s interaction with society through the 
technologies of water requires an approach that goes beyond political economy. The 
following section will argue that a socio-technical view of water will achieve this 
purpose best.  
2.5. Technical, material and political 
Apart from technology’s interconnection with labour and capital, it is very much 
capable of affecting the everyday experience of water and planning for water supply 
in unpredictable and unintended ways (Latour 1991). Technologies and engineering 
have always had a role to play in the management of water and other resources 
(Mosse & Sivan 2003). But, with the rise of the environmental movement in the 1970s 
and plans for environmental mitigation, the role of technology has become a matter 
of contention and debate, exemplified by the debate between the ‘technologically 
optimistic’ (Hannigan 1995: 194) ecological modernisation theory and environmental 
sociology, which calls for a “fundamental reorganisation of the core institutions of 
modern society (the industrialised production system, the capitalist organisation of 
the economy and the centralised state)” (Mol & Spaargaren 2000). Inclination to use 
technology has also been criticised as depoliticising (Swyngedouw 2007) whereas the 
practice of using of technology has often lead to new forms of political contestation 
(Subramanian 2009, von Schnitzler 2008).  
In this context, it is productive to think of water and nature as not just socio-natural 
but also socio-technical (Bakker 2012). The technical need not necessarily be an 
external technology but also the flow of water engineered to fulfil a purpose (Mosse 
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& Sivan 2003). The material properties of water make such engineering uniquely 
possible. The materiality of water itself becomes a technical mediator.  
Traditionally anthropology has engaged with the material cultures surrounding 
water. It is based on the premise that landscape is “the symbolic environment 
created by a human act of conferring meaning on nature and the environment” 
(Greider & Garkovich 1994) and investigates the cultural meaning of water or a 
natural environment to the particular society. Veronica Strang (2004), undertaking 
an exploration of the material cultures of water in the midst of the environmental 
movement, suggests that society creates a cultural space around water, which is not 
subject to rational argument or action. Numerous studies have been done, along 
these lines, on the cultures of bottled water use (Opel 1999, Wilk 2006). The focus of 
these studies is on the meaning foisted by society on water or other materials 
associated with it like bottles, pipes or river-banks. They don’t consider the active 
materiality of water or the related artefacts themselves.  
There has now emerged a strain of anthropological and geographical work that, 
borrowing from science and technology studies, looks at the active mediation of 
water by technological artefacts. They emerged as a response to the critique of 
‘commodification’ in water anti-privatisation protests; their objective is to 
complicate the relationship between water, governance and society by looking at 
particular forms of commodification (Wagner 2010). These forms are created by 
mediating technologies – like water bottles, pumps, pipes or desalination plants. The 
studies in this cannon – on household plumbing (Orlove & Caton 2010), bottled water 
(Hawkins & Race 2011) or water meters (von Schnitzler 2008) – lead to an analysis of 
macro-structures and issues like governance, sustainability, politics and race.  
The socio-technicality of water embodies structural and cultural politics concerned 
with its supply and use; it also generates some of them. As von Schnitzler (2010: 9) 
puts it, anthropology of water is: “is always already also an anthropology of  the  
(techno-)  political  projects through  which  water  is  mediated and that it in turn 
mediates.”  This approach, which is by no means restricted to anthropology but is 
adapted in geography, history and environmental studies too, suggests a politics 
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specifically connected to the technologies that mediate water and go beyond 
material culture’s view of water as a cultural symbolism. It also transgresses the 
Marxist tendency to place water as an actor that is manipulated by capital. In other 
words, water, as a socio-technical element, is not an ‘inert resource’ and not merely 
a ‘backdrop to conflict’ (Bakker 2012). It is bestowed with an active materiality and 
function in biological and social life that places it at the centre of governance and 
politics (ibid.).  
Its physical properties – like pressure, leaking, flow – are metaphors for how access 
to water is decided by a negotiated notion of informal citizenship (Anand 2011, 
Coelho 2006). The kind of heavy infrastructure required to withstand the vagaries of 
water in excess and scarcity, comes to represent metaphorically and practically, the 
dense web of politics and governance required to sustain the infrastructure and the 
power it projects (Bijker 2007). Studies of technologies of water have frequently 
discussed the role of the state in the socio-technical process. Technology and water 
are both subjects in which the state usually has political and strategic interest. A 
water pump could play a role in state formation just as a large dam could (Barnes 
2012). In turn, the state uses water technologies to exert its power and influence 
(Jones 2012, Selby 2003). Gandy (2004) and Kooy & Bakker (2008) have shown how 
water’s close connection to bodily hygiene and the technologies employed to achieve 
that were used historically by imperial governments to project civilizational 
superiority and to exercise social and racial discipline.  
The disparate set of studies, from which the socio-technical conceptualisation of 
water is drawn up above, present a platform on which to build a study of technologies 
of water. They also indicate an opportunity to theorise from below the relationship 
between water, technology and society. The socio-technical conceptualisation of 
water is relatively recent and the studies in that tradition do not follow a single 
theoretical approach. This opens up the possibility to use the unique materiality of 
water in a framework of the politics of technology. 
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2.6. Conclusion 
“Do we live in water cultures?” asks Wiebe Bijker (2012: 624) in an article on the 
conceptual benefit of studying society through the lens of water. Of course water has 
always been a necessary part of all societies and cultures. There is no particular 
reason why this would be the era of water culture. What Bijker refers to is the eclectic 
range of topics that an academic study of water was opening up for pursuit. 
“…societies will be better understood when the role of water is the focus of analysis,” 
he goes on to argue (Bijker 2012: 625). This chapter has attempted to see what water 
has revealed about societies over the past hundred or so years. It has also looked at 
how societies have viewed water over the time period and critically considered those 
conceptualisations of water.  
19th century Britain was in many ways the epicentre of transformative ideas on water 
and its role and utility in urban life. From there emanated the ideal that a centralised, 
municipalised and networked supply of piped water represented a clean and hygienic 
urban modernity. The primacy of engineering in water management was also 
solidified in Victorian London and passed on to colonial and post-colonial nations. 
While war time Europe encouraged chemical interventions to purify water, the post-
war Keynesian welfare states and post-colonial governments encouraged public 
investment in large scale water infrastructure. Water infrastructure represented an 
avenue for development and nation building.  
All of that, however, started unravelling in the 1970s with the withdrawal of the state, 
rise of environmentalism and the growing influence of international non-
governmental aid. Water was increasingly at the centre of the private vs public 
debate, which opened the conceptual dilemma of whether water was a commodity 
or a common resource; should it be free or paid for? When privatisation of public 
water utilities failed to achieve the desired results in many parts of the world, 
community management became widely discussed and advocated. Water became 
the poster-child of the commons. These developments were analysed by Marxist 
political ecologists who considered capital as instrumental in shaping socio-natural 
relationships.  
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Of recent, the central role of capital has been challenged by studies that take 
technology as the mediator between water and society. These studies also re-center 
the role of the state and government in the process and allow for an exploration of 
macro-structures as well as micro-politics. Water, in this case, is socio-technical, in 
that it is mediated by technology. It possesses an active materiality that shapes and 
is shaped by the technologies and socio-political processes. Water is at the nexus of 
technology, society and the state.  
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3. METHODOLOGY - REFLEXIVE ETHNOGRAPHY 
 
3.1. Introduction – Infrastructure as ontology and epistemology 
“That is invariably the case in the East; a story always sounds clear enough at 
a distance, but the nearer you get to the scene of events the vaguer it 
becomes.” - George Orwell on Shooting an Elephant11 
Orwell’s experience above of approaching an elephant may be familiar to anyone 
with a fieldwork component in their research. In contrast to the clarity of an 
academic hypothesis and meticulously prepared research schedules, the field is all 
blunt edges offering no easy starting point and more questions than answers. 
Interviews, on the face of it, are full of long-winded answers and contradictory 
narratives not addressing the question one started out with. Orwell’s conclusion 
about this being the case in the ‘east’, presumably, is only because that’s where he 
had encountered an elephant ever. My case studies were located in the global South 
and the North, but offered a similar experience in terms of muddling my hypotheses 
with discursive data and abstract narratives that often defied clear causation and the 
neat compartments of sustainable and unsustainable practices that media reports 
portrayed.  
Yet, this is the promise of opening the ‘blackbox’ of infrastructure (Latour 1999) – 
using its incredible complexity to unravel the minutiae of urban life while embracing 
its utilitarian pragmatism that may not confirm to grand narratives. To stretch the 
elephant metaphor further, a closer look at different aspects of infrastructure is 
bound to reveal contradictory features not tallying with the overall narrative one 
expected to find or started out with. How then do we make sense of infrastructure? 
Is it more valuable to conduct a close ethnographic study of one piece of equipment 
(De Laet & Mol 2000) or is it important to abstract the whole structure into maps and 
documents which could then become the researcher’s data (Carroll 2012)? Do its 
                                                          
11 Available at: http://orwell.ru/library/articles/elephant/english/e_eleph  
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materials and form tell a story about the social environment they function in or does 
the behaviour of institutions and engineers explain the way they came to be built.? 
These questions are complicated by what Brian Larkin (2013), in his seminal article 
on the politics and poetics of infrastructure, calls their ‘peculiar ontology’ of being 
“things and also the relation between things.” Focusing on the relations is often a 
study of the social and institutional environment that they are produced in, while an 
interest in their materiality or ‘thing-ness’ involves zooming into their constitution of 
particular events and social relations. However, scholars in geography and 
anthropology have found ways of straddling this duality and attempted to address 
the mutual constitution of infrastructure and their environments in their 
methodological undertaking. Epistemological and ontological musing on 
infrastructure can be traced back to Susan Leigh Star’s (1999) enduring work detailing 
an ethnography of infrastructure. She lists nine defining qualities of infrastructure, 
including ‘embodiment of standards’, ‘built on an installed base’ and the oft-
repeated ‘becomes visible on breakdown’, assuming the norm of working 
infrastructure being something that fades into the background, invisible for all 
practical purposes. This has, of course, been shown to be an untenable definition as 
scholars working in the global South have pointed out that infrastructures can be vital 
and affective in their visibility. Calling infrastructures as ‘lively’, Amin (2014) has, in 
fact, argued:  
“Nothing is more striking than the visibility and sound of housing, sanitation, 
water and electricity, streets and landscapes in the making. The unfolding 
infrastructure is the object of attention, the frame of values and affects, the 
grid of neighbourhood, and the matter of wellbeing, sociality and struggle.” 
(Amin 2014: 143) 
Indeed, empirically rich accounts of infrastructure are often those that focus on its 
use and acculturation, whether it is roads in Peru (Harvey & Knox 2015) or co-existing 
networked and household water systems in Tijuana, Mexico (Meehan 2014). While 
both these studies focus on specific infrastructural objects – one highway project in 
the case of Peru and three distinct systems of water use in the case of Tijuana – and 
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ask the same kind of questions, they draw from different methodological traditions. 
Harvey and Knox (2015), who are anthropologists, stick to their disciplinary practice 
of ethnography; Meehan (2014) uses what she calls household surveys, which are 
really in-depth interviews at the household level, in conjunction with historical data 
and documentary evidence. Exploring the use of infrastructure has also lead to the 
examination of so-called ‘informal practices’ in the global south and how they 
constitute everyday regimes of rule and authority (ibid., Ranganathan 2014). These 
studies, in drawing out a ‘sociotechnical coexistence’ (Furlong 2014) have been 
useful in challenging the predominance in STS-inspired studies to focus on Large 
Technical Systems (LTS) of the kind Star (1999) started out with.  
Star’s (2002) concern was primarily with information systems which work as 
substratum to a wide range of other processual areas like biomedical research, 
employment data and insurance claims. Contending that this underlying data is 
infrastructure in much the same way as pipes and power lines are urban 
infrastructure, she makes a case for a methodological approach based on the study 
of large informational data sets, like transaction logs or technical specifications, in 
order to ‘scale up traditional ethnographic sites’ and pay attention to the ‘effect of 
standardization or formal classification’. As she points out, it is not exactly possible 
to learn much out of “using fieldwork to stand and watch people punching keys and 
looking at screens.” (p. 108). In some ways, a seawater desalination plant, which is 
certainly no LTS, is similar. It is usually a series of tanks followed by an assembled 
structure of filters that continuously perform the function of reverse osmosis to 
output water free of its mineral and hence, salt content. Largely an automated 
process, there is little activity that is happening in the plant to inform the 
ethnographer of the social or material constitution of cities. Consequently, studying 
textual information generated around the desalination project, as in the London 
case, has often been more enlightening than ethnographic practices of interviewing 
and observation. But, the study of infrastructures needn’t be a choice between 
immersive observation into its ‘making’ or analysis of textual and numerical datasets 
about them. 
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It can be about the human work involved in their production, maintenance, use and 
socialisation (Carse 2012). As Star & Ruhleder (1996: 115) argue, “Analytically, 
infrastructure appears only as a relational property, not as a thing stripped of use.” 
So, for instance, roads are mobility for drivers, problems to be negotiated for canal 
diggers or the pedestrian, and variables to be incorporated for the city planner. 
Centring the human-technology interaction, this approach leads the investigation 
into the kind of work most associated with technological systems – engineering. 
Given infrastructure planning and construction often spans national territories and 
global flows of capital and knowledge, Larkin proposes a method for their study as 
whole systems where:  
“…ethnography might need to be conducted in government centers far from 
where the actual roads are constructed and might take into account 
politicians, technocrats, economists, engineers, and road builders, as well as 
road users themselves.” (Larkin 2013: 328) 
The thing about urban infrastructure is that their development and functioning are 
symbiotic with the cities in which they are located, cities themselves being intensely 
networked systems bringing together global, local, technological, social, 
governmental and engineering processes in everyday habitation. Cities are a “world 
thick with infrastructure” (Latham & Wood 2015). So, ethnography here needn’t be 
far away from where the infrastructure is, but can take into account the urban 
ecology – its affective materiality, everyday life, custom and public culture – as 
observational input, even while recording governmental or engineering practices and 
related documentation. In other words, it is possible to see infrastructures ‘like a city’ 
(Valverde 2011).  
Framed against totalising analyses of spatial organisation, like networked 
infrastructure planning for example, as technologies of discipline, Mariana Valverde’s 
(2011) approach of ‘seeing like a city’ pays attention to the pragmatic ways in which 
legal and governance techniques are often more ‘flexible, contradictory, and fragile’ 
than expected, thus ‘undermining’ themselves and succeeding in executing a 
particular political agenda only by ‘highly contingent reasons’. The flexibility or 
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contradiction in a given planning document could, of course, be there by design and 
aid in achieving its political intent. Nevertheless, the epistemology of ‘seeing like a 
city’ doesn’t presuppose that technologies of governance are necessarily tied to a 
political agenda. Translating this to the study of urban infrastructures would mean 
that plans and policies for their construction would have to be considered alongside 
the contingent situations in which they came or failed to be built. They can be 
conceptualised as relational infrastructures of urbanisation, supporting material 
infrastructures as well as the socio-political imaginations that they inspire (Picon 
2018). While not so perfect a phrase as ‘conduct of conduct’, infrastructures of 
infrastructure building would come close to explaining an articulation of power, 
scientific or otherwise, in cities drawing on contingent assemblages of urbanisation 
rather than governmental rationalities. That infrastructures can be both the 
foundation as well as the outcome, the cause as well as effect, is after all what makes 
their unique ontology (Larkin 2013). To this, it can be added that infrastructures are 
process as well as project, as the following chapters will attempt to establish.   
It is no surprise then that the complex urban character of infrastructure has naturally 
required interdisciplinary approaches and mixed methods that have characterised 
recent studies, especially in cities of the global South (see for eg. Björkman 2015, 
Usher 2018). A key figure that emerges in this body of work that can broadly be called 
the ethnography of infrastructure is that of the engineer. It takes seriously Latour’s 
(1987) call to follow engineers through society, as they go about socialising scientific 
knowledge in building and maintaining technological networks, their practice serving 
as conduit between state and society, and simultaneously constituting a structure of 
rule. Conceptualising engineering as a ‘hybrid socio-technical profession’ (Bell et al 
2011), these studies have been adept at showing how infrastructural projects are:  
“…provisional and contingent achievements that demand constant attention 
to maintain their connections, performances and parameters.” (Harris 2013: 
358) 
Study of engineering knowledges are nothing new to geography or any form of 
spatio-political analysis, of course. They have frequently been associated with 
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modernist practices of nation-building, rationalisation of space and control of 
populations, a phenomenon comprehensively historicised by Mitchell (2002) in his 
theory of the rule of experts. It is no co-incidence that many of these accounts of 
engineering modernity (Gandy 2008, Swyngedouw 1999) are set in the early 20th 
century in Europe or in the colonies, for the success in setting up networked systems 
in several European cities at the time had indeed brought to the forefront the giddy 
possibilities offered by engineering. However, there has been another strand of 
work, which complicates the modernising function of engineering by focusing on the 
theme of negotiation that dominates building and working of infrastructures. As 
historian Martin Reuss (2008), based on his work for the U.S.Army Corps of 
Engineers, asserts, “engineers often spend more time negotiating than building.”  
The negotiation itself has long been a function of engineering, though, as essays 
detailing the conflict-ridden construction of the London sewers have shown 
(Dobraszczyk 2008); with Hamlin (1992) even arguing that there was a distinctive 
group of engineers who wanted to follow an ‘anti-systems’ or decentralised 
approach to the London project. Interestingly, India’s sprawling metropolises appear 
to have been particularly inspiring to researchers studying the socio-technical role of 
engineers and their negotiated work (Anand 2011, Bjorkman 2015, Coelho 2006, 
Harris 2013, Ranganathan 2014). All five scholars cited here combine ethnographic 
methods of interviewing and observation with the reading of policy and project 
documents, accompanied by the inevitable inhabitation of infrastructure (Latham & 
Wood 2015) that comes with living in the city. These ethnographies are characterised 
by visual cues (Harris 2013, Ranganathan 2014) and personal interactions which 
reveal different things about urban infrastructure than the study of engineers in the 
global north or colonial cities (Gandy 2008, McFarlane 2008a) relying on exhaustive 
documentation and meticulous correspondence, often sourced from historical 
archives.  
This difference in approaches to studying infrastructure in the global South and North 
became clearer to me through the course of my own fieldwork. While the Chennai 
case offered little in terms of published reports, correspondence or policy documents 
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towards my analysis, there was opportunity for plenty of personal interactions 
followed up with proper interviews with officials at various levels and functions of 
the water governance apparatus. Additionally, the visible and multi-faceted nature 
of water supply in the city meant that I could draw on visual and even auditory cues 
as observational data; living in the city during the course of the fieldwork, I inhabited 
this infrastructure, engaging with its complexity and everyday practicality at the 
household level. Having lived in the same city before, but returning now after 
spending a few years in London, this experience constituted affective materiality that 
played a part in the critical lens I took to my analysis. So, the ethnography in Chennai 
was immersive and multi-sensory, and based almost entirely on personal interviews. 
In London, I was able to find plenty of published reports and documents relating to 
the desalination project and water management in general even before I embarked 
on fieldwork. But, there was very little scope for personal interactions or interviews 
following that. In many cases, the very availability of documentary material became 
reason to be denied personal audience with several officials. The limited access I was 
afforded in researching London’s water system may have, of course, had to do also 
with my positionality as an immigrant woman of colour, attempting to do social 
research on organisations that worked ostensibly in the realm of the technological 
and the scientific.  
Further details on how fieldwork was carried out in the two cities will be elaborated 
in separate sections in this chapter. But, before that, I will briefly sketch the research 
design and the rationale for it below.  
3.2. Research design – following connections through 
The study of infrastructures, as the brief review above has shown, have benefitted 
from applying ethnographic tools (Star 2002). The analytical techniques of 
ethnography, however, can be used in examining textual material as much as in 
personal interactions or field notes. A combination of the epistemologies of STS, 
geography and urban studies has shaped a versatile interdisciplinary method for the 
study of urban infrastructures that turns the intense complexity of cities into its 
source to excavate documents, individual accounts, institutional practices and socio-
68 
material relationalities.  This thesis is interested in the kind of knowledges and 
political formations that emerge around the construction of water infrastructure in 
cities. To this end, it uses the desalination plants built in Chennai and London as a 
recent infrastructural transition through which ecological, engineering and political 
processes could be explored in the cities.  
Both cities had a unified water supply and sewerage organisation, which – a quasi-
public utility called Metrowater in Chennai and the private multinational company 
named Thames Water in London – exert a powerful imagination of legacy, 
technological work and everyday domestic utility. They were, naturally, a key site of 
research, but not the sole or necessarily the most significant actor in the construction 
of the desalination plants. Following the trail of planning, regulation and consultancy 
leading up to the construction of the desalination plants resulted in a network of 
institutions, professionals and political influences - like political parties in Chennai 
and the Mayoral office in London – that were mapped out to be potentially tapped 
into during the course of fieldwork. Thus, the fieldwork was structured as a process 
of following engineering work through the city. That is, I would start with individuals 
in the water company and follow up on their institutional connections with other 
professionals or associate and opposing agencies in the construction of the 
desalination plants. This follow-up could be in the form of documents to be referred 
or a personal interview, usually. The vast number of institutions that are involved in 
the everyday practice of building, maintaining, using and socialising water 
infrastructures necessitated this network approach. But, they also reflected the 
fundamentally relational nature of engineering work and infrastructure making in 
cities.   
In Chennai, the desalination plants were also linked physically and in popular 
discourse to other hydro-social engagements, like the prevalence of reverse osmosis 
purification units in households or the coastal commons as an ecological resource for 
the city and its historical fishing communities. So, I followed these leads as well, 
conducting interviews with private sector engineers designing reverse osmosis units 
for residential and office buildings; and with coastal activists and residents. In 
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London, on the other hand, the desalination plant was linked back over and over to 
the regulatory and planning regimes for water in the UK. Even research and 
development within Thames Water only came up upon questions specifically 
directed towards a former head of research in the company; engineering or water 
management expertise too were seldom discussed except in international trade or 
development conferences. Water engineering and management, then, emerged as a 
network of practices and social relations in both cities than as entrenched belief 
systems, knowledge or as calculative technocracy.  
In using ethnography to trace these connections, McCann & Ward’s (2012) 
techniques to study policy assemblages and what they term a ‘mobile’ urbanism have 
been highly useful. Rather than the traditional ethnographic idea of a ‘bounded’ site, 
they argue that it is important to adapt techniques of ‘following’ to do empirical 
justice to the theorisation of cities as relational and assembled. This has precedence 
in anthropology’s use of multi-sited ethnography to bridge the discipline’s founding 
binaries of ‘local’ and the ‘global’ (Marcus 1995). So, the techniques of ‘following’ 
usually applied to transnational movement of people, including experts (Larner & 
Laurie 2010), can also be applied to ideas, things and indeed policies or technologies, 
all of whose movements could also be interconnected. But, in following 
infrastructural development in Chennai or London, it would be unrealistic to practice 
immersive observation in all the institutions and sites it networks through. This is 
where interviews, which are considered ‘staged’ and ‘scripted’ encounters in 
traditional ethnography, become a particularly useful way of getting access to 
powerful individuals and institutions who are not used to being in the social 
researcher’s gaze (Peck & Theodore 2012). Thus, in adapting to Geography’s shifting 
concern towards agents of what Ananya Roy (2012) calls ‘middling modernism’ and 
‘cultures of circulation’, the critical value of different ethnographic methods are also 
altered.  
‘Following’ the ‘things, metaphors, stories, and conflicts’ relational to the 
desalination plants (McCann & Ward 2012), 90 interviews were conducted in Chennai 
and 35 in London, some of them repeated ones with participants who were inclined 
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to interact further. They were all anonymised using a simple coding of C1, C2, C3  (see 
Appendix I-C) and so on for Chennai; and L1, L2, L3  (see Appendix II-C) and so on for 
London, the numbering being largely random. Since my participants’ professional 
capacity was often as relevant to the argument as their comments, any interview text 
cited is always preceded by a brief introduction to who said them throughout the 
empirical chapters. Typically, interviews lasted half an hour to an hour; in Chennai, 
the interactions always gave me an opportunity to observe the work, and 
professional and social interactions of my interviewee before and after the interview. 
In London, interviews usually came with reading assignments – documents and 
articles that the interviewee referred to and recommended I look up for further 
details. I have coded these using the same logic as that used for interviews with CD1, 
CD2 etc. (see Appendix I-B) referring to documents for the Chennai case and LD1, LD2 
etc. (see Appendix II-B) for London. I also attended a conference, two trade events 
and two social gatherings in Chennai; and four industry workshops in London. I have 
coded these along with field observations as ethnographic encounters with codes 
CE1, CE2, CE3 etc. (see Appendix I-A) referring to Chennai, and LE1, LE2 etc. (see 
Appendix II-A) referring to London. The list of ethnographic encounters in Chennai 
coincides with the list of institutions that had been mapped out while laying out the 
research design, whereas in London, it is the list of documents that reflects the set of 
institutions involved in water management. That is, my encounters with institutions 
of water governance was heavily mediated by published documentation in London.  
For most part of interactive work in the field, recording proceedings was either futile 
or not allowed, except in a small number of interviews in London. So, much of my 
research material is in the form of copious hand-written notes, some recording 
exactly what was being said and others jotting down the content of each sentence, 
along with significant gestures, sounds and keywords. My experience working as  
journalist in Chennai came handy in this mode of gathering research data. The politics 
and implications of this will be explored while explaining fieldwork in each city in 
further detail below. But, from a methodological standpoint, this meant that I was 
already interpreting oral and visual communication even at the time of interviews 
and other field activities.  
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Mediation of primary sources by the researcher is, of course, inevitable given that 
their very presence and positionality are capable of altering the kind of information 
conveyed. By the same token, whether the researcher is positioned with a recorder, 
a camera or a pen and notepad could influence the direction the interaction takes. 
Irrespective of whether I was permitted to record conversations or not, I always 
carried my notepad with me, given I needed to make field notes wherever possible. 
The ‘sites’ where I conducted fieldwork varied widely between the staid offices of 
Metrowater and government agencies, offices of private companies attempting a 
swankier look with white walls, cubicles and glass doors, conference or business 
centres located at the urban peripheries, fishing villages in Chennai and busy cafes in 
London. There was inevitably a lot of movement during fieldwork and limited time 
and space to set up ideal interview conditions. Thus, even recorded interviews 
sometimes had too much background noise, making my written notes quite valuable. 
In order to minimise the layers of interpretation that eventually goes into my 
transcribed records, I digitised handwritten notes at the end of each day; this also 
allowed me to add details I remembered from a particular meeting and juxtapose 
interviews with field observations for the day  
In Chennai, almost all my interviews were held in Tamil, which however always has a 
smattering of English in them. So, my notes followed the speech format by code-
switching between the two languages. My daily exercise of note-taking and 
transcription, then, also allowed me to translate according to context and tone of 
speech. So, for example the word ‘sustainability’ would always be referred to in 
English, with just one of my interviewees, a Marxist environmental activist, 
attempting to coin a Tamil equivalent. Words like ‘engineer’, ‘technology’, 
‘infrastructure’ and ‘supply’ fell in the same category. If the Tamil words for them 
were used, which was almost never, the meaning changes ever so slightly and this 
would be noted in my transcripts in case it became relevant to my analysis. ‘Engineer’ 
in Tamil, for example, would literally be someone who works with ‘materials’; and 
‘technology’ would be ‘industrial technique’. The most significant difference was 
between the Tamil and English words for the water company: in English it was the 
Water Supply and Sewerage Board, but became the ‘Drinking Water Board’ in Tamil, 
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more accurately reflecting the specific concerns of water supply in the global south. 
Even though conversations were entirely in English in London, my interviewees’ 
speech was peppered liberally with jargon, abbreviations and technical terms, which 
consequently featured more in my analysis of London than Chennai.  
The following sections will describe the fieldwork process in the two cities, its 
challenges and how my methods adapted to those. Despite an ideal of infrastructural 
ethnography involving unfettered access to sites of engineering and following 
engineers wearing hard hats, the reality of infrastructure making, especially within 
grey government offices, is different and needed a lot of compromise and reflexivity 
in my methods. The clear differences in the way I was best able to engage with water 
infrastructure in Chennai and London altered my analysis and comparative 
framework, which will be discussed in the final part of this chapter.  
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Table 1: Details of Fieldwork in Chennai and London. 
 
 
Total 84 
interviews
Metrowater Engineers: 14, Administrators and others: 4 18 interviews
Private Water 
Sector
Engineers: 7, Consultants: 3, Managers and others: 
5
15 interviews
Government 
Institutions
Dept. of Environment, Chennai Corporation, 
Former Mayor,Public Works Department,Municipal 
Administration and Water Supply Department
13 interviews
Coastal 
Residents
Adyar Estuary, Kattupalli (Minjur), Nemmeli 13 interviews
Water Users 9 interviews
Non-
Governmental 
Organisations
Care Earth Trust, Coastal Resource Centre, Human 
Rights Advocacy and Research Foundation
9 interviews
Others 7 interviews
Total 20 
documents
`
Total 39 
interviews
Thames Water Engineers: 3, Consultants: 2, Administrators and 
others: 3
8 interviews
Private Water 
Sector
Engineers: 2, Consultants: 12, Water Managers: 10 24 interviews
London 
Government
Former Mayor, Policy Researcher, Sustainablity and 
Resilience Manager
3 interviews
Others 4 interviews
Total 32 
documents
Chennai Fieldwork Details
Interviews
Documents
Documents
Interviews
London Fieldwork Details
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3.3. In the field  
3.3.1. Chennai – ‘information drought’, but conversation rich 
Location: Metrowater, Office of the Managing Director (MD). 
Time: Early in the fieldwork, Week 3. 
“Write a letter addressed to the officer and leave it with us. We’ll pass it on to 
him.” 
“Will you then contact me over phone with an appointment time?” 
“Sure.” 
“Or I could check with you tomorrow. What’s the direct line here? You know I 
could email you the request letter – that way, you can just reply to the email.” 
“No no, better write a letter on paper. We can’t be sure of emails.” 
Writing a letter of request to interview was a ritual repeated throughout my 
fieldwork in Chennai. Any government office I turned up at, I was met with the 
instruction: “write a letter”. I would sit at the desk of a secretary or colleague to the 
official concerned and write a brief explaining my project and what I expected out of 
the interview. I couldn’t just carry copies of a pre-written template as the request 
would have to be tailor-made to the specific official not only in terms of his role in 
the water supply system but also in terms of his temperament and relationship to his 
subordinates. There was even an occasion when my hand-written letter was typed 
out for me by an office assistant, correcting for what he considered the right way of 
addressing his boss with a request like mine. The emails I had sent in advance were 
not of any consequence either.  
This wasn’t simply a techno-phobic bureaucracy clinging on to the formal practices 
of an older era and its archaic hierarchies. After all, government offices had routinely 
started co-ordinating activities on WhatsApp groups and have been taking to Twitter 
to publicise their work. Emails may have arguably been a mode of formal 
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communication that was less used in Chennai’s institutions of water governance. Yet, 
the letter-writing demonstrated the deliberate employment of the cultural idiom of 
deference to perform the authority of the state. Having been a journalist from a 
newspaper going in and out of Metrowater a few years back, there was a marked 
difference in access with the change in my positionality. The way the institution 
presented itself to a reporter in the city and a student from abroad speaks for the 
process of boundary-making between state and society.  
The process of drafting the letter outside the door of each potential interviewee 
meant that the office staff were involved in it.  Typically, whenever I approached an 
engineer or administrator of some seniority, there would be a secretary or office 
assistant who would look for ways to turn down my request. In other cases, the 
officers themselves would ask for a letter to keep in their records. The first few 
interactions of this kind ended up being hostile because I was taken aback by their 
obvious desire to keep me at bay. But, I soon learnt that the initial wariness was 
followed by a mellower response from the secretary, who would lower his voice to 
advise me on how best to write the letter or approach the concerned officer so that 
he is amenable to respond and not refuse participation in my project. The 
micropolitics of these interactions also affirmed to me the value of my methodology 
– to engage with the everyday practices of infrastructure-making by drawing from 
ethnographic techniques of observation and interviewing. Sometimes, the means of 
collecting information said more about the politics of urban infrastructure than the 
actual data collected. It enabled me to observe work carried out in government 
offices, movement of people between and within them, and the subtext of official 
titles and hierarchies – who deferred to whom? What kind of files and maps were 
visible and how did they circulate around?  
Chennai’s water supply system, unlike London in the UK, wasn’t a part of a national 
or even state-level uniform system of water governance and policy. In fact, in policies 
relating to water or urban governance in Tamil Nadu, Chennai was always afforded 
an exemption or a separate section. This meant that the set of institutions that could 
be influencing water supply were spread far and wide, or take unexpected forms, like 
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the Tamil Nadu Water Investment Company (TWIC) or the local panchayats where 
the desalination plants were built. In order to navigate this institutional plurality, I 
adopted the method of ‘following’ connections, which has snowballed into my 
dataset. But, most of these institutions were either directly under or associated with 
the Tamil Nadu State Government, which Coelho (2004: 57) points out, had “a 
reputation for extreme paranoia about releasing information to the public.”  
This was indeed my experience in attempting to access any documentation or even 
information that was officially supposed to be published, for instance, the annual 
reports of Metrowater or the environmental impact assessment for the desalination 
plants. After repeated attempts to access some of these key documents, I had a 
decision to make about the kind of information I sought to obtain. The documents, 
some of which I eventually did get to see, might contain some clues about how 
exactly decisions related to desalination came to be made, whereas relying on what 
engineers and other professionals in the water sector told me in interviews and 
informal conversations would mean that I was getting to know their experience in 
working with water infrastructure. I decided that the latter was indeed valuable 
material on its own, considering that several of my interviewees were keen on talking 
discursively about various aspects of their work life, which painted a richly 
complicated picture of technocracy in Chennai.  
However, the official channels for interviewing key decision-makers and project 
engineers in Metrowater or other agencies didn’t materialise until halfway through 
the fieldwork. So, I took a leaf out of the methods in which water users often 
accessed bureaucracies for their civic issues – by contacting neighbourhood level 
officials like area engineers and ward councillors for Metrowater and the city 
Corporation. There were also two key NGOs who worked occasionally on water 
issues; they were able to put me in touch with Government engineers who they had 
found to be keen on engaging with socio-ecological issues of water in the city, within 
or outside the framework of their jobs. So, I started meeting those engineers in their 
area offices, from where neighbourhood level distribution was co-ordinated. While 
this told me little about the desalination plant itself, it said a lot about how water 
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infrastructure was spatialised and materialised in the city. But, some of those 
engineers also happened to be posted in projects and planning before their current 
role in distribution, and so were able to discuss their participation in the recent wave 
of infrastructure building for Chennai’s water supply. The neighbourhood level 
ethnography and attending conferences or trade events enabled me to also contact 
private sector engineers working with membrane technologies (of which reverse 
osmosis is one) as consultants and as building contractors installing household 
purification and recycling systems. What became clear through this initial part of my 
fieldwork was a wide range of engineering knowledges and roles that shaped the 
city’s socio-natures and environmental subjectivities in myriad ways. Even the 
project managers and administrators that I later interviewed officially often came 
from engineering backgrounds.  
Throughout the fieldwork, I had to keep adapting my strategy to fit with the 
circumstance and office situation at which I met people; so, handwritten notes 
became the most flexible form of recording data in this ‘on my feet’ approach to 
fieldwork. It was also a necessity in the second part of my fieldwork, which consisted 
of formal interviews with higher level bureaucrats in several Government agencies 
including Metrowater and other water management companies. Audio recording 
was uniformly denied in all these places; but the interviewees were keen to ensure 
that my notes were accurate and so, allowed me the time to keep writing as we 
spoke. 
Both desalination plants in operation in Chennai were under the control of the 
private company that built them. The Minjur plant was planned and built by a private 
company called IVRCL which formed a consortium named Chennai Water 
Desalination Limited (CWDL) with the Spanish companies Abengoa and Befesa for 
the purpose. Their agreement with Metrowater constituted what is called a Design-
Build-Own-Operate-Transfer or DeBoot model of public-private partnership. That is, 
Metrowater purchases water from the plant for a period of 25 years at the end of 
which the plant transfers to it. The Nemmeli desalination plant was built by VA Tech 
Wabag, an Indian infrastructure company that started its life as the subsidiary of the 
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Austrian company Wabag, but then was cut off from its parent business which it 
eventually acquired resulting in what its website calls a ‘reunification of the Wabag 
group’12. Their work on the Nemmeli plant was an EPC contract that simply involved 
a fixed-term contract to build and maintain the plant, with its ownership remaining 
with Metrowater. The plant was thus funded by Metrowater with assistance from 
the Tamil Nadu State Government and the Indian Central government (CD8, CD9). 
Since my ethnography focused on engineering practices in the city, it was simply 
impractical to pursue any interaction with engineers or other actors in the Spanish 
companies. IVRCL, by the time of fieldwork, had sold their stake in the plant, leaving 
only Wabag whose engineers still worked on the Nemmeli desalination to recruit as 
participants in my research. I was, however, able to use the local network of 
engineers to contact the plant manager at Minjur who could then let me visit the 
plant on her discretion.  
The spatiality and multiplicity of water infrastructure in Chennai meant that I could 
use the city as my ‘site’ to explore networks and stumble upon connections and 
participants during the course of my fieldwork. This fostered informal connections 
even though my positionality was firmly fixed as an outsider – a young(er) student 
from a university abroad – interacting with engineers who shouldered much 
responsibility in running the city. Yet, I would call potential participants on their 
phone for interviews and be invited over for a cup of tea, as long as I guaranteed 
anonymity, right away or within the week. My participants also took interest in my 
work wanting to know what I had gathered so far, what this has told me about 
Chennai and the sociology of its water infrastructure. This gave me the opportunity 
to discuss the wider discourses on water management and their opinions on them. 
This was in contrast to the London experience.  
3.3.2. London – Outside the sites of infrastructure making 
As a student at a central London university that does consultancies and internships 
with London’s resource governance, I had a few institutional leads to begin fieldwork 
                                                          
12 See: http://www.wabag.com/the-company/history/  
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in London. I started by participating at an international innovation workshop on 
sustainable water infrastructures held by UCL’s department of Civil Engineering. This 
workshop invited industry professionals, including from Thames Water, and included 
a field visit to the Beckton Desalination Plant as well as the pilot Recycling plant that 
was built during the 2012 Olympics. Subsequently, scanning UCL’s events calendar 
opened up several occasions to meet professionals in water governance with the aim 
of setting up further interviews. I also signed up for industry events in the city, two 
of which were very productive since they were focused specifically on water 
management in London and involved networking with the very engineers and 
consultants who were involved in planning for the Beckton desalination plant.  
Yet, these interactions developed into a longer conversation or an interview in very 
few cases. Sometimes, the workshops themselves and the discussions that happened 
in them were informative on their own. They provided insight into the matters of 
concern over which networking and exchanges happened between engineers, 
consultants and other resource managers. Building on the contacts I developed 
during this networking phase, I started emailing officials in Thames Water, the 
regulatory agencies and consultancies involved with the desalination project, 
exploring ways in which I could engage with them for my research. I would propose 
an interview or an informal conversation in their office so I could observe processes 
of decision-making and planning as I visited them. But, of all the interviews I 
conducted, only two were held in a working office, both in Thames Water’s 
headquarters in Reading.  
Partly because Thames Water was located outside London, most of my interviewees 
preferred to meet at a café or a meeting venue, like an office at UCL. These were the 
category of conversations that despite the recording, had too many external 
disturbances in the audio, leaving me relying on my notes to fil up the gaps. 
Interestingly, many of the interviewees in London were more comfortable with the 
recorder than with my persistent note taking. I expected to follow up on these 
meetings with a reciprocal visit to their offices, which was met with much lesser 
enthusiasm on their part. Engineers and professionals in London, unlike in Chennai, 
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seemed to be not used to the idea of answering lay questions about their work, much 
less being the subject of social enquiry. This, however, did not make them open to 
this novel exercise. I was constantly directed to published documentation and 
industry reports for questions on the everyday work that influenced approaches to 
water infrastructure in London. The availability of these documents, often in 
abundant volume but not always addressing the concerns of social research, became 
a block beyond which conversations didn’t proceed far. They also made meetings or 
interviews an exercise in my participant explaining to me how things worked, often 
addressing what they saw as my positionality of being a ‘researcher from India’. Once 
they had ‘given’ me the document or the information I asked for, there was nothing 
further to discuss.  
I approached the Greater London Authority (GLA) through its elected members and 
researchers, as that had been a site of contestation against the desalination plant. It 
also has committees for various functions of urban governance, including 
sustainability and resilience. Here, too, documents and reports were readily available 
even before I could get a chance to explain my research objectives. That I was given 
access to textual material by various sources – they were in any case usually available 
online with some diligent searching – did not, however, mean that it was possible to 
easily find any kind of information one was looking for. For instance, the public 
consultation in which then Mayor Ken Livingstone had given strong evidence against 
the desalination plant and Thames Water’s priorities was all but impossible to find. 
Requests to Thames Water and the GLA only redirected me towards each other. At 
one point, I was also told that they had made it available online and it was up to me 
to find it, despite clear messages in their online archives that older material tended 
to be taken down. Finally I stumbled upon it in the cached archives of the Newham 
Borough Council, to which the planning application was originally submitted.  
Another case was that of Thames Water’s older resource management plans, a 
statutory document that water companies in England and Wales are required to 
publish every five years. They are meant to be publicly available, but the company 
shelves the older plans, understandably because they are so extensive and 
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voluminous. After being told by several sources that the plans were already made 
public and so, I should be able to access them, I finally requested for the plans as a 
customer and got them sent to me by the company’s customer service. Eventually, 
as in the Chennai case, I had a decision to make about what sources I would turn to 
and how I would use the fieldwork experience to direct my research. 
In delineating their method of ‘following’ for a mobile theory of urbanism, McCann 
& Ward (2012) make a distinction between following people and following 
documentary evidence, the former being a way of way of observing practice and the 
latter of policy. In London, the reluctance of people to permit an observation of their 
practice left with me no option but to go the document route. Even ethnographic 
‘meta-data’ i.e. field notes that describe the ‘relational situations’ in which policy or 
practice happened, were more extensive in Chennai thanks to meetings and 
document collection happening mainly outside the spaces of infrastructure making 
in London. This is reflected for instance in the long list of ethnographic encounters 
(CE1, CE2 etc. - see Appendix I-A) cited in Chennai, in comparison to London, where 
it’s the documentary sources that form a longer list (LD1, LD2 etc. - see Appendix II-
B). It soon became clear that the nature of data gathered in Chennai and London 
were very different. Coding published documents and conference discussions 
brought up planning jargon and abstractions of infrastructural complexity rather than 
the processual narrative of the formation of networks and agencies that emerged in 
the Chennai case. These ‘certain differences’ (McFarlane & Robinson 2012: 767) 
between the two cities determined how they could comparatively interact with each 
other.  
3.4. An experimental comparison – shall the twain meet?  
Since the research data from Chennai was clearly far more extensive and 
ethnographic than that from London, and there were obvious limitations to 
comparing them as two separate case studies, I started thinking one city through the 
other (Robinson 2016a). That is, while considering a particular theme or problematic 
in one city – for example, climate resilience, it was useful to think about the form 
that this theme might take in the other city. It was also an exercise in eliminating a 
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normative ideal of what water infrastructure was supposed to be, and consider why 
one city did not do things the way the other city did. For example, my experience 
with timed water supply – for a few hours per day on specific days of the week – and 
the separation of drinking water from other water in Chennai inspired the question 
of why London would not consider doing that in emergency situations. To put it in 
other words, what actions were taken to make sure that London’s water supply 
always remained a system of continuous flow for 24-hours a day every day?  
My grounded ethnographic experience in Chennai frequently made it the city that I 
thought London through, thus inverting the traditional reference point of the city 
from the global North. This was also a function of the fieldwork design, which 
privileged an interactive ethnography often used to study states and systems in the 
global South, but less in the global North now. The epistemology developed at the 
beginning of this chapter and my previous research experience in Chennai had drawn 
me towards this method. But, using the same rubric in London prompted me to 
reflect on how methodological decisions were made often by the kind of information 
that a city made available to researchers; and how these decisions, in turn, 
determined urban theory that has for a long time “divided between analyses of 
wealthier and poorer cities in the wake of developmentalism.” (Robinson 2016b) 
Thus cities of the global South came to be centres of ‘southern theory’ (Tuvikene et 
al 2017) that focused on the ‘the specificity, distinctiveness or even uniqueness of 
cities beyond the West’ (Brenner and Schmid, 2015: 161).  
This thesis, in placing Chennai and London under a similar epistemological and 
methodological rubric, has attempted to avoid the binary of ‘universalism’ and 
‘particularism’ and instead engages in what Lancione & McFarlane (2016) have called 
‘experimental comparison’. In this form of urban comparison, the goal is not to arrive 
at a paradigmatic urban theory based on the comparison; nor is it to focus on the 
differences as an argument against urban theory. Instead, “it is an effort to reveal at 
the same time ‘interconnected trajectories’ (Ward, 2010) and differential patterns.” 
(Lancione & McFarlane 2016) Such an approach to comparison is experimental 
because its outcome is the development of “devices to orient further critical 
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reflection on the specifics of the cases.” (ibid.) The dialogue between the two cities 
here, thus excavates in each of them, processes that might not have been obviously 
visible in a singular case study or through the lens of established theory.  
By using a contextualised method of thinking, a set of themes that could be observed 
in different forms across the two cities was developed. Then, the textual material 
was coded again for descriptions of how the themes played out in Chennai and 
London. Tracing themes through the data, however, was a multi-step process. The 
fieldwork method followed a logic of connections and movement of people and 
things; so, the research data emerging from it could not be detached from the 
personal and situational context in which it emerged. A senior bureaucrat’s account 
of infrastructure development differed from that of a contracting engineer on a 
building project not only in content but also in the agency it carries. So, once the 
codes were established, the occurrence of specific themes were referenced with the 
source it came from. These source-theme combinations were then listed out and 
rearranged to trace a narrative of how the processes concerned materialised in the 
two cities. This was far from a neat list, and was more of trial and error of messy story 
arcs into which other accounts would then fit in, shaping an analytical chapter. In the 
data from London, the source mattered lesser because much of the research material 
was from official documents. In the end, the London case was more useful as a 
comparative exercise to excavate further out of Chennai than as a standalone study. 
But, the themes identified in London certainly present possibilities for further 
research, as the outcome of experimental comparison (Lancione & McFarlane 2016) 
is expected to be.  
The four empirical chapters that follow are thus organised into four major themes 
that emerged from this analysis, and contain further sub-themes.  
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Chapter Themes Chennai London 
4 Articulation of the 
state 
Distributed agencies and 
individualised authorities 
built over socio-material 
formations, for which 
urban infrastructures form 
a key site of articulation.  
A regulatory state for 
which water’s ability to 
be governed makes it a 
key thing around which 
technoscientific 
government can revolve 
5 Relationality of 
infrastructures 
Infrastructural expertise 
built over shared 
knowledges between 
urban residents and 
engineers, who negotiated 
multiple commitments in 
their daily work 
The figure of a British 
water expert constructed 
through urban 
imaginaries of London 
and its legacy and 
sustained by the practice 
of networking among 
water managers around 
the world 
6 Epistemologies of 
water engineering 
Multiple epistemologies 
following from the wide 
range of engineering 
disciplines that work on 
engineering – it is the 
interaction within this 
cacophony of voices that 
constitutes infrastructure 
The multiplicity of 
knowledges that go into 
infrastructure-making 
sought to be reconciled 
by an overarching risk 
framework 
7 Political 
contestation 
Coastal development and 
a politics of environmental 
identities 
Assertion of Mayoral 
authority by challenging 
the premise of water 
infrastructure planning 
from a discretionary 
position 
Table 2: Conceptual themes of comparative analysis between Chennai and London. 
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3.5. Conclusion 
Uncovering the blackbox of infrastructure, as I discovered during fieldwork, was a lot 
less revelatory and a lot more exploratory than I expected. Rather than a tidily 
packaged box that demanded only the curiosity and time of a researcher to unravel, 
it was a complex network of things and people that responded slowly to picking and 
prodding. It was partly through the work of analysing and knowing the multiplicity of 
networks that there emerged the form of an infrastructure at all.   Engineers and 
water managers  did this work, and by following them, my analysis has mirrored this 
networked ontology of knowledge production as well. By doing this, I was able to 
broaden the scope of what we understand as infrastructures to the negotiated 
everyday practice that enables water access and distribution in Chennai. But, the 
differences in the kind of data I was able to gather in Chennai and London significantly 
shaped my analytical conclusions as well. The documentary evidence that dominates 
analysis in London, thus revealed actions of boundary-making and the establishment 
of expertise or governing authority, whereas the Chennai side of the story revealed 
distributed agencies and shared knowledges.  Thus, the ethnographic basis of my 
methodology was better suited in Chennai where the work of infrastructure-making 
is visible in everyday practices and the city as the site of that process. The following 
chapters seek to encompass this divergence between Chennai and London within the 
structure and aims of the thesis by adopting the thematic structure outlined above.  
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4. MATERIALISATION OF THE STATE IN WATER INFRASTRUCTURES 
4.1. Introduction 
Six months after completing fieldwork in Chennai, when the city appeared to have 
taken a technocratic turn towards building modernist water infrastructure, there 
arrived a moment when analytical process seemed to fail in making the city 
knowable. Massive floods submerged many parts of Chennai over three days in 
December 2015, exposing its utter vulnerability and unpreparedness to hydrological 
whims.13 The city lacked not only the technological infrastructure or engineering 
capability to deal with the floods, but also suffered from the absence of any coherent 
political or institutional capacity to respond to this hydro-social crisis. Its fault lines 
opened up, Chennai looked far from any transition towards techno-scientific or 
administrative modernity. At the same time, conducting fieldwork in London, 
consultants, engineers and policy documents informed me that London, which 
already had universal water supply and sewerage systems, was building further 
technological infrastructure in order to be resilient and infallible. Slow in fixing 
massive leaks in its pipes which lead to loss of volumes of water, the city could, 
nevertheless, afford to simply access further resources, even if through energy-
intensive means, without suffering the devastating consequences like the floods 
Chennai faced for ignoring its floodplains. There was an ostensible story of contrasts 
between the global north and south; a disconcerting incommensurability in the way 
their infrastructures were imagined and understood.  
However, as it usually turns out with research, complexities and patterns started 
emerging in both cases through what Meehan et al (2013) call a ‘parallactic shift’ in 
focus. A parallax is an optical phenomenon defining apparent change in the position 
of an object, caused by viewing it from different lines of sight. Meehan et al (ibid.) 
use this concept to explain their approach to objects as standalone forces shaping 
power, stressing that this is meant to develop a robust theory of objects in 
                                                          
13 “A wrong call that sank Chennai”. The Hindu. 10 Dec 2015. 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/chennai/chennai-floods-a-wrong-call-that-sank-the-
city/article7967371.ece  
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constituting power and not to discount the effect of social relations. Thus, the “shift 
is more parallactic than it is paradigmatic.” (p. 2) A parallactic shift in this thesis, then, 
indicates a different position to view water infrastructure from, rather than a 
negation of the material differences between how water is accessed by citizens in 
Chennai and London, or how desalination, an energy-intensive technology 
potentially harming marine life, might be distracting from sustainability issues in the 
two cities.  
Taking a cue from Ferguson’s (1994) question about development schemes in Africa, 
this chapter sets out to ask what else such infrastructural projects achieve apart from 
ordering arguably unsustainable techno-natures. After all, Chennai Metrowater as 
well as Thames Water are aware of the long term maintenance and ecological issues 
with the water network in their respective cities, but are slow in tackling them. 
Desalination plants do very little to address massive leakage issues or loss of riparian 
systems which work to recharge the ground water table and drain the city. Yet, they 
face minimal opposition or political resistance to their plans. In Chennai, where water 
supply is closely connected to the elected Government (of the federal state of Tamil 
Nadu) – where two parties of similar ideological and policy persuasions alternate in 
power. The year after the floods was a general election when for the first time the 
ruling party was elected to power, despite the incredulous images of devastation 
transmitted across the state. Water, suddenly, didn’t seem to be an electoral issue. 
Or the political role of water was changing. In London, despite the unique model of 
complete privatisation of water in England & Wales, water managers insisted that 
the desalination plant was built in response to government regulation.  
Informed by empirical material, which points towards a narrative of shifting 
governance structures rather than policy debates on sustainability, this chapter will 
consider the mutually constitutive relationship between water infrastructure and the 
state. Karen Bakker contends that water is biopolitical because:  
“…modern governments seek to optimize both water resources and our 
individual water-use practices in order to secure the health and productivity 
of the population. This control is enacted through formal regulation, but also 
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is self-policed through the cultural aesthetics of health and hygiene, ranging 
from entire bodies of water to individual human bodies.” (Bakker 2012: 619) 
But, what if it wasn’t water that modern governance seeks to optimise, but rather 
the sustainability of the institution of governance itself? It is this structure of rule 
sustained through the governance of water that is identified as the ‘state’ here. The 
state is not necessarily a coherent reified entity comprised of professional politicians, 
publicly funded institutions or governmental actions. Here, it is a rubric through 
which to understand power relations in water governance across the global north 
and south. Water’s materiality and the unpredictability of its embeddedness in the 
cityscape allow for little by way of precise control. Knowledge or the lack of it with 
respect to water’s behaviour in the future necessitates planning and regulation, 
which makes it an object of governance (Carroll 2012). So, water wields its agency to 
shape the state because of its capacity to be governed (Meehan et al. 2013).  Water 
infrastructures are, then, a materialisation of a specific kind of state power – techno-
political in Chennai and regulatory in London.  
The first part of this chapter (section 4.2) will explain the analytical approach it takes 
to understanding the state and its relationship to urban water. In both cities, there is 
a form of ‘stateness’ (Painter 2006) that is mutually constituted with water 
infrastructure. But, the specific forms this stateness takes are distinct as well as 
emergent. That is, the state is transforming and shifting along with urbanisation and 
environmental change in the city. The rest of the chapter is divided into a section on 
Chennai and another on London. Section 4.3 discusses the Chennai case in three 
further subsections. 4.3.1 explains how the multiplicity of institutions that govern 
water supply in the city occupy a geographical spread that gives insight into how the 
state is materialised in the city. The movements and interactions between people 
that establish the institutional structure of water management in the city, however, 
follow an interconnected logic of patronage and administrative welfare. 4.3.2. 
explains the importance of popular politics to the development of water access 
mechanisms in the history of Tamil Nadu; this history, in turn, can be used to 
understand the techno-political articulations of the contemporary Tamil state. 4.3.3. 
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follows a chronological order tracing how the idea for the desalination plant 
originated with the growing importance of Chennai and a broader urban agenda in 
the political and imaginative geography for Tamil Nadu. It traces the series of 
institutional interactions that achieved the construction of the desalination plant 
back to the logic of connections described in 4.3.1. Section 4.4. discusses the London 
case as one of technoscientific governance built around a governable object, which 
in this case in water. For this, it uses the concept of the boundary object drawn from 
science & technology studies (STS) (section 4.4.1.). In section 4.4.2 the shifting and 
alternating conceptualisations of water that have defined the regulatory path taken 
to govern the privatised water industry in London, is explored. Section 4.4.3 then 
uses two maps published by the UK Environment Agency to illustrate how these 
shifting conceptualisations have been instrumental in constituting the regulatory 
state as well as building techno-material infrastructures like desalination.  
4.2. Assembling the urban state 
In the late 1980s and 1990s, privatisation of urban water supply started in western 
Europe, from where successful companies started investing in water around the 
world, including major cities of the global south. This wave of privatisation was built 
on the premise of ‘state failure’ to provide equitable, efficient water access 
particularly to the urban poor, according to global developmental organisations led 
by the World Bank. The state, here, was equated to public institutions and elected 
governments that had largely been in charge of water supply as a public 
developmental necessity during the post-war and post-colonial years in the global 
north as well as the south – the so called ‘state hydraulic’ paradigm (Bakker 2003b). 
However, as delineated in chapter 2, this was followed by a ‘strategic retreat’ (Bakker 
2013a) of private companies from water provision in certain unprofitable 
geographies, which were usually the very areas that the state had failed to provide 
for and privatisation was expected to address. The public sector then had to step in 
to sustain water supply systems around the world with the private sector settling in 
to ‘shallow expansion’ focusing on specific profitable technologies or projects, and 
liaising often with city authorities rather than national governments (Pierce 2015). 
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What emerged at the scale of the city is a complex apparatus of public and private 
institutions as well as professionals, in which the figure of the state was not easily 
discernible. This complexity was encompassed, instead, by the framework of 
‘governance’ which also became a lens from which to analyse the inequities and 
problems of water supply to large cities (Bakker et al. 2008).  
Yet, in Chennai and London, where the desalination plants are excellent examples of 
the private sector’s ‘shallow expansion’ through discrete localised projects, there 
emerges a figure of the ‘state’, defined more by its idiom of rule than its position of 
public accountability or funding. London’s water supply is part of the famous UK 
model of privatisation where water resources, supply and sewerage are entirely in 
private hands for effective management. Chennai’s water utility Metrowater, though 
still a government institution is parastatal – a type of organisation that became 
popular during the 1980s following structural reforms in several countries (Bakker 
2013b). Its management is tied to the Tamil Nadu State Government but its 
operations remain autonomous in theory and have largely been ‘corporatised’ for 
full cost recovery. But, their positioning in the public-private spectrum and the basis 
of their finances do not preclude these institutions from being a component in the 
apparatus of the state that is constituted with and through processes of urban water 
supply. The construction of techno-natures, sustainable or otherwise, then becomes 
an urban articulation of the state, in material and discursive form.  
The biopolitical role played by water in the rationalisation of modern cities has been 
of widespread interest to urban scholars, who have focused on technologies and 
practices by which the relationship between bodies and space have been moulded in 
the exercise of power (Gandy 1999, Kooy & Bakker 2008, Osborne 1996). There isn’t 
an ostensible state in these studies, but political technologies or governmental 
rationalities inscribed through an institutional apparatus. If Foucauldians were 
interested in power beyond the state and preferred to discuss the 
‘governmentalisation’ of the state (Rose & Miller 1992)  - the logic of operability on 
which modern government is built – for state theorists, this opened up a 
conceptualisation of the state beyond the institutions and acts of government. 
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Building on Foucault’s observations on the étatisation or statisation (Barry, Osborne 
& Rose 1993) of society, the scope of analysis can be extended to the myriad forms 
and discourse that the state takes in everyday operationalisations of rule (Carroll 
2009). Ethnographic explorations of the state have done exactly that in excavating 
rationalities of rule in practices of bureaucratic and social institutions, within and 
without the encompassment of the nation-state (Corbridge et al 2005, Ferguson & 
Gupta 2002, Sharma & Gupta 2009).  
For Corbridge et al (2005: 10), who are concerned with how the subaltern see the 
state and work with it amidst reforms towards decentralisation and localised 
governance, “encounters with the state are produced by dispersed state agencies 
amid conditions of greater or lesser institutional scarcity.” Ferguson & Gupta (2002) 
situate the state in the symbolic realm of ‘cultural production’ arguing that states are 
“constructed entities that are conceptualized and made socially effective through 
particular imaginative and symbolic devices.” But, in cities, especially those that are 
political capitals or nodes in global economic flows, there is an abundance of 
institutions at the local and national scales. Yet, a similar ethnographic approach to 
studying predominantly public provision of urban water has been more useful in 
delineating informal and strategic means by which water access is negotiated 
between residents and water professionals (Anand 2011, Bjorkman 2015, Coelho 
2006). All of this raises the question of what exactly the state is. If individual members 
as well as disparate institutions have been effectively implicated in the logic of rule, 
yet allowing for ‘informal’ practices to prevail in urban public works, then what 
purpose does the state or its conceptualisation serve? What distinguishes state from 
society and why is that important?  
Outside the Foucauldian canon of governmental rationalities, there have emerged 
sophisticated understandings of the state that still recognise its dispersal in society; 
these elude a categorical grouping of their own because of nuanced differences in 
their approaches. A common theme they feature, however, is of state-making as a 
process of boundary-making (Carroll 2012, Das & Poole 2004, Mitchell 1991). It is 
consistent with the ‘statisation’ of society that the state becomes harder to pin down 
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and for that very reason, the ways in which it is distinguished gains political 
significance. But this is not a fixed or uniform outline of the state. As Mitchell (1991) 
suggests:  
“…the elusiveness of the state-society boundary needs to be taken seriously, 
not as a problem of conceptual precision but as a clue to the nature of the 
phenomenon. Rather than searching for a definition that will fix the 
boundary, we need to examine the detailed political processes through which 
the uncertain yet powerful distinction between state and society is 
produced.” (Mitchell (1991: 78) 
Das & Poole (2004: 7) do fix this boundary at the rule of the law, which would then 
decide the “practices and spaces that were seen to form part of the state and those 
that were excluded from it.” Whereas the act of making and sustaining that boundary 
produces the state’s legitimacy for them, Mitchell argues that it is ‘a mechanism that 
generates resources of power’ (Mitchell 1991: 90).  
The phrasing here is key - power is not accrued to the state as a reified entity, but is 
an outcome of the process, distributed among actors and institutions unequally. 
However, in attempting to bridge the ‘agency-structure’ conundrum of such a 
distributed mode of state-making, he conceptualises the state itself as only the 
“metaphysical effect of practices” that produces an appearance of structure (p. 94). 
This hypothesis, unsurprisingly, is not popular among scholars who have drawn from 
Mitchell (1991) for the state, if nothing else, is not an illusion (Painter 2006). Besides, 
the state, constituted through a shifting, continuous political process, doesn’t have 
to be a fixed structure, even if only metaphysical. It can be materialised (Carroll 2012) 
or embodied (Mountz 2003) through the very processes that constitute it. The state 
isn’t to be found as a separate structure elsewhere from the everyday life where it is 
experienced, but can be conceptualised as an assemblage of those very practices and 
things through which it is articulated.  
Joe Painter (2006) calls this ‘stateness’ in his seminal article on the ‘prosaics’ or 
mundane practices and everyday discourse that add up to the widespread 
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experienced effects of the state, which he observes in ‘industrialised countries’, but 
has been noted in the global south as well (Ferguson & Gupta 2002, Gupta 1995). 
What is uniquely significant about his theory, however, is the notion of ‘prosaics’, 
which is drawn from Bakhtin’s philosophy of ‘dialogism’ and ‘unfinalizability’ to 
highlight “the unsystematic, the indeterminate and the unintended” (Painter 2006: 
763) aspects of the state.  Whereas Mountz’s (2003) theory of embodiment 
attributes irrationalities to the humanity and belief systems of the state’s employees, 
Painter (2006: 762) asserts that, often, it is a ‘panoply of discordant voices’ (citing 
Campbell 1996) that assemble around particular issues in time and space to 
‘effectuate’ the state. When that issue is water, the agency and materiality of the 
substance and the technologies employed to access, use and manage it, are 
inescapable as ontology as well as analytical rubric.  
Following from the growing body of work in STS and Geography that study power 
and rule as functions of materiality, Carroll (2012) writes the history of the 
technoscientific state in California, where water was a ‘boundary object’ (Star & 
Griesemer 1989) around which science and government were constructed. In 2009, 
he cast the study of the state as cultural analysis, where culture was triangulated as 
practice, meaning and materiality (Carroll 2009). The culture he was interested in 
specifically was of science and engineering or ‘technoscience’; and how it socialised 
the idea or ‘meaning’ of the state into practice through material devices. In this way, 
the state was conceptualised as a ‘particular kind of society’ (Carroll 2012: 495). This 
framework accounted for material agency as well as human intent by allowing 
exploration of:  
“…how human intentions concerning problems related to water led to the 
design of various forms of material culture, such as levees, metering devices, 
and hydrologic maps, and how these became critical actants” (Carroll 2012: 
497) 
Whereas this classic ANT-inspired approach deems materiality to be an unintended 
consequence of human intention, Katie Meehan (2014) draws from object oriented 
philosophy to contend that water infrastructures are not ‘power-tools’ used by the 
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state to exercise power, but are themselves ‘well-springs of power”. She shows 
through everyday infrastructures of water access how objects “both coexist with and 
limit state power, resulting in variegated geographies of institutional authority.” 
(Meehan 2014: 215) However, through different philosophical routes, Meehan 
(2014) and Carroll (2012) arrive at identical conclusions about the state, with the 
former arguing that infrastructure building has not “so much centralized as 
concretized, cast in rebar and cement” state power (Meehan 2014: 223) and the 
latter deducing that the state “is critically built into and out of the 
environment.”(Carroll 2012: 495). Fundamental to such an understanding of the 
state is the concept of ‘technonatures’ which, as previously delineated, refers to how 
ontologically ‘non-humans of all kinds’ are involved in the making of socio-natures 
and how the epistemology of such a world is ‘technologically mediated’ (White & 
Wilbert 2010: 6).  
Techno-natures constructed by the intricate networks of urban water supply are 
found to be critical in constituting the state in Chennai as well as London. Their role 
as ‘objects of government’ is not dependent on the success of those constructions in 
ensuring social or environmental sustainability, but in assembling a structure of rule. 
As Whitehead points out:  
“While states have been criticised as either ineffectual, unjust, or even 
irrelevant managers of socio-environmental relations…[they] continue to play 
a significant role within a range of environmental issues at a number” 
(Whitehead 2008: 414) 
Since the environment is understood to be techno-natural, the politics of state-
making in them is techno-political. However, in the framework of technopolitics, 
instead of thinking of non-human materiality as a foil to human action, what if the 
state made use of the ‘force’ of objects in building its own spatiality and 
sustainability? For instance, as Pushpa Arabindoo (2017) shows in the case of the 
2015 Chennai floods, the widespread circulation of the statistical term ‘100 year 
flood’ and its conveniently literal interpretation by the government deeming the 
floods ‘unprecedented’ and a ‘rarest of the rare’ weather event, allowed for middle 
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class environmental subjectivities about the ecological fragility of Chennai’s 
urbanisation to be unchallenged. Thus, by skilfully converted the statistical 
abstraction of a ‘100 year flood’ into popular political discourse and environmental 
knowledge, the unpredictability of water’s force was constitutive of state power as 
much as its occurrence was caused by actions of society. This chapter finds that this 
is achieved through the daily work of the state and not just as response during 
exceptional events. Urban infrastructures and spatiality are constituted through 
constant negotiation between the state and unpredictable techno-natures, this 
unpredictability being part of how the state shapes its intent. If “our mastery of tools 
lures us into thinking we understand their total reality” (Meehan 2014: 217), the 
states presented here make no such claim, instead preferring to assemble and be 
assembled by infrastructures built on the unknowability of tools and techno-natures.  
It is partly the handy use of the word ‘assembling’ that makes the Deleuzian 
vocabulary apt in the analysis of states that are constantly remade around urban 
socio-materiality. Unlike the ‘actor network’ or to use John Law’s (2008) term 
‘material semiotics’, which doesn’t make explicit the intended action that leads to a 
provisional arrangement of human and non-human actors, the notion of the 
assemblage is easily imagined in the process of assembling. Typically, in the study of 
cities, assemblages are drawn from below – by illustrating grassroots movements and 
social formations that disrupt and modify central planning (McFarlane 2011). But, 
there is a case to be made for viewing the assemblage from above in order to attend 
to techniques of reterritorialization and scaling (Legg 2011), or a spatial re-
assembling of state power (Allen & Cochrane 2010). There is role for deliberation in 
the assembling and that which is assembled holds potential to act as a whole, if only 
provisionally. As Ian Buchanan (2015: 385) argues, “the assemblage is purposeful, it 
is not simply a happenstance collocation of people, materials and actions, but the 
deliberate realisation of a distinctive plan.”  
So, the theory of the urban state this chapter sketches is not about a moment in 
history when a new stable formation has risen from the ashes of an old order. The 
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state is, instead, conceptualised as an already emergent thing that is assembled and 
re-assembled through the techno-politics of water infrastructure.  
4.3. Chennai: urbanisation of Dravidian hydro-modernities 
4.3.1. Peopling institutional geographies of water 
Metrowater, the utility in charge of water supply and sewerage in Chennai, is 
headquartered in a sprawling leafy complex at the head of one of the city’s arterial 
and historically iconic roads – Mount Road (CE1). Built to connect the colonial bastion 
of Fort St George with St Thomas Mount, the highest point of the city in its then 
southern end, the 13 km road splits the length of the city centre into east and west; 
coastal and inland neighbourhoods. It has since been renamed Anna Salai in honour 
of C N Annadurai, a respected leader of the Dravidian movement whose political 
offshoots continue to rule the political discourse and governments in Tamil Nadu. 
Annadurai’s statue also adorns the start of this road, while Fort St George continues 
to be the seat of the Tamil Nadu State Government, even though a massive complex 
meant to house the legislative assembly and secretariat was built nearby in 2014 
(CE3). In a city prone to such political symbolism, the location of the Metrowater 
offices is not just a matter of hydrology. The office building itself is non-descript, with 
greying blocks of 7-8 storeys clustered in right angles housing neatly maintained but 
sparse offices facilitated with hastily added air-conditioning units. It used to be the 
site of one of the three sewerage pumping stations that served the colonial city and 
so the bylane in which it is inset is called ‘pumping station road’.  
The name, in its banality today invokes a fountainhead of stateness (Painter 2006) 
that is materialised through water infrastructure in the city. As a transmission 
engineer never tired of saying:  
“Whether water flows or not in the city, the back and forth between our MD 
[Managing Director] and the secretariat never ceases.” (C15)  
He used the Tamil word for secretariat which literally translates as ‘executive 
headquarters’, making his comment all the more insightful of the action of 
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assembling the state that the movement of people and files did, aided by the 
proximity of the institutions. Twice, while interviewing the MD (C51), the researcher 
accompanied him on his short commute to the secretariat or walked him out on his 
way there. Such embodied work done to establish and sustain connections between 
different institutions governing the city, including its residents, frequently ‘peopled’ 
(Simone 2004) water infrastructure in Chennai, as the chapters here will 
demonstrate. Abdoumaliq Simone, employs the term ‘people as infrastructure’ to 
describe  “a specific economy of perception and collaborative practice” (ibid.:408) 
that exists among marginalised urban residents to enliven and provide for everyday 
life in the city. While the infrastructures discussed here are not marginalised in any 
sense in Chennai, they demonstrate how the state and other institutions of ordering 
employ similarly provisional and informal practices of infrastructure-making. Much 
like with the concept of ‘informality’ which despite its origins as a way of 
understanding marginalised urban lives, has now been shown to be a feature of even 
ordering cities around the world (Tuvikene et al. 2017), the idea of ‘peopling’ is 
reinterpreted here to show how such techniques are used by urban actors at all 
levels, in order to imbibe political claims into material forms through flexible 
connections of people, objects and institutional structures. In this particular case, the 
close relationship between the Secretariat and the Metrowater HQ hinted at the 
inseparability of water from the elected government in Tamil Nadu, which is crucial 
to understanding the nature of the state’s articulation in Chennai.  
It was in 1978 that for the first time an institution was set up to exclusively for the 
supply of water to the city, separate from other municipal functions carried out by 
the city Corporation. The Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 
1978 (CD11) defines the institution’s mandate broadly: 
“An Act to provide for the constitution of the Chennai Metropolitan Water 
Supply and Sewerage Board, for exclusively attending to the growing needs 
of and for planned development and appropriate regulation of water supply 
and sewerage services in the Chennai Metropolitan Area with particular 
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reference to the protection of public health and for all matters connected 
therewith or incidental thereto.” (CD11) 
Framed as a regulatory as well as planning organisation, Metrowater was to have on 
its board the Minister in charge of water supply, the Secretary to the Government 
and the Commissioner of the Chennai Corporation, among others. The Act also made 
it clear that “’Government’ means the State Government” of Tamil Nadu, and not the 
Union Government in New Delhi.  
This, however, is not the origin story one hears at Metrowater, which always traces 
its history further back to 1914, when Kilpauk Water Works, the then city of Madras’ 
first water treatment plant, was opened. The water works complex, a red brick 
heritage building, continues to function as one of the city’s three major water 
treatment plants and also anchors Metrowater’s training centre, a quiet floor of 
seminar rooms surrounding a courtyard – like a school during vacation. A project 
engineer remarked wryly about the training centre:  
“That building comes alive only when the management decides that its 
engineers need to be trained by some international consultancy or the other. 
The last time we went there, it was a training session on RTI [Right to 
Information Act]. We learnt the different ways in which we could refuse to 
give out information, while still complying with the Act.” (C14) 
The training centre has hosted, among other topics, sessions on reverse osmosis, 
naturally, on water quality held by the UK company Severn Trent and on marine 
biodiversity. Metrowater’s participation in these global circulations of knowledge 
and practices of governance, at a site where it draws on its historical legacy, is always 
accompanied by the mundane practices of movement and interaction through which 
it maintains its position as interlocutor for the Tamil Nadu State government. For 
example, the executive engineer in charge of the Nemmeli desalination plant was 
almost never to be found in his office on the top floor of the HQ but was away on site 
visits, even though the plant’s operation and maintenance was contracted out to a 
private company and wasn’t supposed to be supervised on a daily basis by 
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Metrowater. The 45 km distance between the two locations did not deter this 
movement but added to the importance of his work and position. He explained on 
one such afternoon, when he had returned from a site visit:  
“We have visiting dignitaries from other countries or cities all the time – 
today, it was the Israeli Ambassador. We couldn’t really let the private 
company show them around. Anyway, the minister would be visiting on such 
occasions, so, I would have to go at least for that.” (C48) 
The private company’s view of the matter was however dismissive, with its Chief 
Technological Officer saying:  
“I’m not sure what Metrowater expects to achieve out of being in these visits. 
It’s not like they have the technical expertise for it. They are probably doing 
it only because the minister told them to.” (C13) 
In any case, Metrowater’s role as simultaneously a part of the government apparatus 
as well as its interlocutor is acknowledged in both comments above. In fact, the 
waterscape of the city is criss-crossed by a such interlocutors, a multipicity of 
institutions that have varying effects on how water is experienced as an object of 
everyday use and a matter of concern (Latour 2004).  
For one, Metrowater, the institution tasked with water supply and sewerage 
functions, has limited capacity to achieve the goals of ‘planned development and 
regulation’ listed in the Act that established it. This is because it does not have 
authority over any of the surface water bodies in its operating area, except the three 
reservoirs from which water supply for the city is drawn. The surface water bodies in 
the state fall under the 160-year old Public Works Department (PWD), which in 1971 
gave birth to the Tamil Nadu Water Supply & Drainage Board (TWAD) that is now in 
charge of water supply outside Chennai. In 2008, a dedicated institution called the 
Water Resources Organisation was carved out of the PWD, primarily for river basin 
and irrigation management. But, as the organisation describes its relationship to 
water bodies:  
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“Our State has got about 39,000 tanks out of which around 10,000 tanks are 
owned by Public Works Department. Out of 10,000 tanks, about 5,000 tanks 
are system tanks fed by riverine channel flows. The rest 5,000 tanks are rain 
fed tanks.” (CD16) 
Metrowater has to enter into an abstraction agreement with the WRO if it needs to 
draw water from one of these tanks, unless the tank has already been handed over 
to the Chennai Corporation to be rejuvenated or maintained as an ecological service. 
The Corporation is also in charge of storm-water drains, which are meant to flush the 
city of any stagnated rainwater and not mix with the sewerage pipes operated by 
Metrowater.  
The WRO oversees an Institute for Water Studies (IWS) and a State Ground & Surface 
Water Resources Data Centre (SGSWRDC) in Chennai, both performing a research 
and documentation role. Using a combination of GIS and other field research 
methods, they produce 5-year reports on the state of surface and ground water 
resources by river basin (see Figure 5), apart from advising concerned departments 
on the viability of their schemes. However, according to one of the Joint Directors 
(JD) of the IWS:  
“In the last ten years, we have been terribly understaffed and underfunded. 
Our staff strength is only 56 where it is supposed to be 78, and I see no 
attempt to fill the vacancies or upgrade our equipment, all indications of the 
department closing down. But, things may be looking up soon for I gave a 
presentation last month to the Chief Minister, who says it’s important for us 
to publish reports every two years now.” (C23) 
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Figure 5: Map showing river basins in Tamil Nadu. 
Source: Public Works Department, Policy Note 2017-18, Govt. of Tamil Nadu (CD5, p. 
196-197). 
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This institutional plurality can be visualised in the form of infrastructure, involving 
mediation between other governmental departments, private companies and water 
users, contributing to the ‘state effect’ (Painter 2006) that is felt through the water 
supply network. The reason it is experienced as a ‘state effect’ and not mere 
bureaucracy has to do with how water infrastructures have always been implicated 
with the ruling government in Tamil Nadu  and the relationships of patronage that 
structure its authority. A key feature of this framework is the curious figure of the 
‘institutional big man’ who embodied a: 
“…notion of individuality and instrumentality that is central to the politics of 
South India and crucial to an understanding of the dynamic relationship that 
exists between action and organization in Indian society.” (Mines & 
Goursishankar 1990: 761).  
Contradictorily being “both a quintessential hierarchical man and an individual,” 
(p.763) his ‘constituencies’ are comprised of the benefactors of his individual 
patronage. But, the existence of an institution and its hierarchy are necessary for the 
exercise of that patronage. Unsurprisingly, the example the authors give for such a 
figure is the late Chief Minister J Jayalalitha – a leader often casually dubbed 
autocratic, but whose authority, far from being absolute, derived from the 
convenient positions occupied by other institutional big men in her network. This 
kind of power structure requires ‘satellite institutions’ with their own officers (p. 764) 
reminiscent of pre-colonial kingship enacted through a "a shifting series of centers of 
different kinds of functions, connected with various interlocking networks” (Shulman 
2014: 21).  
These actions are more evident in regulatory institutions, newly set up in 
collaboration between the Union and State Governments. One such is the State 
Environmental Impact Assessment Authority (SEIAA) that was notified by the 
Ministry of Environment & Forests (MoEF), Government of India, in 2006 for the 
purpose of clearing what it called category B projects (of lower value or risk) at the 
state level (CD12). Since the Authority was at its core a 3-member committee 
nominated by the Union and State Governments, it is reconstituted with each 
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electoral cycle, with trusted officers of each government appointed to those 
positions. Early in 2015, the SEIAA as well the State Coastal Zone Management 
Authority (SCZMA), an institution with a very similar mandate notified in 2012 
(CD13), were in the process of getting dissolved and reconstituted. The outgoing 
Member Secretary of the SEIAA was the former head of Metrowater, who happened 
to have been at its helm when the desalination project was devised. When his 
retirement came about, he was appointed Officer on Special Duty, a way for partisan 
governments to keep their trusted bureaucrats around, heading the SEIAA.  
The Tamil Nadu Environment Directorate (CE4), an executive agency under the Tamil 
Nadu Department of Environment and Forests, housed SEIAA and the SCZMP in a 
South Chennai building, and was also a top-heavy office with two directors and two 
engineers. According to a director:  
“We are here to carry out the Government’s mandate, like preservation of 
specific lakes or conducting environmental awareness programmes. Apart 
from that, we deal mostly with environmental clearance for projects, sorting 
them into category I and II or A and B, giving clearance here if possible or 
passing it on to the concerned authority.” (C45) 
A Superintendent Engineer chipped in to allay any scepticism about the office’s 
capabilities:  
“You should try visiting the central government MoEF. They get 500 
applications per month and just keep clearing like clockwork. It’s not unusual 
for some applications to be deliberately submitted when the SEIAA is 
dissolved so that it goes to the MoEF and gets cleared. But, some others 
prefer to keep the project in the state – so, they would plan it at just the limit 
for category B if possible.” (C50)  
The honour system they seemed to be suggesting was, in fact, a long nurtured 
network of individuals who had been patrons of each other’s works and ideas, and 
developed similar interests in how public administration and urban development 
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were to be conducted. They were the institutional big men who passed projects and 
applications around their network, crafting infrastructures of statehood, employing 
skills and knowledges from a generalist’s rather than an expert’s toolbox.  
This kind of official can be found within the organisational structure of Metrowater 
as well. Take the position of the Engineering Director (ED), which is one of the three 
positions appointed by the Government, the other two being the Managing Director 
(MD) and Finance Director (FD). It has limited institutional authority as it’s the MD 
who heads the organisation and is in charge of its flagship projects, which are then 
assigned to specialist divisions like with desalination. As the ED explained about other 
operations: 
“It is really the Treatment & Transmission (T&T) engineers who head 
operations and maintenance. I would be able to tell you about desalination if 
it came under the Planning & Design department, where I have some 
experience. But, when it was planned, the Superintendent Engineer at 
Contracts & Monitoring was seen as more efficient. So, it went to that 
department.” (C36) 
But, this ED had something of a coterie in Metrowater – his fellow commuters from 
his days in a southern suburb of the city called Tambaram. One of them explained:  
“He is a man of strong community. He really took interest in those of us who 
would travel by train from Tambaram and nurtured our ideas, giving us a leg-
up where he could. He is like that at work too, always building personal 
connections.” (C14) 
Whether the personal connections amounted to much, he had tried to create value 
for himself in the institution by building up into someone the engineers could turn to 
against what they perceived to be a hostile management. It would be impossible to 
draw any direct consequence from his actions to Metrowater’s current interest in 
improving water supply to the southern suburbs, especially given recent 
development in the city’s south as opposed to the north . But, his network is a sample 
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of the relationships of patronage that sustain spatial privilege and marginality. 
Another instance was a T&T engineer who insisted on helping me with writing a letter 
to the MD (something that Metrowater required before research could be 
conducted). There were usually people to be found waiting outside his office – 
representatives from resident welfare associations or other civilians who were there 
to talk about their water supply. Unsurprisingly he was from the south of the city and 
very interested in the growing residential suburbs there and their eclectic methods 
of accessing water.  
The relations of power that legitimate the institutional big man are derived not from 
any innate authority of their position or character or inevitable kinship ties, though 
kinship, caste or origins may certainly enable the employment of strategic relations 
creating ‘differentiated agents and positions’ (Çalışkan & Callon 2010). So, 
technologies of government in Chennai are “concerned with the question of 
distribution, not simply of resources, but of agency” (Farias 2011: 370). For the Tamil 
state, the bureaucratic structures of government have, in fact, been useful in 
developing these networks of patronage, through a combination of personal and 
ideological connections as well a shared belief in the ideas of a modern 
developmental state. As Gopakumar (2009) puts it:  
“A primary way the Dravidian state has exerted its authority over Chennai has 
been by building the capacity to arrange society according to its ideology 
through a strong, efficient technocratic bureaucracy.” (Gopakumar 2009: 
116)  
The ‘Dravidian’ character of the Tamil state that he draws attention to is significant 
in understanding why water is a political object in Chennai and how it contributes to 
state-making. The following section will sketch a brief history of the Tamil state built 
on the foundations of the early 20th century political movement called the Dravidian 
movement, and its encounters with Chennai’s waterscape. In order to do that, the 
2015 Chennai floods offered a typical illustration.  
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4.3.2. Whose project is it? 
The December 2015 floods, while far from being unprecedented in their mere 
occurrence (Arabindoo 2017), were unusual in one way. They affected the affluent 
neighbourhoods in the southern parts of the city more than floods usually do. This 
was attributed to the Chembarambakkam reservoir whose floodgates weren’t 
opened until it was inevitable, causing a sudden deluge. The news magazine Frontline 
wrote:  
“Tamil Nadu, traditionally a water-starved state, has a peculiar problem when 
it comes to water release from reservoirs, dams and lakes. Every single 
release is treated as a celebration by a section of people…Such water release 
details have, for about two decades, been decided by the Chief Minister. Each 
time a routine water release takes place, a press release is put out crediting 
the Chief Minister with ordering the release.” (Radhakrishnan 2015) 
In the delay caused by waiting for such a ritualistic opening of the 
Chembarambakkam reservoir on direct orders from the Chief Minister, the deluge 
became inevitable and unmanageable, the article implied. Portrayal of the Chief 
Minister as a ruling patron, especially in matters related to water, is hardly confined 
to agricultural rural regions in Tamil Nadu. Tea shop discussions14 on water supply to 
Chennai and other cities, for instance, attribute credit or blame to water supply 
projects directly to the Chief Minister at that time. This partly has to do with the 
constant under-the-skin presence of the ruling party government in public and 
personal life. This is the state that instituted the midday meal scheme in schools, 
universalised the free and subsidised public distribution of rice and facilitated 
marriage or childbirth through various government schemes. As recently as 2013, it 
opened government run eateries selling food at negligible prices in major Tamil cities. 
What’s interesting about these schemes is that they also carry in either their name 
                                                          
14 “Tea kadai chronicles”, The New Indian Express, 15 Dec 2016, see:  
http://www.newindianexpress.com/cities/chennai/2016/dec/14/tea-kadai-chronicles-1549060.html  
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or public artefacts like pamphlets, buildings etc., reference to the ruling party or 
more precisely, to its iconic leader.   
The state in Tamil Nadu is routinely implicated with the practices, ideologies and 
leadership of its two major politics parties – the DMK and the ADMK. Both parties 
trace their origins to an early 20th century rationalist movement, now often referred 
to as the Dravidian movement, that mobilised Tamil linguistic and caste identity as 
an affective unifier. Two years after the older of the two parties, the DMK, won its 
first election in 1967, the Madras State, as it was then called, was renamed Tamil 
Nadu, meaning literally the Tamil nation. Literature, drama and poetry had played a 
key part in popularising the party’s campaign and the Dravidian movement in 
general. So, it was little wonder that its prominent leaders were writers who 
enthusiastically used the growing medium of cinema to further their cause. One such 
writer was M Karunanidhi, who became Chief Minister when the DMK’s founding 
member C N Annadurai died in 1969, and has continued to be the leader of the party 
till date. The first position that this five-time Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu held in 
1967 was, however, Minister for Public Works, coveted for its charge of large water 
bodies.  
For a long time, provision of water to cities as well as for agricultural regions was 
synonymous with the management of these public works – lakes, tanks, canals and 
irrigation systems among others. For the city of Chennai, this meant the construction 
of an additional tank called the Poondi reservoir and strengthening of capacity to 
channel and treat water from the existing sources – the Red Hills and Cholavaram 
lakes. The city also identified groundwater aquifers and well-fields from which water 
could be extracted for urban supply. An elaborate distribution system dividing the 
city into 12 zones with separate distribution stations for the north, south and central 
parts was developed at this time, and continues to be the foundation on which 
further capacity is added today. When CMWSSB was created in 1978 followed by a 
period of World Bank funded restructuring and development, it was more of such 
aggregated projects and incremental additions to the network that the organisation 
continued to do until the late 1990s. The World Bank appeared to have little to do 
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with the two prominent large scale projects that were planned during that period – 
the Krishna Water Supply Scheme that involved bringing 15 tmcft (thousand million 
cubic feet) of water from the Krishna river 485 km north of the city; and the 
Veeranam Water Supply Project that involved channelling 180 mld of water from the 
Veeranam lake 228 km south of the city.  The World Bank’s implementation report 
for its Madras Water Supply Project II hints at why this was so:  
“Within less than six months of Loan Effectiveness the Tamil Nadu 
government that had negotiated and supported the project was voted out of 
office. The incoming government did not favor the project’s selected bulk 
water scheme, the Veeranam scheme, but preferred an alternative solution, 
the Krishna scheme, to bring more water to Chennai.” (CD14, p.2) 
So, the loan amount corresponding to the Veeranam project was cancelled and the 
World Bank stuck to assisting in a general goal of “improvements to the sources of 
supply, treatment, distribution and conservation of water.” (CD12, p.2) The credit to 
the Veeranam and the Krishna projects would go not to a global technocratic agency 
but to specific Chief Ministers.  
The origins of the Krishna water project are usually traced to the 1956 re-organisation 
of federal states in the newly independent India, when the erstwhile Madras 
presidency covering much of south-eastern India was carved into majority Tamil-
speaking Madras and majority Telugu-speaking Andhra states. The Krishna river 
flowed through three other states including Andhra but not Madras, which 
nevertheless appealed to the tribunal set up under the Interstate River Water 
Disputes Act, 1956 to allocate Krishna water for supply to the city of Madras (Nikku 
2004). It is worth noting that Tamil Nadu, which has long portrayed itself as short-
changed by riverine systems, is engaged in perennial riparian disputes with its other 
neighbouring states, Karnataka and Kerala, and these are potent political issues at 
the State level as well for the Union Government in Delhi.  
It wasn’t until 1976 that the states involved reached an agreement to transfer water 
from the Krishna to Chennai. The 1977 Tamil Nadu elections were, however, won by 
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a breakaway faction of the DMK called the ADMK, lead by popular actor MG 
Ramachandran (MGR) who had been the public face of the DMK through the 
revolutionary roles he played in his movies. MGR, who continues to have a cult 
following in Tamil Nadu still influencing the electoral performance of the ADMK, 
never lost an election until he died in 1987. MSS Pandian (1989) calls it ‘the MGR 
phenomenon’ that mobilised ‘subaltern consciousness’ through the roles that the 
actor played in his films evoking Tamil ballads and folk tales that allude to historical 
characters. The official agreement to channel water from the Krishna river to Tamil 
Nadu through a series of canals was signed between Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu 
in 1983 under the MGR government, and it thus became MGR’s project. MGR, 
however, came to be remembered for the increased installation of public water 
pumps and distribution of free plastic pots for the poor, sparking popular political 
analyses about the ADMK’s proclivity for paternalistic solutions as opposed to the 
DMK’s preference for construction projects (C9). This also tallied with the 
fundamentally rural focus of the ADMK and the DMK’s interest in urban development 
(Gopakumar 2009).  
These political priorities have arguably overshadowed the Master Plan drawn up in 
1978 along with the creation of CMWSSB. This plan was updated in 1991 to take into 
account expected water from the Krishna, and then revised again in 1997 (CD18, p.). 
By then, following a power tussle after the death of MGR, Tamil Nadu had fallen into 
a pattern of alternately electing to power the DMK lead by Karunanidhi and the 
AIADMK, a faction of the ADMK lead by MGR’s fellow actor and political heir J 
Jayalalitha. During this period, government projects accomplished under each 
government were aggressively ‘branded’ as a Kalaignar or Amma scheme after the 
popular honorary titles bestowed upon the respective Chief Ministers. ‘Kalaignar’, 
meaning artist, stood for the DMK leader Karunanidhi and ‘Amma’, meaning mother, 
stood for the AIADMK leader Jayalalitha.  
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Figure 6: Publicity material for inauguration of Minjur desalination plant, Chennai. 
Source: IVRCL press release shared with researcher. 
 
So, the Minjur desalination plant, though initiated under the AIADMK regime was 
completed under DMK rule and was inaugurated by Karunanidhi (see Figure 6). The 
DMK, in turn, started the Nemmeli desalination plant which was completed under 
AIADMK rule and bears a plaque commemorating its inaugural by Jayalalitha. 
Contrary to the practice elsewhere of bottled water labelled with images of pristine 
mountains to assert quality, government-distributed subsidised water bottles in 
Tamil Nadu bear a picture of the Chief Minister, Jayalalitha in this case. The label 
drew legitimacy from the water rather than the other way around, for packaged 
water had long been in use in Tamil Nadu even when circulated in reusable cans of 
dubious appearance (see Figure 7).  
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Figure 7: Packaged water in Tamil Nadu. 
Source: Left - The Hindu/ THG Publishing Private Limited - 17 Sep 2013.  
Right – Fieldwork photo.  
‘Amma’ government-distributed subsidised water bottles in Tamil Nadu ( left) and 
commercial water can (right). 
This continued until 2016 when the latter died, leaving her party further split and the 
DMK under the de facto leadership of Karunanidhi’s son M K Stalin. It is this trio who 
have shaped Chennai’s waterscape in the past three decades not only through the 
projects and schemes that bear their name but also through the elaborate networks 
of authority and distributed agency that their governments have nurtured. Stalin, 
who had been politically active since the 70s and was elected to the Tamil Nadu 
Legislative Assembly in the 80s from a constituency in central Chennai, became the 
city’s first directly elected Mayor in 1996. The previously ceremonial office of the 
Mayor had been abolished in 1973, but was reinstated in 1996 by the DMK 
government which had itself been elected after a long hiatus that year. The move 
was prescient of the role the city was to play in the state’s polity and political 
economy and placed infrastructure development, albeit mostly of transport, at the 
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forefront of the urban agenda (Arabindoo 2006, Gopakumar 2009). Although this 
agenda is mostly linked to a range of road construction, it also initiated the 
Chembarambakkam water treatment plant, a significant addition to Chennai’s water 
infrastructure. Designed with ‘French assistance’, construction on the plant, 
however, began only in 2005 and was completed in 2007, in time for inaugural by the 
DMK Chief Minister Karunanidhi, elected in 2006. The plant’s capacity is 530 MLD, 
meant to treat water from the Krishna river, but it supplies around 150 MLD 
depending on water level in the Chembarambakkam lake. Figure 8 gives a timeline 
of the developments in water infrastructure for Chennai described so far, and their 
firm association with the political party in power at the time.  
The story of how Chennai got a desalination plant in 2010 arguably starts in 1996; 
unless you ask an AIADMK loyalist who would trace it to 2001. For the simple purpose 
of chronology, I start with 1996 and M K Stalin, the first elected Mayor of Chennai 
from the DMK. 1996 was the year that the city’s official name was changed from 
Madras to Chennai, even though both names had been used interchangeably in 
practice and even in certain official documentation over the years. This, along with 
the Singara [beautiful) Chennai campaign launched by the Mayor, was symbolic of 
the city shedding its traditional image and instead, mobilising its social and cultural 
strengths to partake in neoliberal globalised flows of capital and technology 
(Arabindoo 2006). But, the ensuing infrastructural development also revealed 
micropolitical relations that were rooted in the social, historical and material 
conditions of the city. But, before we get there, the rapid urbanisation that Chennai 
underwent in the following years and the accompanying plans for massive upgrades 
to its infrastructure and less so, to its water supply system, needs to be set in context.  
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Figure 8: Political entanglements of water projects in Chennai – A timeline 
Source: Developed by author. 
 
That the power and reputation of a leader is both asserted and dependent on their 
ability to assure water supply has been a theme since pre-colonial times in Tamil 
Nadu. Historical anthropologists have provided detailed accounts of a particular 
system of water engineering involving a network of tanks and canals that dealt with 
seasonal monsoon rains by using the natural gravity of landscape to facilitate flow 
and storage of water (Kent 2013, Mosse & Sivan 2003, Stein 1980). Of these, David 
Mosse’s (Mosse & Sivan 2003) focus is explicitly on the state, addressing the 
orientalist construction of pre-colonial India as a republic of villages, free of or lacking 
the intervention of a state. Arguing that the state then was as involved in everyday 
life as it is today, he establishes that the water network and the idioms of kinship, 
authority and law associated with it were technologies that “supported supra-village 
authority and control around water allocation” (ibid.: 64).  
It is the idiom of authority itself and the negotiated nature of its control that is of 
interest to us here:  
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“…kings build tanks to mark acts of bravery or to reward the religious wisdom 
which guides it. Indeed, in the founding of kingdoms and villages alike, warrior 
prowess and religious merit are linked to the bringing of water. However, 
water and land are not resources for Maravar warriors to hold and enjoy, but 
rather to rule through granting them further to communities…” (Mosse & 
Sivan 2003: 65) 
The elaborate process of granting material rewards in exchange for more or less 
nothing except respect or gratitude, which eventually ought to translate as power, is 
the relationship of patron and client that many accounts of south Asian society and 
state describe (see Pillavsky 2014 for an overview). In some accounts, the patron-
client transaction is a subversion of democratic modernity (Kochanek 2000), even if 
it might indeed complement and enhance electoral democracy and state service 
delivery (Sadanandan 2012). It is also detected as a feature of neoliberal 
governmentalities, where cutback of state resources is accompanied by indirect but 
politically connected modes of service delivery (Bear 2015, Björkman 2015). As 
Piliavsky (2014: 3) points out, patronage and clientelism are often used as 
euphemism for corruption in the Anglophone media, indicating an incomplete or 
perverse modern state-formation. But, the Indian democratic state has time and 
again proven to be a highly sophisticated machine (ibid.) defying stereotypes of 
oriental despotism or village republics, especially in agrarian societies with complex 
hydraulic works (cf. Wittfogel 1953).  
In fact, the splintering of social groups and their diluted loyalties to temple, state and 
locally powerful warriors in pre-colonial South India, could be understood as an 
organic mode of checks and balances to authority: 
“Legal conceptions in religio-political traditions were relativist regarding the 
nature of rules, rights, and legitimacy, and these widely accepted conceptions 
hindered political authorities from developing absolutist, centralizing 
control.” (Price 1993: 495) 
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In postcolonial India, the Dravidian movement happened to be adept at using visual 
and literary media to project itself as the natural representation of this ‘subaltern 
consciousness’ (Pandian 1989). Rather than being a radical movement offering a 
clean break from a hierarchical past, then, the Dravidian state shows signs of 
continuity in its curious mix of patronage and distributed agency as the mode of 
exercising statehood. It helps to keep in mind that the mobilisation of Dravidian 
nationalism in post-colonial India drew on ancient Tamil literature and sought to 
actively reclaim the logic of Tamil cultures, if only imagined. The parallels between 
contemporary Tamil polity and pre-colonial rule are, hence, not literal. Nor is this a 
culturally essentialist account of an unchanging society. Not even pre-colonial Tamil 
Nadu was unchanging, as Mosse & Sivan (2003: 65) demonstrate how the 
continuously changing and physically shifting settlements of the region over two 
centuries made its ecological as well as social engineering vulnerable to military 
conflict with colonial armies at the end of the 18th century. Tracing patterns in the 
political technologies and cultures used across widely different historical periods 
enables an understanding of the assembling and reassembling capabilities of power.  
The historicisation offers a framework from which to critique contemporary 
urbanisation processes in Chennai in its own terms, avoiding ‘universalist 
propositions’ (Chakrabarty 1992: 351) of modern cities, states and their 
sustainabilities. While Chennai is certainly undergoing some rapid change and 
rewiring of its global networks, it’s worth noting that its encounters with technology, 
global capital or neoliberal urbanisation are preceded by a history of similar 
encounters.  
4.3.3. Urban articulation of the state 
Visiting a high ranking politician in Tamil Nadu, like a former Mayor of Chennai, is a 
bit like a attending a noble’s court (CE7). He is surrounded by a select group of party 
members, his advisers and fellow politicians of lower ranks. They are all clad in 
regulation crisp white shirts and matching dhotis, with an occasional woman in a 
saree. There are also other outsiders – media persons or representatives from citizen 
organisations - waiting impatiently for their turn to speak to him. The politician, in 
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this case, spends a substantial amount of time with each visitor; but his meetings are 
conducted in the middle of this assembly of trusted people. Even by these standards, 
M K Stalin’s inner circle, which was at one point formalised as a ‘core committee’ 
during his time as Mayor was legendary. A colleague of his explained:  
“He also started a co-ordination committee to liaise operations between 
Metrowater, Libraries, Fire Service, Slum Board etc. That is, after all, the kind 
of work the Mayor is empowered to do. It is not like he is directly in charge of 
water supply or transport. But, he can, as elected representative of the 
people of Chennai, work with agencies to make public services better in the 
city. This, however, is possible only if it is the same party in power in the State 
Government as well. The Mayor can co-ordinate only if there is co-operation 
from Government Institutions, which are of course allied always with the 
party in power.” (C60) 
The constitution of the Mayoral office in 1996, for all its global outlook, was also 
seemingly designed to encourage the culture of the ‘institutional big men’ and their 
relationships of patronage. Other cities like Bangalore were constituting formal 
agencies to further the urban development agenda as a government-private sector 
partnership (Sami 2013). In Chennai, the City as well as the State Government 
preferred networks established at a personal level. It was in Stalin’s ‘core committee’, 
which was different from the official co-ordination committee, that the idea for 
desalination is said to have emerged (C25). This committee was mostly a mix of 
industrialists and civil service officers and did not exactly consist of experts on urban 
development or infrastructure.  
In fact, both the DMK and AIADMK governments were in the practice of nurturing 
their trusted civil service officials, who would be posted to key administrative roles 
or assigned to head flagship projects when each party was elected to power. A 
change in the elected government is always accompanied by news of not just the 
ministers assigned their portfolios but also of change appointments to important 
public institutions like Metrowater, or posts in the Secretariat. 
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Figure 9: Chennai Water Infrastructure – Institutional Flows.  
Source: Developed by author.  
The most trusted of these are assigned advisory or consulting roles after their 
retirement or become part of the party leader’s planning committees, like Stalin’s 
above. In any case, both parties, founded on ideals of social justice and distributive 
welfare, have a fairly all-encompassing approach towards governance and aim to 
reach the widest possible beneficiaries in their programmes, at least as an ideal. 
Figure 9 illustrates the array of institutional connections determined by the official 
structure of urban governance as well as sustained by the distribution of personal 
patronage networks.  Andrew Wyatt (2013) describes this as a combination of 
‘clientelist’ politics and ‘programmatic’ policies leading to universal populism. Civil 
service officials, then, suffer no ethical dilemma in their job of executing universal 
schemes, despite maintaining loyalty to specific parties. A senior bureaucrat in the 
Government Secretariat reasoned: 
“The institutional arrangement in Chennai is very similar to say, Bengaluru or 
Hyderabad. The universal wisdom then was that the creation of a strong 
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Mayoral authority will help in urban development. But, it soon became 
evident that that was a silver bullet and a Mayor cannot be easily vested with 
much power, nor can he do everything on his own. People expect politicians 
to be responsible for their everyday services here – if something goes wrong, 
he’s directly to blame. So, every leader needs trusted advisers who can work 
the machine to get things done.” (C65) 
Stalin’s core committee, however, doesn’t seem to have taken the desalination idea 
much further, for, by the time it actually materialised in Chennai, it was under the 
auspices of the AIADMK ruled State Government in 2001, as small scale 0.1 MLD 
installations adjoining settlements of the urban poor along the coast.  
2001 was a landmark year for water projects in Chennai because of the consecutive 
years of monsoon failure that had depleted the city’s ground and surface water 
sources15. As with urban water shortages, the scarcity was compounded by lack of 
tools to preserve water from the rainy days as many parts of the city were built over 
historic lakes and marshlands meant to preserve water. This also meant that the city 
depended significantly on the groundwater that it had built over, drawn using 
borewells to sustain its everyday life and growth. The network supply accounted for 
only a few hours of supply on alternate days or a couple of days per week. When the 
ground and surface water sources dried up in 2001, presented an opportunity for 
drastic measures to address these issues. Plans that had been brewing for a while 
and techno-legal methods that might have been more difficult to implement at other 
times could be hastened to completion now, not least because they would also be 
accomplishments of the government then in power – the AIADMK under Chief 
Minister J Jayalalitha. From a 2002 Metrowater policy note listing all the projects 
completed that year: 
“The status of city water supply and the Contingency plan for managing the 
acute water crisis was reviewed by the Hon'ble Chief Minister in detail on 
11.6.2001. In order to tackle the grave water situation and acute drought, it 
                                                          
15 “Chennai's water woes”, The Hindu, 05 Jun 2003, See:  
http://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/mp/2003/06/05/stories/2003060500290100.htm  
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was decided to adopt a multipronged strategy with immediate measures to 
attend to the day-to-day needs and long term measures for a permanent 
solution to the water problem facing Chennai city.” (CD14, p. 1) 
The immediate measures consisted largely of bringing water in from distance sources 
by road and rail. Water was drawn from as far south as Erode (400 km) to distribute 
about 70 MLD in Chennai through lorries, stationed tankers and widely installed 
stand pumps. The more long lasting effect was however the drilling of deep borewells 
and identification of well fields in the hinterland, which continue to send water in 
lorries to sate Chennai’s increased thirst today. This has also become the situation 
against which new projects are assessed or justified: 
“RO desalination costs 54 paise/litre compared to 13 paise for other surface 
water sources. But, what RO is expected to replace is transport of water in 
lorries from far away, which costs on an average Rs. 1.2 per litre. For 
Metrowater, this is not a profit enterprise, but public service. So, they are 
only going to see if it fits into their budget.” (C38) 
“Any treatment plant is worth-it, even if it’s only an addition of 10 MLD. 18000 
litres per lorry. 10 million divided by 18000 litres per lorry would be 500 
lorries per day.” (C13) 
“In 2001, water was brought in from Neyveli [200 km] at the rate of Rs. 2200 
per load in lorries and trains – that’s literally money down the drain. We were 
looking for a more reliable and sustainable source which is when desalination 
came into the picture.”(C48)  
In 2001, the first step was, however, small scale desalination units for the urban poor: 
“Metrowater has taken a considered decision to focus on fishermen's 
colonies and aggregations peopled by the economically disadvantaged 
groups. Since these areas are located close to the sea and suffer from lack of 
potable water, resulting in major health related problems…a beginning has 
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been made situating two Reverse Osmosis Plants one at Ayodhya kuppam and 
another at Kasimedu kuppam in Royapuram.” (CD14, p.5) 
These units have now been closed, but, the other long term measures stay. The plan 
to draw water from Veeranam lake, dubbed the New Veeranam Project, was initiated 
and construction completed in 2004, although supply never touches the planned 180 
MLD owing to fluctuations in water levels in Veeranam lake, which is also the local 
source of irrigation. It is still often referred to as a ‘lifeline’ to the city, along with the 
Krishna Water project, even though their actual contributions to the piped network 
in terms of volumes are never known. Metrowater only releases figures of its 
reservoir levels, not how they were filled. As a water researcher in one of the city’s 
development institutes said:  
“It is engineering projects like Veeranam that save politicians in times of crisis. 
Metrowater engineers do not seem to know of this enormous political power 
they hold, though. Even though people may be getting their everyday water 
from lorries, it is seen as a messy method. Veeranam on the other hand is 
something that the state did for them.” (C52) 
The Secretary of the Municipal Administration & Water Supply (MAWS) department 
of the Tamil Nadu Government, a politically important department to which only the 
most trusted bureaucrats are usually appointed, said: 
“For Krishna water, we have to ask Andhra. For Cauvery, we ask Karnataka. 
Veeranam was water from within Tamil Nadu. But, even that is not Chennai’s 
own water source, of course.” (C65) 
Yet, at the time, it wasn’t the Veeranam project that created ripples in the city’s 
hydro-politics, but a more unexpected initiative – rain water harvesting (RWH). The 
dramatic implementation of the RWH programme became the stuff of legends and 
fed into a growing middle class environmental subjectivity in the city (Arabindoo 
2011). 
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In 2002, a municipal ordinance mandating rainwater harvesting in all buildings 
became an amendment to the Chennai Metropolitan Area Groundwater (Regulation) 
Act 1987 which gave buildings a year to comply. When the approach of the deadline 
in 2003 saw poor compliance, the act was amended again giving buildings just one 
month to implement rainwater harvesting systems or face disconnection of water 
and sewerage services from the utility. That is, buildings had to add fittings to their 
plumbing to channel any rainwater collected on their rooftops to the ground, and 
make adjustments at the ground level for the water to be able to seep under. The 
impact that this law actually had on groundwater levels is disputed (Arabindoo 2011), 
as it’s difficult to measure whether any increase in groundwater levels is due to this 
programme or the subsequent years of healthy and even heavy rainfall. But, the 
widely publicised follow-up on the law and its punitive rather than incentivised 
implementation was a landmark in the urban articulation of the Dravidian state.  
Rain water harvesting soon became something of a matter of pride for middle class 
residents across the city and allowed for an environmental subjectivity that could be 
reconciled with their urban lifestyle. It was also considered a communitarian 
initiative because installations enabling seepage of water into the ground improve 
the groundwater table for everybody, not just that particular household. By the same 
token, enough number of buildings would have to do it for it to be effective. 
Combining a strict legal framework with the city’s proclivity for technological 
installations, as evidenced by its widespread adoption of borewells and household 
reverse osmosis purifiers more recently, RWH became a model to aspire to 
irrespective of its results. The MAWS Secretary at the time, who had come from a 
long and memorable stint as MD of Metrowater, retired in 2010, but was appointed 
Officer on Special Duty soon after. An AIADMK loyalist and a confidante of its leader 
Jayalalitha (she resigned her post when Jayalalitha died in 2016), she was at the 
forefront of government action enforcing the RWH rules. Seated in her top floor 
office overlooking the vast sands of the Marina beach, she explained:  
“When we said, ‘be a good boy and do it’, it failed. Only the ‘Do it or else…’ 
approach worked. I tried implementing an RWH condition for new buildings 
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to get a water connection when I headed Metrowater, but wasn’t able to 
achieve much. With political backing, though, I was able to achieve the same 
thing, with the penalty that buildings would lose their existing Metrowater 
connection if they didn’t comply!” (C61) 
What made it work, according to her, was the ‘political will’ that mobilised party 
machinery to accomplish this for their ‘Amma’, the respectful moniker by which Chief 
Minister Jayalalitha was known. She was ‘agencing’ the autocracy of the AIADMK 
party structure to make what she thought was a necessary urban governance 
programme work. Had she been responsible for initiating the desalination plants the 
city now has as well?  
“No way! It is the kind of project engineers think up. What we need is 
decentralised technology, like the small RO units set up in 2001. Metrowater 
perhaps thinks it will lose its importance if it enable widespread conservation 
efforts and decentralised initiatives like RWH. But, they have to realise, in the 
longer run, that’s the only way to avoid total public disillusionment with 
them. They, after all, operate within a political framework and cannot afford 
public discontentment at their hands.” (C61) 
Nevertheless, plans for a large scale reverse osmosis desalination plant was already 
underway then. An Austrian company named VA Tech Wabag pitched desalination 
projects in Mumbai, Gujarat and Chennai in 2003 according to the company’s public 
relations officer (C74). But, Metrowater engineers remember discussions about 
commissioning a desalination plant in the late 1990s, before the 2001 elections and 
the change of government.  
“The MD had called for a few project engineers to start working on a proposal 
and so we did. But, it was close to the 2001 elections and what with the 
drought as well, our proposal never saw the light of the day.” (C14) 
In any case, before VA Tech Wabag’s plant opened at Nemmeli to the south of the 
city in 2013, there was another desalination plant that had opened in Minjur to the 
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north in 2010. This plant was built like any other factory amidst the heavy industries 
of north Chennai by a private infrastructure company named IVRCL which formed a 
consortium called Chennai Water Desalination Limited (CWDL) with the Spanish 
companies Befesa and Abengoa to plan and build the plant. Metrowater entered into 
a purchase agreement with them16.  
“It was an international company that built it and they seemed to prefer the 
planning and financial freedom of executing the plan on their own. It worked 
out for us because we were new to the technology and could learn from this 
one before launching our own plant.” (C48) 
In infrastructure governance parlance, it’s called the Design-Build-Own-Operate-
Transfer or DeBOOT model of public-private partnership, where the public institution 
offers a concessionary deal to the private company to take the risk of investing. In 
this case, the compulsory purchase agreement and Tamil Nadu’s relatively low 
electricity charges were to have helped.  
The Nemmeli desalination plant, on the other hand, involved all the institutions 
discussed above and more. It is Metrowater’s own plant, built on a traditional EPC or 
Engineering-Procurement-Construction model and further extended as a 
Maintenance contract as well. The detailed project report (DPR), which is the initial 
planning document, is always prepared by an external consultant in such large 
projects. In this case, the same consultant who worked on the Veeranam project, 
MECON ltd., a Government of India undertaking formerly known as Metallurgical & 
Engineering Consultants, prepared the DPR.  
“We couldn’t very well decide that the government wants a desalination plant 
at this site, so we will build it there. MECON, being a public institution, is a 
trusted consultant. Metrowater has better experience in water treatment 
than them, obviously. So, our engineers had a difference of opinion in terms 
                                                          
16 See: http://www.ivrcl.com/desalination.php  
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of what kind of filters should be used in the plant. But, these technical 
objections were taken as insubordination, like a political objection.”(C14) 
There had been other technical disagreements, but none of them challenging the 
premise or need for desalination itself. For instance, a scientist from the National 
Institute for Ocean Technology (NIOT), a Union Government institution that 
researches thermal desalination (as opposed to reverse osmosis) in its south Chennai 
campus, was in the advisory committee for the Nemmeli plant:  
“Metrowater is taking the right step in aggressively expanding its supply – the 
city needs it. But, they have been hasty, I don’t think they gave enough 
thought to the brine discharge mechanism or long term maintenance. 
Thermal desalination is inefficient and that’s why it’s environmentally safe. 
But we need to conduct more indigenous research on that. I don’t think 
weighing reverse osmosis against rainfed sources is a fair comparison. It is too 
simplistic to say city’s water supply can be met if it gets enough rain.” (C55) 
The NIOT, backed by the Union Government’s Department of Science & Technology 
has been experimenting with solar powered desalination in southern Tamil Nadu, 
tidal powered desalination in Kerala and small scale reverse osmosis units in village 
schools. A similar, if a more business oriented and larger scale profile can be seen in 
Tamil Nadu Water Investment Company, which is promoted by the Tamil Nadu 
Government and IL & FS, an infrastructure financing corporation. After planning a 
treatment & recycling system for the textile manufacturing hub of Tirupur in western 
Tamil Nadu, the company was contracted to conduct ‘feasibility studies’ for 
desalination along Chennai’s southern coast, and then to prepare DPRs for water 
distribution systems in 26 municipalities across the state. Its latest project is the 
upgradation of water supply & sewerage for a city in Maharashtra, a state in north-
western India.  
Infrastructural development in the public sector has spurred an inter-governmental 
trans-regional economy of expertise in matters of governance, as evidenced by 
Metrowater’s and NIOT’s showcasing of their desalination projects to public 
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administrators from California and Florida (C8, C55). Despite activists and 
environmentalists decrying the mismanagement of Chennai’s coastline, Tamil Nadu 
Environment Directorate’s mapping of the coast has attracted interest from other 
states: 
“We spent Rs. 3 crore [30 million] on coastal zone mapping, covering 
everything - mangroves, sand dunes etc. Only the turtles were left out. Seeing 
this, West Bengal & Maharashtra want to do the same thing. They’ve 
approached us and Anna University.” (C50) 
There emerges the picture of an infrastructural state here (see Figure 9), which, using 
the institutional and technological means available, builds elaborate interconnected 
systems – of governance or material utility – thus sustaining a framework of rule as 
well as firmly materialising itself into geographies of urbanism. Irrespective of the 
ideological or other differences, both the DMK and AIADMK, when in government, 
wanted to be seen building things. Material outcomes were concrete ways in which 
their stateness could be asserted. Just as much as there might have been a shallow 
expansion of the private, there was also an expansion of the state, cast in institutions 
and infrastructures. As the MAWS Secretary at the time said:  
“We did RWH and that was a good thing. Lakes and tanks that we have 
neglected so far have to be rejuvenated. But, do you really think as a 
government, it is responsible for us to tell people ‘collect your own water and 
pump it out of the ground for your use’? In the end, networked supply is more 
efficient and we haven’t even covered half the overall consumption in the city 
yet.” (C65) 
Private companies that work with Metrowater or the Tamil Nadu government, thus, 
are ambivalent about their work. As the Chief Technology Officer at Nemmeli said:  
“With Metrowater, everything has to pass through high command before we 
can go ahead with whatever the plan we proposed is. They make sure we can 
complete the project without trouble – they help with getting a power 
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connection or planning approval - but that means we have to put up with the 
eccentricity that is Tamil Nadu politics.” (C13)  
In what way did the elaborate network of institutions and their quasi-governmental 
status help in achieving this infrastructural state, though? The feasibility studies done 
by TWIC to choose a site for a desalination plant in southern Tamil Nadu give a clue. 
The study lists a set of parameters based on which the assessment was done with a 
simple Yes or No against each site. So, there is ‘availability of land close to sea’, ‘will 
the seabed sediment affect the quality of intake’ ‘water quality – does it require 
extensive pre-treatment’ etc. Where the factors are more complex, for eg. ‘geology 
of seabed’ or ‘acceptability from a social/environmental point of view’, they are still 
answered with a simple Yes or No, thus selecting the site with the most number of 
Y’s against it (CD2). Another example of this is the detailed project reports (DPRs) 
submitted for environmental clearance with the TN Directorate of Environment 
(CD3). After elaborate details like geological maps of the district including the seabed, 
tide details, rainfall and humidity charts etc., this is how the section on the plant’s 
environmental impact reads [the section is reproduced here (see Table 3) rather than 
attached as the authors of the report did not permit a copy, but consented to 
reporting/writing about it]  
Far from developing a technical or administrative expertise, what the DPR 
demonstrated was a unambiguous contribution towards the building of the plant. 
The elaborate network of institutions and administrators were themselves an 
infrastructure enabling the construction of material projects and the hence, the 
‘concretization’ (Meehan 2014) of stateness (Painter 2006).  
In the past decade, the official area of Chennai city has been expanded dramatically, 
ostensibly for the purpose of improved planning and infrastructure provision in the 
hinterlands into many parts of which the city had already grown. In January 2011, 4 
months before the Tamil Nadu State assembly elections, the then DMK government 
announced that the Chennai Corporation would be expanded from an area of 176 sq 
km set in 1978 to 430 sq km, by incorporating smaller local bodies like town and 
village panchayats into the city limit. 
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Land use proposed : Others (that is, not residential, commercial or 
industrial) 
Water required for project : - 
Whether the site is near 
backwater, estuary, creek or 
lagoon 
: No 
Alternate sites for environmental 
consideration 
: Not considered 
Current land use : N/A – not agriculture, homestead, forest, 
fallow, mangrove, orchard, marshes, sand 
dunes 
Any breeding or nesting ground : No 
No. of trees cut : None 
Trees cut : N/A 
Dredging : No 
Any Sand dunes removed : No 
Cutting/Cleaning of Mangroves : No 
Not near : National park, marine park, sanctuary/tiger 
reserve/elephant reserve/turtle nesting 
ground, Coral reef, mangroves 
No cyclone affectation : - 
Point of final discharge : No 
No population to be displaced : - 
No cyclone affectation : - 
Point of final discharge : No 
No population to be displaced : - 
 
Table 3: Excerpt from the Detailed Project Report for environmental impact assessment. 
Source: Data collected from field notes. 
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At the same time, the Chennai Metropolitan Area, which is the area that comes under 
the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, the para-statal institution that 
does master-planning for the city, was increased to 1189 sq km. While the opposition 
party then contested the move claiming that a large city administration would 
compromise on governance and public delivery, the expanded city corporation was 
dramatically renamed ‘Greater Chennai Corporation’ by the AIADMK lead 
government in 2016, following other cities in India like Bangalore and Mumbai. Often 
the infrastructural funding cities could obtain either from the Central Government or 
international agencies were proportional to their size making the expansion a 
rational political economic move. As a senior politician put it:  
“The city was expanded in order to get funding from JNNURM17 or other aid 
agencies. Large cities had an edge in terms of appealing to investors as well 
as the Union Government’s priorities. At that time, Chennai was the smallest 
in terms of actual corporation area, while Bangalore, Delhi, Hyderabad had 
all expanded their limits already.” (C60) 
In a case of cyclical reasoning, this also became the rationale for increased 
infrastructural development in the public as well as the private sector (C23, C36, C48, 
C75). In 2018, Chennai became the largest city in India by increasing its metropolitan 
area seven times to 8878 sq km (CD4). If the 2011 expansion was any indication, the 
city is all set to become the stage for more of the infrastructural state (see Figure 10 
for a map of Metrowater’s plans to expand its water supply along with the city).  
 
 
 
                                                          
17 JNNURM - Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission 
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Figure 10: Chennai Metrowater – extension of water supply to the expanded city. 
Source: Metrowater website. chennaimetrowater.tn.nic.in  
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4.4. London: regulatory state 
4.4.1. Water as boundary object 
“I advise companies and utilities on water sustainability all over the world. 
But, when I get home, I’m unable to get my daughters to use lower pressure 
on their showers. I had to finally buy a low flow shower head to force this 
behavioural change.” (L20 - Sustainability Consultant, London)  
It has been over forty years since London’s municipal water utility called the 
Metropolitan Water Board was restructured into a quasi-public institution called 
Thames Water Authority, and subsequently, privatised in 1989 as Thames Water 
(Jones 2013, Pearce 1982). The privatised entity was initially part of a massive 
engineering company that expanded into water markets in North America and 
Europe, but was then sold off to a consortium of investors lead by an investment 
fund, which, in turn, has transferred to a consortium of pension funds18. This period 
roughly coincides with the disappearance of a popular political discourse on water in 
the city.  If it can be detected at all, it is only in gendered, domesticated forms as 
articulated by the consultant above. Possible contamination of water during the wars 
or the subsequent controversy over fluoridation (Jones 2013, p. 140-160) were 
emotive issues, involving political intervention. Hydrological contestations, to be 
sure, continue to shape water policy and politicise it elsewhere in the country, 
especially in the north of England. But, in London, deficiencies in water supply or 
sewerage are framed as building issues to do with faulty plumbing or old fittings, and 
seldom treated as a city-wide or infrastructural problem. While some of them are 
raised occasionally in consumer forums and water companies are blamed for 
hosepipe bans in drought years19, the political value of water in urban public 
discourse appears to have largely diminished.  
                                                          
18 The Metropolitan Water Board was established in 1903 to unify nine different water companies 
supplying water to London. It was restructured as a quasi-public authority in 1973 called Thames 
Water Authority and subsequently, privatised in 1989 as Thames Water. (See Pearce 1982, Jones 
2013). The company was bought in 2001 by the German utility group RWE and then sold to Kemble 
Water Holdings, a consortium controlled by the Australian investment fund Macquarie Group in 
2006. Kemble Water Holdings is now controlled by a set of pension funds from all over the world.  
19 See http://utilityweek.co.uk/ 
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Except with specific interest groups, usually landed agriculturalists, water is hardly 
the kind of vibrant political object that energy or housing or transport is in the UK, 
much less in London. Critique of water supply or governance seldom make for 
important political statements or reported news. All of this has lead to the water 
sector becoming a frequent example of the ‘retreat of the state’ that is said to have 
begun with the privatisation of various sectors under the Thatcher government in the 
1980s (Oliver 2007). The privatised water sector, since, has certainly come to be 
financialised and embraced a ‘post-political’ concern with environmental efficiency 
and risk mitigation rather than spatial or distributive issues (Allen & Pyke 2013). But, 
the absence of familiar forms of antagonistic politics or resource struggles by itself 
does not mean an absence of politics altogether (Barry 2001).  
In the past nearly thirty years, privatised water management in England and Wales 
has hardly been a static phenomenon, with a range of regulatory models and 
institutions developed to govern this industry; and the water industry, in turn, 
undergoing a restructuring to protect its own financial interests. Throughout this 
period, the water sector as a whole – the water supply companies, their consultants 
and contractors, and the regulatory institutions – has produced a number of political 
objects in the form of reports, maps and material infrastructures (Barry 2002) in 
response to ostensibly hydrological and climate events. The desalination plant 
constructed in Beckton was one such hydro-social artefact in the Thames Valley, 
meant as back-up only during times of drought and as preparation for a future 
afflicted by climate change. Hence, it is referred to as ‘future-proofing’ (LD33) rather 
than as ‘drought-proofing’ or ‘weather-proofing’ which were terms sometimes used 
in Chennai. But, that wasn’t all the difference between the two cities.  
Thinking London through Chennai, a crucial difference in the environmental 
subjectivities of the two cities comes up. Both cities turned towards an energy 
intensive technological solution in response to a drought situation, mediating this 
decision making process with political artefacts like posters and speeches in Chennai; 
and reports and maps in London. But, whereas in Chennai, ‘stateness’ was 
established by an elaborate network of individualised agencies with political 
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affiliations thus ‘peopling’ (Simone 2004) infrastructures with a multitude of actors, 
the technopolitical process in London works on the basis of water as a boundary 
object (Star & Griesemer 1989) around which a system of government is evolved 
between regulatory and private institutions. The boundary-making also serves the 
additional purpose of demarcating the line between state and society; experts and 
citizens; technoscience and everyday water use. This is, of course, a continuous 
process giving rise to different political formations and environmental knowledges. 
In these distinctive hydro-social assemblages, the difference between the ‘means-
ends-necessity’ (Arabindoo 2011: 112) pragmatism of Chennai and the 
infrastructural excess (which does not necessarily mean perfection or abundance of 
water supply) of London cannot be discounted. The 24-hour-on-tap supply of water 
in London itself, then, acts as a boundary marker (Mitchell 1991), with those who 
know how the water gets there on one side establishing a structure of rule or 
‘stateness’ (Painter 2006) and those who just turn the tap on the other.  
In the following sections, the STS (science & technology studies) concept of the 
boundary object will be used to critically look at a specific set of reports and maps 
leading up to the construction of the desalination plant. These are not documents 
related to the plant per se, but reports that were circulated in the wake of the 
successive years of drought and the environmental regulatory response to it in the 
noughties. But, before we get there, what is a boundary object and how is it different 
from any object of governance that enables a structure of rule? The term boundary 
object was coined by STS scholars Star and Griesemer (1989) in their quest to 
understand how scientific work usually achieved results in consensus over a wide 
range of people and things. They identified “a 'central tension' in science between 
divergent viewpoints and the need for generalizable findings” (p. 387) by deviating 
from the myth of a scientific breakthrough and of consensus being a natural 
outcome. Understanding this from the perspective of objects that normally inhabit 
multiple social worlds, they ask: “how can findings which incorporate radically 
different meanings become coherent?” (p.392). The idea of a ‘boundary object’ that 
can aid in achieving this consensus or coherence thus starts to take shape. Boundary 
objects, according to them: 
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“have different meanings in different social worlds but their structure is 
common enough to more than one world to make them recognizable, a 
means of translation.” (Star & Griesemer 1989: 393)  
This, however, is a vague definition that in its most popular form is applied in 
arguments of social constructivism (Bijker 2001, Harvey & Chrisman 1998). Besides, 
the ‘multiplicity’ of water (Barnes & Alatout 2012) and its range of social roles has 
already been widely commented upon. How, then, is the concept of the boundary 
object useful? Star (2010) has later clarified that this ‘interpretive flexibility’ is only a 
fundamental building block over which the concept of the boundary object can be 
developed primarily to reveal the ways in which various groups working on the object 
juggle its forms to arrive at a workable conclusion. That is, more than the 
characteristics of the object, it is how it’s contested back and forth in an attempt at 
resolution among groups of professionals or social groups that is of interest. 
Specifically, this section benefits from a close reading of Carroll’s (2012: 489) take on 
the role of water as “an object at the boundary between science and governance.” 
He shows how the construction of water as a resource enabled the Californian state 
to come in contact with the idea of scientific governance, generating “new discursive, 
organizational, and material forms in both realms, which in turn stitches them 
together.” (ibid.).  
In the case of London, this process can be observed in the mechanism of 
environmental regulation, which, as the following section will show is a particular 
articulation of the state. The creation of a regulatory framework after water 
privatisation, as we shall see, enabled the British state to consolidate its authority 
over water systems throughout the country and work with various forms of expertise 
in discursive ways that might nevertheless be a vehicle to push a political agenda. 
The result:  
“is not scientific government, but a technoscientific state formation 
composed of a complex set of continuously contested and shifting 
interconnections.” (Carroll 2012: 490) 
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4.4.2. ‘Peckham Springs’ to desalination – shifting conceptualisations of water 
A 1992 episode of the popular TV series Only Fools & Horses featured Peckham 
Springs, a bottled water brand flying off the shelves of newly sprung organic food 
stores in London. It showed its lead character, south London wheeler-dealer Derek 
‘Del Boy’ Trotter, merrily bottling tap water from his council flat, labelling it the 
aforementioned ‘Peckham Springs’.20 
Del: “We’re doing nothing illegal, are we? Eh?” 
Rodney (Del’s brother & occasional conscience keeper): “Nothing illegal…? 
Del, We’re selling public water to the public!” 
Del: “Ah…this water used to be public. And then Maggie, she privatised it, 
didn’t she? 
It now belongs to a board of directors and a load of investors. They sell it to 
us, we sell it on. We’re only repackaging it.”  
With its wicked wit and a cleverly packed plotline, the show managed to capture the 
neoliberal environmental zeitgeist of the era in the episode aptly titled Mother 
Nature’s Son. In 1989, water in England and Wales had been completely privatised in 
that each of the river basins in these regions was sold to a single private company for 
management. These companies owned the assets, including the watery ones, in their 
basin. In this market, it was only in bottled water that there was scope for other 
entrepreneurs like Del Boy, for private companies were essentially monopolies in 
their respective river basins. Although privatisation was driven by the desperate need 
for investment in water infrastructure (however flawed the logic of expecting it from 
the private sector might be) in order to rectify falling water quality, one of its aims 
however was to make water a market commodity – a freely traded good whose 
pricing and quality reflected supply and demand in the market (LD1, p.11). This was 
                                                          
20 ‘Mother Nature's Son’ (1992). Only Fools and Horses, Episode 11. BBC. 25 December.  
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in line with the growing wisdom of the era that the market could achieve the kind of 
economic and environmental discipline that states and user awareness couldn’t.  
“Water may be a gift of nature but it is also a commodity.  In the economic 
sense, this is a good or service exhibiting scarcity; unlimited amounts are not 
available at  zero cost. Even where water is plentiful it has to be treated and 
distributed, and  wastewater has to be safely disposed of. These activities use 
up economic resources. In many - perhaps most - countries at all stages of 
development, water is scarce and is rapidly getting scarcer.” (Winpenny 2005)   
As with any other commodity, then, water’s scarcity would increase its value and 
pricing, thus imposing efficiency and discipline among its users, leading to water 
conservation. This was the premise of market environmentalism (Bakker 2005). The 
image of Del Boy bottling water from his council flat shrewdly conveyed water’s 
trajectory from everyday object to a nationalised public resource to finally a 
commodity to be sold in the market. It showed how ‘council pop’ (Jones 2013) came 
to be an ecologically sensitive commodity.  
In 1973, water supply and sewerage, managed by local councils in the post-war 
period, was nationalised, consolidating 200 supply authorities and 1400 sewerage 
works into 10 Regional Water Authorities organised according to river basins. This 
move “was driven by economies of scale, the engineering logic of integrated river 
basin management and an antipathy to local government” (Page & Bakker 2005). In 
London, however, water supply had been consolidated over the metropolitan area 
way back in 1903. 
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Figure 11: Ontologies of water through history in London. 
Source: Developed by author. 
So, the loss of local community control over water felt in other parts of England 
(Strang 2004) was less of an issue in the city. Structurally, nationalisation paved way 
for privatisation in 1989 by consolidating water management into river basins and 
prioritising cost-efficient water supply with an emphasis on demand management 
(Bakker 2001). (Figure 11 shows the history of restructuring of the water sector was 
accompanied by shifting conceptualisations of water, which will be discussed in the 
rest of this chapter.)  
The key difference between the two time periods, then, was in terms of their 
distributive economics. Under nationalisation, water was framed as a strategic 
resource important for public health, which meant that regional and property-value 
based cross-subsidies were applied to ensure universal water supply of adequate 
quantity and quality, even if the goal was full cost recovery for water supply (ibid.). 
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As Page & Bakker (2005) further point out, this did not eliminate the influence of local 
politics or interest groups. Powerful land owners and industry groups, in particular, 
were able to lobby for specific exemptions or inclusions in water policy and its 
implementation. After 15 years of this arrangement, in 1989, the 10 regional water 
authorities were sold to private companies, effecting a complete privatisation of 
water management, with each basin to be managed holistically by a single private 
company. The market was supposed to take care of setting a fair price and ensure 
responsible use of a sensitive resource.  
But, the initial years of privatisation of water are now remembered mainly for the 
sudden spike in the charges for water. In a report prepared for Public Services 
International, a global federation of trade unions, Lobina & Hall (2001) find that 
average price increase for the whole country as well as for only Thames Water was 
nearly 50%. Following widespread backlash from the popular media, including those 
generally backing the agenda of privatisation, market pricing was abandoned and a 
regulatory route was taken (Bakker 2001). New Labour’s manifesto for the 1997 
elections mentions water in the context of promoting competition in order to foster 
a successful and profitable business environment, but foregrounds the interests of 
customers and the environment:  
“Where competition is not an effective discipline, for example in the water 
industry which has a poor environmental record and has in most cases been 
a tax-free zone, we will pursue tough, efficient regulation in the interests of 
customers, and, in the case of water, in the interests of the environment as 
well. We recognise the need for open and predictable regulation which is fair 
both to consumers and to shareholders and at the same time provides 
incentives for managers to innovate and improve efficiency.” (Labour Party, 
1997) 
The Labour government elected that year passed Water Industry Act 1999, two key 
features of which had a lasting impact on the evolution of the water industry in 
England: (i) It prohibited water companies from disconnecting service to users who 
hadn’t paid their bills (ii) It imposed significant restrictions on metering of household 
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water use except under extra-ordinary circumstances, or unless the customer 
wanted to be charged ‘by volume’. Even this provision was meant for the customer’s 
preference in case their volume of use did not match the value of their property, 
which was the existing method of charging. For good measure, the Act adds that 
customers who opt for billing by volume of use cannot be charged for the fitting of 
meters in their premises. 
The result of this was that water charges continued to be billed on the basis of the 
value of residential properties, called ‘rateable value’, for the most part. These 
charges had to be approved by the Director General of Water Services, which became 
Ofwat, deriving from the Office of Water Services that supported the Director 
General, in 2006 (LD26). Ofwat is now constituted by a Board rather than the Director 
General, and conducts price reviews every five years on the basis of its mandate to 
“balance the interests of consumers with the need to make sure the sectors can 
finance the delivery of water and sewerage services.”21 This early focus on pricing 
continues to be the most significant restriction applied on the water sector, forcing 
water companies to plan for the least possible increments in investment, 
simultaneously protecting stakeholders and shareholders, from a business point of 
view (Ogden & Watson 1999). The institution representing the public to the industry 
– the Consumer Council for Water, formerly the Customer Service Committees – are 
on the side of the ‘average customer’ taking a majoritarian stand on keeping the 
prices down rather than argue for water conservation or distributive justice, as Page 
& Bakker (2005) point out. 
This ‘re-regulation’ of the water sector, in theory, thwarted the march towards 
market environmentalism, where pricing mechanisms that incorporate 
environmental costs are important to inculcate user discipline. Yet, the privatised 
water sector soon came to be known as a success story in environmental water 
management. The Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and 
the agency it sponsors to execute environmental regulation, the Environment Agency 
(EA), both announced at the turn of the century that the water management strategy 
                                                          
21 See: https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulated-companies/price-review/ 
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of the 90s under a privatised industry had achieved record quality in England’s rivers 
and other water bodies (LD31, LD32) with a simultaneous improvement in drinking 
water quality as well (LD29).  
This has been achieved by recoding (see Figure 11) water from its position as a 
strategic national resource to a ‘part of the environment’, argues Bakker (2005), 
perhaps the most consistent chronicler of the water sector in England: 
“The reconfiguration of citizens as consumers under market 
environmentalism has thus occurred in tandem with the representation of 
the environment as a legitimate user whose interests are to be balanced 
with—or even prioritized over—those of consumers.” (Bakker 2005: 560) 
What she refers to is the EA’s role in issuing abstraction licences and approval for 
safe disposal of treated sewage. These licenses are issued by taking into 
consideration the level of stress a water body is under and whether it can afford to 
be extracted for human use. As the EA sets it out in its abstraction licensing strategy: 
“Abstractions over 20 cubic metres per day require an abstraction licence 
(with some exceptions). Whether we grant a licence or not depends on the 
amount of water available after the needs of the environment and existing 
abstractors are met, and whether the justification for the abstraction is 
reasonable.” (LD25: 9) 
The regulation, as the above statement shows, requires justification to extract water 
from the environment’s use towards human use. So, the ‘market’ side of market 
environmentalism may have failed; but, this didn’t mean that environmentalism had 
necessarily been a smokescreen either. While it may not have been possible to use 
pricing to effect user discipline and water conservation, the regulatory framework 
placed environmental use in the same plane thus changing the way water was 
conceptualised. In other words, water’s multiplicity was put to use to alter industry 
approach to its management. It is usually assumed that commodification is desired 
by neoliberal states but is not achieved due to cultural or social plurality. But, what if 
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states and indeed the private industry could benefit from the ambiguity of water and 
the ‘tacking back and forth’ (Star 2010) between water as a resource, a commodity 
and a part of the environment? This would constitute water as a boundary object 
around which regulatory governance could be built.  
4.4.3. Two maps and the turn towards water multiples 
During the course of the interviews in London, in contrast to Chennai, the colourful 
history of privatisation, politics and regulation almost never came up. However, 
discussions veered more towards the regulators and their models to approach to 
water than about the actual mechanics of water supply itself, even less specifically 
about the desalination project.  
“Ofwat’s job has always been to balance supply and demand in an industry 
which doesn’t have market competition and the commodity is one essential 
for life.” (L13) 
“The key to understanding the water industry in England and Wales is to 
understand Ofwat. When water was privatised, there was a need for 
companies to be regulated so they don’t provide shoddy service or 
overcharge customers. So, Ofwat was instituted.” (L17) 
“It’s not Ofwat’s job to protect water as a resource. It is their job to ensure 
our ability to supply water, to protect our resources (chuckles)” (L34) 
By their resources, the respondent, a former engineer at Thames Water, meant 
finances and water, hence the chuckle. Understandably, Ofwat featured more 
prominently in response than the EA, since it was Ofwat that approved water 
companies’ pricing and their resource management plans, before it was passed on 
formally to DEFRA for final approval. In practice, Ofwat worked with water companies 
to ensure that their projects, like desalination for example, are workable financially 
and that they would be able to recover their expense through reasonable pricing. The 
EA’s major interactions with the water sector was in licensing abstraction and issuing 
permits for safe discharge of treated waste, clearly a more traditional regulator’s 
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role. Yet, there was one report prepared by the EA which kept cropping up in 
discussions about the desalination plant. It was a classification of areas by water 
stress published in 2007 (see Figure 12), in response to the drought conditions the 
south east of England had started experiencing from 2004-06 (Marsh 2007).  
The EA did not come into existence during the water privatisation of 1989, but rather 
in 1996, following the Environment Act 1995, passed in the same year that the north 
of England suffered a particularly severe drought. The EA was meant to replace a 
number of other institutions and so came with a wide range of functions including 
that of the National Rivers Authority, pollution control, fisheries regulation, flood 
defence and some aspects of harbours, navigation and conservancy. While the EA 
does not replace any executive or engineering functions like the statutory duties of 
the water companies to provide an essential service, it is tasked broadly with the 
mandate “to protect or enhance the environment.” It was meant to be the agency 
that helped DEFRA make decisions about responding to drought, flood and other 
environmental events. 
So, when the south east of England faced a dip in rainfall resulting in water shortages 
from 2004-2006, the EA, on request from DEFRA, prepared a report classifying areas 
in England by their level of water stress. This report contained a map that colour 
coded whole river basins according to the level of water stress they were 
experiencing; ad since adjacent river basins tended to share similar hydrological 
features, whole regions were coloured in blocks of yellow, orange and red. But, 
hydrology influenced only the report’s estimated water availability; the other major 
factor it considered was actually household water use which it scored on the basis of 
volume. Higher the volume of per capita water use, the score contributed towards a 
higher stress level. Based on a three tier classification of ‘low’, ‘medium’ and 
‘serious’, the whole of south east of England was marked ‘seriously water stressed’ 
in bright red in the map. This was picked up widely by the media, civil society and 
public interest groups22.  
                                                          
22 “Water metering plans put forward”, BBC, 30 Jan 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/6314091.stm  
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Figure 12: Map showing Water Stress Classification in England in year 2007.  
Source: Environment Agency Water Stress Classification 2007. (LD2, p. 5) 
 
The Consumer Council for Water (CCWater) responded as below to the to the EA 
report: 
“We agree that there should be some degree of coordinated water efficiency 
activity everywhere in England.  We believe that this already happens to an 
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extent as water companies have a statutory duty to promote the efficient use 
of water by their customers. There is a broad spectrum of water efficiency 
activities ranging from education programmes which should happen 
everywhere, to compulsory metering and supporting initiatives for this, which 
should only happen in areas where it is more cost-effective than other 
approaches to manage to the supply-demand balance.” (LD30) (italics added) 
The peculiarity of water regulation in England conscripted water users as both 
‘consumers’ or ‘customers’ to be given a certain level of service, and also 
environmental subjects obliged to water companies’ national duty to control their 
usage behaviour. CCWater straddles the line between water as a resource that needs 
to be efficiently used and a commodity that needs to be managed in cost effective 
ways and attempts to reconcile these two conceptualisations of water through the 
factor of user interests.  
Water companies conceptualise levels of stress entirely through their ability to 
provide a certain degree of service or alternatively, the need to impose certain use 
restrictions. In fact, the latest EA National Drought Framework in 2017 (LD27) 
identifies three types of drought – environmental, agricultural and water supply 
droughts – of which the last one is rarer because supply systems are designed to deal 
with environmental adversities. Accordingly, water suppliers are required, by the 
Water Industry Act 1991, to prepare and maintain Drought Plans, updated every 
three years. Drought management measures usually span the three categories of (i) 
Temporary Use Ban (ii) Drought Order (iii) Emergency Drought Order (LD28). The first 
two categories involve restrictions on non-essential use, popularly known as 
hosepipe bans. Emergency drought orders have not been issued in the UK since 1976. 
This is because they involve withdrawing full service through some means and 
introducing limited supply, like through standpipes. In everyday parlance, this means 
that if drought effects cannot be mitigated through hosepipe bans, then people will 
have to be queueing in front of standpipes, a dramatic shift in access levels.  
“The shift is dramatic because our infrastructural doesn’t have room for any 
in-between levels. You can’t cut off supply for a few hours per day to 
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vulnerable populations like old people, hospitals etc. Retrofitting houses with 
dual piping for drinking and other water will be expensive and infeasible.” 
(L33) 
“Standpipes, we have to admit, are a bogeyman. I mean, we have to use them 
temporarily when a main bursts or something. But, we wouldn’t do it 
voluntarily as a drought measure.” (L34)  
So, Thames Water’s decision to build a desalination plant was taken in the middle of 
the drought of 2004-06, with the spectre of standpipes ahead:  
“There was no one eureka moment when we took the decision. We were in 
the middle of level 2 [of the drought management framework], banning car 
washing and so on. We could see that if droughts continued into the next 
year, there would be certain areas without water 24 hours a day. Imagine if 
that happened in London, the capital city; now, imagine if that happened in 
the Olympic year!” (L13)  
In this situation, Thames Water had four options to choose from. The first one was 
to build a reservoir in Abingdon in Oxfordshire, something that the company had 
wanted for a long time. But, it was fiercely opposed by a vocal group of local residents 
along with environmental groups for all the reasons that large reservoirs and dams 
are usually opposed for23.  This group, while opposing a reservoir as environmentally 
destructive, however, recommend inter-basin water transfers and desalination as 
sustainable routes for the Thames Valley to take. This is what Thames Water ended 
up doing in building a reverse osmosis desalination plant on the Tidal Thames, to be 
used only in times of drought. It could also have built a waste water recycling plant 
using membrane technology very similar to desalination. The company has built a 
localised recycling plant in east London, which was used to supply non-potable water 
for use in the Olympic stadium. It draws its input from the northern outfall sewer, 
but is localised in that its output doesn’t connect back to the networked supply.  
                                                          
23 The Group Against Reservoir Development (GARD) challenges Thames Waters plans, see: 
http://www.abingdonreservoir.org.uk/  
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Thames Water’s final option was to undertake massive leakage reduction in its 
Victorian mains, which it was anyway required to do by statutory and political 
obligation.  
“We had applied to Ofwat for mains replacement even in the 1990s, but they 
wouldn’t approve the hike in cost and water charges that came with it. So, we 
applied for a twin track approach – mains replacement leading to a 250 MLD 
reduction in demand and a desalination plant for 150 MLD increase in supply. 
They approved this.” (L18)  
Drought hit England again in 2010-11 with two consecutive dry winters plummeting 
groundwater and reservoir levels. By then, the city’s desalination plant was already 
fulfilling the company’s statutory obligation of drought-preparedness. The drought 
ended in the summer of 2012 with record rainfall, after which there has not been a 
drought situation in the city yet (as of 2018). The desalination plant thus has never 
had to be used except to compensate for the odd abstraction problem from a 
reservoir or aquifer.  
In 2013, the EA updated its method of geographical classification of water stress 
levels as well as its representation, publishing a new report with a map that looked 
mostly green (low water stress) with dots of red and orange (LD3). This report was 
prepared for the purpose of helping make decisions on compulsory metering, but it 
focused entirely on overall abstraction and its effect on water bodies in the basin. 
What it, in fact, depicted was the stress on specific water bodies rather than on entire 
basins or the catchment area of said water bodies. Unsurprisingly, this map did not 
become a popularly imprinted image. 
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Figure 13: Map showing Water Stress Classification in England in year 2013. 
Source: Environment Agency Water Stress Classification 2013 (LD3, p. 8) 
 
Bakker’s analysis of the regulatory framework in the UK recognises that water has 
not been made legible through neoliberalisation and commodification, and that 
multiple cultures of water or ‘waters’ persist:  
“Although neoliberalization attempts to rescript water as an economic good, 
consumers’ meanings and values of water do not easily succumb to messages 
of economic reductionism.” (Bakker 2005: 545) 
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This is why she calls water an ‘uncooperative’ commodity (ibid.). But, as the 
documents and reports above have shown, it isn’t only the users who ascribe 
multiple meanings to water; but the arms of regulatory government and indeed the 
water industry, juggle around multiple definitions of water in their textual encoding 
of the environment. The city’s infrastructural growth has, in fact, diversified the 
water multiples leading to different purposes served by waste water, desalinated 
water, brackish water etc. Thus, the regulatory state in the UK does not attempt to 
commodify water despite its multiple existence, but through its variable and 
malleable conceptualisation. It is invested in the ‘interpretive flexibility’ (Star 2010) 
of water as that over which there can be ‘tacking back and forth’ (ibid.) between 
models of techno-scientific governance. This is what enables institutions and experts 
on water governance to exercise a form of ‘stateness’ (Painter 2006) through water 
infrastructure in London. In the consensus and evidence based politics of 21st century 
Britain (Giddens 2013), an essential substance like water becomes an ideal ‘object of 
governance’ through its boundary-making properties and its simultaneous ability to 
bring diverse views together in a necessary plan of action even if not in principle.  
4.5. Conclusion 
There was a clear difference in the way this chapter dealt with the political and 
institutional histories of water in Chennai and London. While the section on Chennai 
delved considerably into continuity of the political cultures and idioms of authority 
shaping hydrology in Tamil Nadu over a long time, the London narrative started only 
after the privatisation of the water sector in 1989 and stuck to the mechanics of 
governance since then. This is partly a function of my ethnographic methodology 
which achieved better results in Chennai than in London, yielding conversations of 
greater length and depth. But, it is also a reflection of the nature of the state and its 
articulation in the two cities. Even casual conversation or the beginning of interviews 
usually referred to the history of water projects and their politics in Chennai, whereas 
in London, there was little said about water before it was privatised. Even the Great 
Stink and Bazalgette’s sewers were reserved for when the city’s legacy was explicitly 
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addressed. But, the absence of a visible political culture or its effect on public 
memory did not make the state absent in London.  
This chapter has given a broad outline of how reverse osmosis desalination plants 
came to be built in two vastly different cities across the global south and north. 
Building on empirical material from the fieldwork, where almost every interview or 
conversation referred to the government or a state institution or the national 
regulation in the context of water supply in general as well as in relation to the 
desalination plants, the chapter turned to the idea of the state to frame its narrative. 
Water infrastructure in both cities is built and sustained through a complex 
interconnection between institutions of government, private companies, individual 
agents and political parties. It is the constantly shifting and emergent logic of this 
relationship that is called the ‘state’ or ‘stateness’ (Painter 2006). The term 
‘stateness’ goes beyond the functionality of governmental institutions and the 
reification of their distinction from and control over society to consider how 
“everyday life is permeated by the social relations of stateness, and vice versa.” (ibid.: 
752) While this might indeed include political imaginaries and cultures that 
institutional practices could give rise to, water is a key element through which the 
state’s presence is materially articulated. Water’s inevitability and indispensability in 
everyday life makes it a useful object through which to study the constitution of 
‘stateness’ across varying geographies. This, however, does not mean that there is a 
universal logic or structure of state power in relation to water. The ‘social relations’ 
that are recognised as the state in Chennai and London are distinct and emergent.  
Water has always been a vividly political object in the history of Chennai and the 
Tamil state, which have evolved in a symbiotic trajectory of urbanisation and 
technological mediation of their social relations. As this chapter demonstrated, these 
relations have been ‘peopled’ (Simone 2004) by an elaborate network of authority 
and distributed agency mobilised over years of Dravidian politics and universal 
welfare populism.  In tracing the succession of events and processes that lead to the 
construction of the desalination plant, this chapter has argued that the network is, in 
fact, socio-technical and constitutes the formation of what can be understood as an 
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‘infrastructural state’. This means that the urban form and its water supply systems 
enable the materialisation of the state in ‘concrete’ (Meehan 2014) forms in 
everyday life as well as in the more-than-material infrastructures of intent, agency 
and authority that characterises Chennai’s institutional set up. The seawater 
desalination projects are an attempt at gradual movement towards centralised and 
universal networks, which would presumably involve increasing and changing 
techno-political mediation, and so present an interesting tapestry on which to study 
emerging engineering practices and technical knowledges shaping urban 
environmental subjectivities. This is precisely what the subsequent chapters attempt 
to do.  
In London too, the ‘stateness’ permeated by water supply and management can be 
termed ‘infrastructural’ but for very different reasons. Here, water acts as a 
‘boundary object’ – a thing that inhabits multiple social words and enables working 
towards consensus across divergent disciplines and viewpoints (Star & Griesemer 
1989) – between regulatory agencies, private companies and users, constituting the 
state through its ability to be governed. Through a review of academic literature and 
regulatory documentation, this chapter followed the back and forth in 
conceptualisations of water that have prevailed since it was privatised in 1989. The 
privatisation was expected to usher in an era of market environmentalism (Bakker 
2005) by redefining water from a resource to a commodity that is subject to market 
pricing. In the final section, this chapter discussed two maps published by the EA,  
representing drought in very different ways, around the time of construction of the 
desalination plant. They showed that water’s multiplicity enables regulators and 
private companies to build a technoscientific mode of governance as well as material 
infrastructures around it. Since it is this mode of governance that that determines 
the universalised, centralised water supply to households, it becomes an 
‘infrastructure of stateness’.  
Susan Leigh Star, in a 2010 article that clarified the concept of boundary objects to 
sceptics and enthusiasts alike, argues that when the ‘interpretive flexibility’ of the 
object gets standardised between actors, “then boundary objects begin to move and 
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change into infrastructure, into standards” (Star 2010: 605). While in the case of 
London, this process is evident in the attempt to model water use and supply using 
standard frameworks across regions, the reliance on connections and strong, if 
unstable, networks to achieve water supply in Chennai is instructive of the clear 
differences in the way the term ‘infrastructure’ is understood and practised in the 
two cities. Infrastructure does not have to be ‘standard’ in order to perform the 
functions of enabling and connecting that it is supposed to do. It could instead be a 
‘structure of contact’ (Amin & Thrift 2017: 35) that sustains relationalities of power, 
knowledge and politics. These themes will be examined in the following chapters.  
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5. RELATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURES OF BANAL ENGINEERING 
 
5.1. Introduction – the osmotic city 
“In the end, life comes down to electrochemical gradients. But we haven't yet 
found very effective ways of making what works for the cell work for society: 
harnessing the energy released by the equalization of solute concentrations.” 
(Ball 2011: 344)  
The techno-utopia to which science writer Philip Ball appears to be yearning above, 
is rendered in philosophical poetry, as if to defy the idea that science is the anti-thesis 
of culture; the rational logic emerging out of the ashes of the unexplained ways in 
which people used to deal with water and the natural environment in the past. It 
imagines a world where the electrochemical gradient that pervades organic life, like 
plant and animal cells or the meeting point of freshwater and seawater, can be put 
to use in generating power. This gradient, created by the difference in the molecular 
make-up of things, is usually navigated through the process of osmosis in nature.  For 
example, when the earth is watered, the difference in the ratio of water to minerals 
between the soil and the plant’s roots enables the absorption of water along with 
nutrients from the soil to the plant cells. This is osmosis. Similarly, when the river 
meets the sea, the difference in their salinity means that freshwater mixes into the 
sea rather than the other way around. The movement is actually effected by an ionic 
exchange and hence can be used to generate energy as Ball (ibid.) says above.  
Technology, nature and culture are often squared off against each other as 
irreconcilable elements of the city. The nature-culture divide, however, has been 
bridged in geographical study through the concept of metabolism – of natural 
resources by circulations of capital, knowledge and power that drive urbanisation. In 
metabolic urbanisation (Swyngedouw 2006), technology is a tool and those who 
wield it are agents of capital or other power structures, crafting hybrid techno-
natures (see chapter 2 for a detailed review of the literature on urban metabolism). 
Fantastic possibilities like the one imagined above might be just another techno-fix 
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in this narrative. But, a critical study of the practice of technologically mediated 
resource access and use in cities throws new light on such imaginations as a hint of 
the negotiation between the categories of nature and culture that technologies 
mediate. Metabolism is far from complete or seamless in cities and circulatory 
technologies and networks have to be constantly made and remade to navigate the 
complex socio-materialities of everyday urban life. As Gandy (2018) has recently 
suggested:  
“In this sense the urban becomes a space of multiple possibilities driven not 
just by the logic of capital but emerging from a series of socioecological, 
technological, and ideological entanglements.” (Gandy 2018: 98) 
These entanglements, based on the metaphor of chemical gradients and the ionic 
exchange between them, can be imagined as ‘osmotic’. An analytical shift from 
metabolism to osmosis in conceptualising the urban enables a nuanced 
understanding of the contested power relations and negotiated techno-politics that 
cities have historically engendered. This approach also opens up the sociology of 
knowledge production in the technological intervention of interest here – reverse 
osmosis desalination. Interestingly, it is also useful in a socio-ecological framing of 
leakage, a significant feature of urban water supply systems all over the world that a 
metabolic approach can only characterise as fracture or disorderliness (Coelho 2006, 
Giglioli & Swyngedouw 2008).  When fresh water mixes and assimilates into saline 
water through a semi-permeable membrane, it is osmosis. Water passes through the 
membrane into the saline side because of osmotic pressure, caused by the difference 
in the concentration between the two liquids. In reverse osmosis (RO), external 
energy is applied to overcome this pressure, enabling a reversal of flow through the 
membrane from the saline to the freshwater side, leaving the minerals behind.  
Thus, the city can be visualised as a series of semi-permeable membranes gently 
separating the categories of technology, the engineer, the urban resident, material 
structures etc. They are categories rather than distinct entities for they refer to 
overlapping hybrid thinking and practice sometimes inhabited by the same 
professional or institution. The semi-permeable membranes allow interaction 
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between the categories enabling movement of things, ideas, identities, power 
relations and knowledge, ultimately reshaping the entities and their relationships. 
They also restrict certain flows potentially giving rise to or limiting conflict. Any 
discourse or knowledge emerging from this is not necessarily a convergence of 
various interests but a practice that seeps through the membranes of conflict and 
communication. This chapter is interested in the osmotic manner in which 
engineering knowledge and practice are mutually constituted with urban 
infrastructures in Chennai and London. It uses RO desalination, a seemingly precise 
techno-fix, as its point of departure to explore the negotiated nature of engineering, 
technology and expertise. It begins by detailing what RO is and how the difference 
between its electrochemical conceptualisation and its material technique can help in 
the understanding of engineering practice in the two cities. It raises the question of 
whether there is such a thing as an engineering approach to water supply, and if so, 
what that means for infrastructural transitions and politics.  
So-called quick-fix solutions like desalination are contrasted against continuous 
maintenance issues like leakage in Chennai as well as London. But, as this chapter 
will show, RO and leaky pipes occupy a continuum of techno-natural interactions 
over which shared knowledges and relational infrastructures are established. In 
order to accommodate the inter-city and global relationalities of these 
infrastructures, the chapter adopts a thematic structure than deal with each city 
separately. Section 5.2. delineates how the gradient of agencies and 
compartmentalised identities exercised by various technical practitioners in water 
management become relational infrastructure, through shared knowledges and 
practices. Section 5.3 places the relational networks of water engineering in Chennai 
alongside those in London to explore hierarchy of knowledge flows globally and how 
a technology like desalination alters that. It then unpacks how expertise emerges 
from these multi-scalar interactions. Section 5.4 returns to the urban scale, tracing 
the global networks back to the city. By discussing leakage, an important issue in 
urban water systems that water companies are wont to ignore thanks to its 
technological dullness, the section lays out a spatial politics of engineering expertise 
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in the city. The chapter will then conclude with a discussion on what engineering 
agency means and how it works with the structural elements of cities.  
5.1.1. Working with pressure 
Chennai and London are two cities that have battled the chemistry of salt and water 
for a long time. Close to the sea, with estuaries and canals drawing patterns over a 
range of porous and non-porous soil types, the biophysical make-up of the two 
contemporary cities encourage play between water and minerals. That they are vast 
urban agglomerations which have been growing steadily over the past 150 years or 
so, and more rapidly in the past two decades has only added salt to this petri dish. 
While Londoners figure out ways to remove limescale from their kettles, Chennaiites 
scrub their steel pots and buckets clean of salt deposits. Rust and clogging are a 
problem in pipelines, showers and household appliances thanks to mineral residue. 
Households have tried out various filtering mechanisms including charcoal and 
muslin cloth to improve water quality, protect appliances and make better tasting 
tea. Taps would have mechanical filters in place even before reverse osmosis 
purifiers and large scale desalination came to be prevalent. So, each of those sites of 
chemical gradation were also sites of technological mediation and hence, of techno-
politics. As Barry (2017a: 13) puts it: 
“the chemical compositions of atmospheres, landscapes and bodies have 
become critical sites for politics, government, and everyday experience.” 
(Barry 2017a: 13) 
Seawater desalination arrives in continuity with this long line of filtration and 
mediating technologies between water, salt and people. Since technological 
mediation is inevitable to urban water access, professional water management is 
necessarily a technological practice, most commonly associated with engineering 
work.  
Osmosis is usually represented by a U-shaped tube (see Figure 14), with a 
membrane dividing its base, separating the two solutions neatly compartmentalised 
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in the two arms of the U. If the membrane allows solute particles to pass through, 
then the low concentration solution moves to the high concentration side, carrying 
dissolved particles with it, as it happens with plants absorbing water and nutrients 
from the soil. If the solutions are water with different mineral concentrations and 
the membrane is permeable only to water, blocking solute particles, then, water 
flows from the freshwater to the saline side until the concentrations of both sides 
are equalised, achieving system equilibrium. 
 
Figure 14: Osmosis and Reverse Osmosis – an illustration. 
Source: Developed by author. 
 
In the illustration, the difference in levels between the two sides represents the 
‘osmotic pressure’. This is the amount of pressure that needs to be applied on the 
higher concentration side to stop the flow of water through the semi-permeable 
membrane. In reverse osmosis, a higher pressure than the osmotic pressure is 
applied on the saline side to reverse the flow so that water flows from the saline to 
the fresh side, leaving the mineral salts behind the semi-permeable membrane. 
Reverse osmosis constantly fights the tendency of the system to move towards 
equilibrium by applying sufficient pressure on the high concentration side to reverse 
the pressure dynamic of the system. This is a widely known and understood process 
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in households all over Chennai, where groundwater was pumped from backyards and 
purified using reverse osmosis purifiers, or simply RO as they have come to be called 
colloquially.  
 
 
Figure 15: Reverse osmosis filters at the Beckton desalination plant, London. 
Source: Fieldwork photo. 
It, however, was not the engineer’s vision of reverse osmosis, as I found out while 
having to watch a half-hour video tutorial on reverse osmosis at an engineer’s home 
in Chennai. It was quite important to understand that the desalination plant is 
comprised of a large number of membranes, possibly of varying vintage, he (C13) 
explained (see Figure 15). This is something critics (C43, C52) point out as a 
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maintenance problem with desalination. The image conveyed by numerous 
engineers to me is of a roll of fabric, which are the membranes layered around one 
another in the form of a pipe filtering the highly pressurised saline water sent 
through them (C28, C40, L35). Since the water pressure exceeds the tendency of this 
high concentration solution to not flow, what emerges out of the membrane is water 
shorn of all its mineral content, some of which is responsible for salinity. So, the 
water obtained is nothing like the fresh water we are used to encountering. The latter 
is multiple and comprised of a wide spectrum of mineral concentrations and 
suspended particles. RO water is wiped so clean of any additional material, harmful 
or otherwise, that it is re-mineralised in order to make it taste close to what we are 
used to. The efficiency or superiority of a RO plant is thus not about the purity of the 
water output, but the proportion of water left behind as residue. In Chennai, about 
40% of the seawater is left behind to be discharged. In London, since the water drawn 
is merely brackish and not exactly seawater, nearly 85% of the solution passes 
through. This outcome of desalination is also socialised at the household level in 
Chennai in terms of the difference in taste between purified RO water and piped 
water if available. The residue is often collected in buckets to water gardens or wash 
automobiles (CE19).  
In engineering circles, water obtained from desalination is more accurately 
understood as a synthesis than as production or manufacture. Although we imagine 
a volume of water gushing through a membrane leaving behind impurities as in a 
sieve, the reverse osmosis occurs at a molecular level because of the electrochemical 
action of ions in the water. The membrane is permeable to these ions and not to the 
mineral ions. It takes repetitive iterations of the filtration process to achieve a steady 
stream of potable water, constantly fighting the system’s tendency to move to 
equilibrium. If there wasn’t attention given to the system, it would spiral into 
equilibrium, in a manner of speaking. So for an engineer, to achieve flow, equilibrium 
needed to be resisted. Maintaining a difference in pressure (Anand 2011) to enable 
flow was crucial to engineering work and thinking. But, is there such a thing as an 
engineering approach that is distinct from other approaches and attuned to a 
particular principle of pressure or precision? As the following sections show, there 
158 
can be observed a clear set of practices of the water engineer in the two cities, but 
this is far from being an essential reflection of their orientation towards technological 
precision. They are, instead, an outcome of their negotiated position between the 
multiple membranes that compartmentalise their identities as technocrats, residents 
of particular geographies, political actors, expert professionals etc. Through gradual, 
repeated iterations of technological and political practice, an accepted framework 
for water supply is formulated.  
5.1.2. The myth of the puppet engineer 
“A municipal water service is, like any other service, a relation among actors, 
a social exchange. Large engineering bureaucracies, however, tend to 
conceive of and portray their services as structured primarily by natural 
principles such as gravity, slope and depth, or by the imperatives of science 
and engineering. Pressure, scale, size and distance are presented as natural 
'givens' – universal imperatives, free of history – and are invoked to explain 
the limits and parameters within which the service must operate.” – Karen 
Coelho (2006: 497) 
This academic critique is surprisingly common among bureaucrats and consultants 
managing water supply in Chennai today. Admonishing engineers for missing the 
people in their attention to hydrology and hydraulics, they’ve granted themselves a 
freer hand in managing water resources on a socio-economic basis. London’s water 
supply is famously privatised and managed by the logic of cost recovery and 
environmental management. It is governed by a strict regulatory framework, which 
is what, several water managers asserted, lead to the construction of a desalination 
plant in Beckton.  
In both cases the managerial intervention was deemed necessary because the then 
model of water supply and sewerage disposal was found to be oblivious to the 
economic and ecological issues that water flows are implicated in. Ofwat’s (LD4) 
recent review of the water industry in the UK credits early 20th century private 
investments and regulated localised supply with achieving nearly 100% piped water 
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supply, but follows it up by arguing that this was insufficient to deal with the pollution 
control and sewerage disposal needs of the 1960s and 70s. Based on the diagnosis 
from a Central Advisory Committee report on water (LD5), in 1971, that it was the 
separate and discrete handling of water supply and sewerage disposal by local 
authorities that was the problem, the Central Government proposed to plan for 
water on “an integrated river basin basis under a responsive management structure.” 
(p.12) As the Ofwat report surmises: 
“This would allow each river and its tributaries to be regulated and managed 
to ensure discharges did not pollute water supplies. It would also ensure that 
abstractions did not put at risk river life and the enjoyment of river users.” 
(LD4, p. 12)  
As detailed in the previous chapter, eventually, the integrated water authorities were 
privatised in 1989, with further emphasis on economic and environmental 
management, even if there was no explicit rejection of engineering.   
In Chennai, the ‘engineering approach’ was directly held responsible for then 
problems with water supply. Administrative officers in the Tamil Nadu state 
government claimed that engineers had, for a long time, focused only on finding ways 
to draw water from Chennai’s hinterlands and failed to make any innovative progress 
in the city’s water network. In line with policy and academic research (see for e.g. 
Baviskar 2004), administrators stressed the need for decentralised or community 
oriented water and demand management as opposed to the engineers’ supply 
oriented approach. A retired official was almost apologetic about saying:  
“There are many passionate engineers in Metrowater and the Government, 
who believe in environmental management. But, by and large, the 
engineering ethos is to prefer large projects than decentralised or smaller 
ones as they are easier to manage.” (C61) 
The engineers, in turn, said that large projects were anything but easy to manage and 
that they did decentralised work every day. Yet, planning for bulk supply of water 
160 
especially through one new technology or source was identified as an ‘engineering 
ethos’ that needed to be reined in for economic and environmental reasons. The UK 
water industry, after privatisation, was facing what a report commissioned by its 
trade union members identified as a private equity problem:  
“We are now down to only four companies, with most of them in the hands 
of private equity consortia, often foreign owned.” (LD6) 
That is, only four of the water companies in the UK were UK stock exchange listed 
companies, with the rest being multinationals or owned by private equities. The 
largest of them, including Thames Water, were owned by private equities from 
around the world with little interest in water engineering as a business, let alone as 
public infrastructure. Yet, the British water engineer continues to hold some 
authority as an expert and acts as a consultant for various projects around the world. 
This has been attributed to the uniqueness of the British water privatisation itself as 
an expertise that can be exported elsewhere (Larner & Laurie 2010). As I will show in 
this chapter, the sheer myth of historical British water engineering and the colonial 
networks it drew from sustain its position in global networks now. In fact, engineers 
in the UK do acknowledge that they are no experts in emerging technologies like 
reverse osmosis, recycling or even smart meters.  
“London has this legacy infrastructure and the entitlement that there’s 
abundance of water! So, we never developed the kind of innovation or 
expertise that they did in Australia or Western US, where there are serious 
droughts.” (L33) 
However, this has not always been the case, as delving into Thames Water’s 
organisational history shows. The company’s interest in water technologies have had 
to do as much with its global ambition as with the ecology of water and its 
governance in the UK. Paradoxically, it is precisely because of the relative stagnation 
of infrastructural change in the UK that its privately owned companies reach outward 
and attempt to establish their expertise in the global water market.  
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The private sector in Chennai charges Metrowater with stagnation in its innovations, 
because its engineers had grown oblivious to cost, pricing and efficiency in water 
access and supply, with government support and subsidy. In a discussion on 
sustainability of desalination, one of the plant managers from the private company 
contracted with maintenance said:  
“Sustainability is in the hands of Metrowater – what the plant costs to set up 
or operate and what they charge the people are incomparable. How can it be 
sustainable then? The engineers don’t have to learn new things. Whatever 
they decide to implement, they don’t have to worry about costs.” (C13) 
He was an engineer as well, but like many others in the private water sector, he had 
spent a few years working in West Asia. His experience in Saudi Arabia, he claimed, 
informed his practice. He also held the title of consultant as he had taken it upon 
himself to learn and develop a managerial approach to water engineering. 
Metrowater engineers, on the other hand, had no reason to learn anything more 
than their limited supply framework and that stagnates them, he reasoned (C13).  
Engineers from Metrowater, however, argued that they were of course keen to 
develop expertise on technologies and cutting edge tools in water management, but 
were seldom allowed the space to do so, thanks to the organisation’s top-down 
decision-making. In fact, conversations with Metrowater engineers routinely started 
with lament against the management and its short-sightedness in terms of skill 
development and technological advancement within the organisation:  
“We were excited when the desalination project was announced – you know, 
some of us had worked on advanced filtration technologies before. We were 
keen on some ideas for pre-filtration treatment and had also started learning 
about bioreactors. But, I think someone must have told the MD [Managing 
Director] that ultrafiltration is the best. It sounds the best as well right calling 
itself ‘ultra’. So, they just stuck to it and ended up finding the best contract 
for it basically.” (C14) 
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A retired engineer who had hoped to be promoted into the management cadre said:  
“How does it make sense to make a civil servant the head of Metrowater? 
Their qualifications might be in arts or sciences. How are they to understand 
water engineering and appreciate our work?” (C12) 
Karen Coelho (2010) attributes the restricted role of engineers to Metrowater’s very 
origins as an autonomous institution constituted from the water supply and drainage 
functions of the municipal government in 1978. The newly set up authority was 
meant to be empowered to set tariffs, contract projects, access funding and take 
financial or project decisions without the partisan influence of local or state 
government. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, this is hardly the case. In 
terms of hierarchy as well as practice, Metrowater is answerable to the Tamil Nadu 
State Government. But, what the organisation ultimately answers to is a neoliberal 
rationality, Coelho (2010) argues, taking gradual, incremental steps, with the help of 
international agencies and consultancies. One of those rationalities was the increase 
in financial and managerial control over engineering functions and decision-making. 
There was inevitably downsizing of staff and freeze in hiring at various times through 
the 1990s. Even when engineers within Metrowater agreed that the reforms were 
necessary, Coelho concludes that it can only be because “…the rationales of reform 
had been so successfully internalized within Metrowater…” (ibid.: 6) 
The understanding that these accounts offer of water engineering as a job in 
Metrowater and as an ‘ethos’ strips it of any agency except that of a machinic 
commitment to techno-solutionism. What kind of agencies do engineers, then, 
employ to work within this organisation that has apparently devalued them and a 
critical environment that sees them as puppets in the hands of a global, faceless 
ideology of neoliberalism? How does the management deal with an obviously 
disgruntled set of employees and what does this engineering-management divide 
mean for the sustainability of water systems? I expected to explore these questions 
in the annual meet up of the Society of Public Health and Environmental Engineers 
(SoPHEE) in Chennai on World Water Day. Engineers employed in Metrowater had 
founded SoPHEE as a professional organisation that also doubled as a social network.  
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The group, its members admit, is not very active. They do meet at least annually for 
World Water Day which falls on the 22nd of March and would I care to join them, 
they asked. And so, I turned up at a meeting venue opposite the iconic Spencer Plaza 
on Anna Salai for a gathering of engineers and their families. In a workplace culture 
that doesn’t involve Friday evening drinks at the pub and allows days off mainly or 
only for child or elderly care, the World Water Day event was the office Xmas party 
of sorts. The event was catered by a not-for-profit called Poovulagin Nanbaral 
(Friends of the Earth), that describes itself as a ‘people’s welfare organisation’ 
advocating a constructive scientific approach towards environmental, conservation 
and development issues24. One of their popular campaigns has been for the 
promotion of millets as a sustainable alternative to rice in Tamil Nadu, as they are 
said to be a less water-intensive crop. The food at the event eschewed rice in favour 
of millets and was delicious (CE21).  
5.2. Compartmentalised professional identities 
At the world water day event in Chennai (CE14), I learnt two important things about 
being an engineer in Metrowater: 1. Navigating complex and often apparently 
contradictory approaches to socio-natures becomes second nature when you 
straddle the job of supplying water to a rapidly growing city with general engagement 
in global environmental discourses. What appears contradictory, though, might also 
be thought of as an ontologically grounded and negotiated understanding of the 
techno-scientific abstraction of sustainability. 2. Engineers were not simply another 
component of Metrowater’s leafy cool offices, along with the piles of papers, stacks 
of files and wooden cubicles. Meeting them outside their office where discussion 
often turned to millets, agriculture and water policy reminded me of the osmotic 
membranes which compartmentalised their identities, politics and profession, if 
often unsuccessfully or at the most, provisionally.  
It was the year that Dr Rajendra Singh, winner of the Magsaysay Award for his work 
in reviving Rajasthan’s tank and canal based water harvesting system and popularly 
                                                          
24 See their website for details: http://www.poovulagu.org/ 
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known as the ‘waterman of India’, won the Stockholm Water Prize. Much of the 
discussion in the event revolved around whether Metrowater engineers, collectively, 
can achieve a similar feat, thus preparing the city better for droughts and floods 
(CE21). However, as the guest lecturer, a development scientist, talked from the 
podium about Chennai’s tanks and canals, the engineer (C27) sitting next to me, 
whispered:  
“This is all very well. But, what about the continuous work we do on an 
everyday basis? We’ve reduced leakage from 25% to 7% in the past 5 years. 
Just because that doesn’t seem to generate exciting news…” (C27) 
He was referring to Metrowater’s concerted leakage reduction project, which was 
much suspect thanks to imprecise data. In an odd similarity with its counterpart in 
London, Chennai’s water network is not metered and residents pay the water 
authority not for their use but for the value of their property, provided it actually has 
a Metrowater connection. This means that any calculation of leakage is based on 
extrapolation from a small measured area and may not reflect the network in all its 
complexity across the city (C7). Leakage in the networked pipes, interestingly, had 
not come up as a major politicised issue in Chennai, in the context of desalination or 
otherwise, unlike in London, where it repeatedly rears its head.   
Metrowater had nevertheless decided to address the issue, however imperfectly. 
This has to do with the nature of Metrowater’s expertise and how that’s spatialised 
in Chennai. Leakage is a subject ridden with class and race connotations around the 
world as we’ll see. But, officially, Metrowater and Thames Water reckoned with it in 
ways that were reflective of the urban politics they were embedded in.  So, naturally, 
when asked to further elaborate on the leakage reduction project, the 
aforementioned engineer replied sagely: 
“Giving information begets more questions and trouble only. The city 
residents know we are doing good work, and that’s all matters.” (C27) 
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It was later explained to me by a college professor who was married to a Metrowater 
engineer: 
“You have to understand that many of these men are frustrated but still take 
pride in their job. They have Masters and MPhil degrees and moonlight as 
consultants sometimes. It’s not easy for them to talk about their work in an 
interesting way and acknowledge how much it means to them.” (C28) 
It was typical feminine emotional labour that she was doing in understanding and 
explaining this to me, especially given that most of Metrowater’s project and area 
engineers were men. But, she had a point about their relationship to work not being 
straightforwardly technical. The engineers were the ones who, during the course of 
the leakage reduction project, did the work of supervising digs in busy intersections 
and convincing resident welfare associations that stopping their supply for a few days 
was for a good cause. Several of them, with a wink or a roll of their eyes, recounted 
their experience with residents walking up to them on the road and questioning them 
on the benefits of digging up the pipes. It was narrated in barely concealed pride, 
though, something like a humble-brag; for it would almost always be followed by an 
appreciation for how much the lay-resident took interest in water supply and how 
their work was appreciated by people even when they outwardly grumbled the 
temporary inconvenience. An Operations & Maintenance engineer at the SoPHEE 
event was confident that:  
“They know that we’re doing essential work when we dig up the roads. The 
complaining, in most situations, is a pretext to knowing more about the 
ongoing project.” (C27) 
The leakage reduction figures that came out of this work was, for them, a vindication 
of this boring unheroic work. An engineer, who is supposed to be calculative in work 
and assessment, here, is only all too human in professing statistics that he knows to 
be unreliable because he has an affective, embodied relationship with the labour 
those numbers quantify. Gathered on world water day to plan for sustainable ways 
of managing water, which included criticism of the status quo and the institutional 
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approach, Metrowater’s engineers still owed allegiance to the everyday work they 
did for the institution. This wasn’t quite as stark a contradiction though. What they 
were valourising was, in fact, affective, shared knowledges of a similar kind to that 
employed by Rajendra Singh to build communal water systems in Rajasthan.  
5.2.1. Affective labour of distribution 
The concept of affective labour is usually studied in the context of post-modern 
service-oriented work or feminist orientation towards the anti-capitalist potential of 
work (Dowling et al 2007). Hardt (1999) called them ‘immaterial labour’ to refer to 
their decoupling from use value and Fordist forms of production. It’s not often that 
an engineer working for the urban water utility is said to perform affective labour. 
However, consider Metrowater’s 15 area engineers (CE5), who are in charge of 
distribution from neighbourhood pumping stations to households (see Figure 16). 
They constitute the city’s area-wise distribution scheme. Along with the city-wide 
operations & maintenance engineers, they act as conduit between the institution, its 
purifying and pumping units and the water users. They have the closest numbers on 
how much water actually reaches a household as they monitor a small area. “But, 
they under-report the household level supply figures,“ chuckled a Project Engineer 
(C14) who used to be posted on distribution. He repeated to make sure I heard right. 
They ‘under-report’ supply figures, not pad them up.  
“Their bosses sitting at the Metrowater HQ want them to reduce supply on a 
daily basis in order to make the reservoir storage last longer. But, that’s not 
how things work at the ground level. You need to take into account local 
needs & pressures, hydraulics in the local area etc.” (C14) 
The area engineer here negotiates three potentially conflicting commitments. His 
institutional superior expects him to help him rationalise water resources by cutting 
down on his allotted supply. His professional obligation is to ‘supply water on time, 
adequately and without loss’ (C15) – a broad goal which nevertheless doesn’t include 
efficient resource management. 
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Figure 16: Chennai Metrowater area wise engineering network. 
Source: Metrowater website. chennaimetrowater.tn.nic.in 
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Finally, he is Metrowater’s interface with the households they supply to in that 
neighbourhood. These households could contact him when they’re dissatisfied with 
their water supply and question him why they haven’t received enough water. It is 
not strictly his job to answer them. But, persistent calls on his phone or pressure from 
the local representative could make his job harder. An area engineer seemed 
surprised by the suggestion that he could decline those requests as being outside his 
job description:  
“How can we not answer their calls? They will, of course, question us, if they 
get shoddy service, no?” (C82) 
If affective labour is about producing value that is not necessarily materialistic, but 
instead a shared community or network, then the work performed by Metrowater 
engineers at the neighbourhood level is indeed affective. The community produced 
is not a complete thing, but what Simone (2014: 18) calls infrastructures of 
relationality where “relationships themselves constitute an infrastructure for 
inhabitation”. Such relationships, he argues, are not merely social exchange but 
material carriers of circulation and “tools through which political imaginations and 
claims are exerted.” (ibid.) The area engineers’ motivation for prioritising supply over 
resource management or answering residents’ complaints may not be external, but 
pertaining to the political claim he makes in the network. 
Networks are often considered a classic case of depoliticised ‘third way’ government; 
a techno-fix in itself to gloss over political divisions. They blur the lines between state 
and market, modelling a non-ideological form of government. But, as Barry (2001) 
points out, they can also be a challenge to centralised bureaucratic forms of power, 
and along with ‘community’ empower anarchist politics. In other words, “it would be 
a mistake to view the network as the symbol of a particular political project.” (p.85) 
In Chennai, they emerge as a socio-technical response to a situation with no 
centralised structure as starting point. They were pragmatic technologies of 
household water access that didn’t fit into a neat binary of traditional and modern 
systems; or ally with ideologically puritan stances of environmentalism versus 
technological progress. 
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Metrowater’s area engineers are ‘institutional big men’ (see chapter 4) to the extent 
that they are able to adjust pipes, pressure and gravity to benefit favourable 
residents or ensure universal supply, including those who may not have paid their 
bills or have fulfilled all requirements to be able to get a connection. The area is their 
‘constituency’ (Mines & Gourishankar 1990) even though they are neither elected 
nor publicly accountable in any procedural manner. They work with counterparts 
from the Chennai Corporation, the city government which is divided into zones and 
then further into wards (CE5). Each ward has an elected councillor and engineers 
appointed to manage public works, like roads and stormwater drains. The 
stormwater drains are built only to catch rainwater and drain them off, and should 
not be mixed up with sewerage pipes, which are managed by Metrowater. There are 
also zone level engineers in the Corporation. As with the interconnected mesh of 
stormwater drains, sewerage and supply pipes, and roads, the engineers at different 
ranks in Metrowater and the city Corporation have plenty of reason to cross paths 
and work together.  
In the Corporation’s case, it is the elected ward councillor who takes complaints, 
requests and pressure from residents. They may even approach him for issues with 
water supply or sewerage – Metrowater’s functions. The Corporation’s ward 
engineers largely defer to the councillor in politically sensitive matters like water 
supply. Paradoxically, it is precisely because Metrowater is an unelected institution, 
it is embodied by its engineers posted all over the city. There are freelance plumbers 
and technicians who are often called in to fix local or household level water problems, 
including by Metrowater. But, they are dismissed as too uninterested in the network 
to be worthy of engagement. A south Chennai resident who was active in civic and 
resident welfare associations had this to say about the plumbers she often called in, 
mainly to work on household fittings and filtration systems:  
“They’ll attend to things if you tell them. The onus is on you. They don’t care. 
They are not really conscious that theirs is an important job. They are just 
plumbers like they are just electricians” (C5) 
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The Metrowater engineer, here, is a figure respected for his skilful handling of the 
essential service of supplying water. He is the face of Metrowater in that area. The 
public utility’s area-wise engineering network is as much an infrastructure as its pipes 
and flows. A parallel exchange with engineering consultants in London illustrated 
such a relational infrastructure in blunter fashion. 
5.2.2. London’s history as legacy 
Nearly a year after the World Water Day event in Chennai, I managed to get invited 
to a paid UK Trade & Investment workshop on global investment opportunities for 
British water companies, held before the World Water Tech Investment Summit. The 
summit was intended to be a showcase for water companies and technologies from 
around the world, a Great Exhibition of sorts for the water industry. The special 
workshop for British water companies involved managers from urban water utilities 
around the world pitching their city or state as opportunity for investment. There 
were representatives from Singapore, UAE, India, Saudi Arabia, Philippines and 
Brazil; most of them apologetic that their respective states insisted on retaining some 
kind of control over water management, unwilling to trust private consultants and 
international experts completely (LE1). Still, a member of the UK delegation asked 
(L39), did they not give water away at throwaway prices? How could they be reliable 
customers for British water consultants and technologies if they didn’t charge for the 
water they supplied?  
This was followed by the presentations from Russia, France, Turkey and USA on how 
British companies have successfully made their name in those markets. Despite the 
clear imbalance in how the national affiliation of the water professionals in the room 
affected their sense of expertise about water management, there were transactions 
happening throughout the room positioning them in global networks of relational 
infrastructure. Cleaning up of rivers and wastewater recycling was a running theme. 
Given that the representatives came from the ends of the world (Brazil & Philippnes, 
for eg.), this was a remarkably co-incidental concern (LE1). Chennai, too, was seeking 
Korean and German expertise on how to clean up its infamously stinking river Cooum 
on a Rs. 600 crore (6 Billion) project (CD1). But, in the months preceding this trade 
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event, there had been elections in Tamil Nadu and a change in government, which 
meant the heads of important government institutions were all changed. The new 
Metrowater head did not have enough time to apply for a visa and make it to London. 
There was a representative from Delhi, who just shrugged about the coming together 
of river clean-up and recycling issues in the room:  
“I mean, the problem with our rivers is more complicated. But, wastewater 
recycling is what we can get help for here, no?” (L27) 
In other words, the room was filled with professionals eager to offer deals for that 
particular water problem, and so that became her agency. Wearing a saree in a sea 
of suits, she was also positioning herself in this network of mostly male water 
managers, through specific material devices. However, a group of British engineering 
consultants had a different pitch for her – instead of approaching foreign firms only 
for their technological solutions, wouldn’t Delhi and north India be served better by 
employing foreign expertise towards diagnosing the problem in the first place? It 
turned out that one of the consultants had already worked on a North Indian project 
and in his opinion, the problem was groundwater depletion and the expertise he held 
was in diagnosing these problems. Out of the Delhi official’s earshot, he exclaimed:  
“It’s crazy. They have no idea what they are doing. It is the perfect 
opportunity. We only have to tell them what they don’t want to hear.” (L28) 
His colleague, worried about this candour, later explained: 
“What he means is because we have been through the journey and have a 
history of experience here, we are able to see the problem right away and 
point it out.” (L29) 
Whether it was the saree or the history of the UK’s or mostly London’s messily 
developed water system, these intangible affiliations became a stand-in for agency 
in a globalised water industry attempting to tackle incredibly complex and socio-
ecologically specific water problems. Expertise was not about specific technologies 
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or projects executed by said engineer, but only having been part of a national or a 
global city narrative of infrastructural achievement. For example, at a workshop on 
planning for infrastructure in cities, a researcher from one of UK’s largest engineering 
consultancies divided the world neatly into regions of infrastructural legacy and 
deficit.  
“If you take India or Africa, there is deficit; and here we have a tremendous 
legacy. Now, this legacy gives us the strength and experience to plan for 
robust infrastructures in those deficit regions. At the same time, we need to 
be thinking about resilience and future-proofing of our infrastructure here.” 
(L15) 
It is in these discussions that words like ‘robust’ and ‘resilient’ or ‘sustainable’ 
became useful to engineers and planners, to categorise infrastructures and 
determine the direction of mobility for knowledge and agency. Once London’s water 
system has been accepted as ‘robust’ and a ‘legacy’, that can then be mobilised 
towards building global relational infrastructures. It was this legacy that a senior 
official in the Government Office for Science was drawing on when he said, on a 
different occasion: 
“Arguably, our greatest achievement has been the separation of the water 
we drink from the water we excrete. Our roads are still Roman and our sewers 
Victorian.” (L7) 
He was referring to the discovery of bacteriology and the construction of sewers to 
prevent water-borne diseases in London 150 years ago, to establish the importance 
of science in British city-building. Another consultant who used to work in Thames 
Water linked contemporary water issues to the construction of the sewers in the 19th 
century:  
“We’ve come from the Great Stink to the Great Think; we make technological 
strides by thinking about resilience, future cities.” (L34) 
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He pointed to a picture of the Thames Barrier on a magazine near him. This rhetoric 
worked because of where London’s engineers were situated in their global network 
comprising several of Britain’s former colonies. It’s the Eurocentrism that allowed 
Peter Ackroyd (2008: 3) to introduce the Thames as the ‘shortest river in the world 
to acquire such a famous history’. Despite the Amazon, the Mississippi and the 
Yangtze being nearly 20 times larger, “none of them has arrested the attention of the 
world in the manner of the Thames,” he (ibid.) says. He may have a point there, 
though. What the Thames lacked in size, it made up for in the colonial imagination it 
evoked (Picon 2018). The Chennai Corporation, in its Cooum renewal project, 
emphasized that it takes its inspiration from the Thames. Historical accounts of the 
Cooum in popular culture point out that the river used to be the Thames of 
Madras.25Some of my interviewees in Chennai promised me that I would come back 
one day to see the Cooum transformed like the Thames I see in London. This axis, 
however, has shifted, albeit only slightly with recent technologies like desalination 
and recycling. 
5.3. Sharing knowledges over the water network 
Metrowater’s expertise has, over the years, been steadily established primarily in 
distribution. When the city corporation was in-charge of water supply, it focused on 
drawing water from major reservoirs around Chennai and conveying it to homes 
through pipes or lorries. The creation of Metrowater in 1978 coincided with political 
interest in new sources of water like the Krishna river to the city’s north in the then 
state of Andhra Pradesh; and revival of the Veeranam project – to pipe water from 
the Chola-era Veeranam lake to the south of the city (see chapter 4). These were still 
questions of distribution rather than technological innovation. Around the early 
1990s, when the city was looking to experiment with technologies like thermal 
desalination, Metrowater instituted a hiring freeze and began contracting out most 
                                                          
25 K. Lakshmi. “What's in a name?” The Hindu. 18 Aug 2015. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/will-
the-cooum-river-be-chennais-thames-407041 
Sam Daniel. “Will the Cooum river be Chennai's Thames?” NDTV. 17 Dec 2009 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/chennai/cooums-name-and-origin/article7552957.ece 
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of its projects (C5, C61), in line with the emerging logic of corporatisation in public 
institutions. So, the core competency or the role of Metrowater’s in-house engineers 
continued to be in distribution. In the same period, the city grew rapidly and spouted 
infrastructure almost organically.  
Several neighbourhoods in Chennai, as in other Indian cities, grew before they 
became part of the city. That is, they would develop into a settlement of neatly laid 
out houses and roads, but falling under the governance of a village Panchayat outside 
the limits of Chennai city or Corporation zones. There would be an administrative 
process to get them included in the city limits and then they become eligible for 
urban public services like water and sewerage. Before they reach that stage, its 
residents, often the homeowners, would facilitate their own water access or mobility 
using private contractors. They would rely on borewells to directly pump 
groundwater, and roads can be built by private companies who, then, sell them off 
to the Corporation. A transmission engineer who narrated his experience with this 
process, however, informed me:  
“The roads have to be public for us to be under obligation to supply water. If 
the developer doesn’t want to transfer ownership, then we can refuse water 
supply.” (C15) 
In this way, residents become familiar with the topography of the region and its 
material connection to urban services like water supply or electricity. They also get 
in touch with utilities like Metrowater at this stage, partly because they are unaware 
of the procedure and the difference in the roles of the Corporation and Metrowater. 
Only the city Corporation can approve inclusion of a residential layout within city 
limits whereas Metrowater can only provide supply and sewerage services to those 
they are officially required and approved to do (CD19). But, the contacts established 
during this phase can lead to informal knowledge networks, where residents come 
to learn of the bureaucratic process and Metrowater officials come to know more 
about the neighbourhood. The above engineer softened from his blunt stance on 
obligation to provide water:  
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“We walk them through the process of applying for connection. They are also 
middle class, no? They would have saved up from their monthly salary and 
bought the house or land on mortgage. On top of that, they now find out that 
they have to arrange for basic services too.” (C15) 
Apart from identifying with their own class, it should be kept in mind that 
Metrowater’s engineers can exercise their skill and knowledge only on houses and 
areas that are officially in the network. They might be able to supply a house that 
does not comply with sewerage or rainwater harvesting regulations, but it will still 
have to fall within their urban jurisdiction. They are institutional big men (see chapter 
4) only as far as their map allows them.  In the case of unauthorised settlements even 
within city limits, Metrowater’s role is diminished to assuring water access through 
trucks. Although this role included socio-political negotiation, supplying water 
through trucks held no hidden mystery of underground pipes, gravity and connecting 
heads. It isn’t even that those are unknown mysteries that only a water engineer is 
expected to be able to deal with. In fact, several residents had a clear idea of the 
water network, the type of pipes and connectors used and the hydraulics of water 
supply in the neighbourhood. It is a body of knowledge in which the engineer is 
interested and invested; and this makes him a partner in urban development for 
suburban residents.  
The resident of an affluent south Chennai apartment complex had this to say about 
his constant tussle with the local engineer:  
Earlier it used to be a standard pipeline of ¼ inch for all apartments and 
houses. Now, they have different dimensions for different building sizes. As 
our building has 43 apartments, we get the maximum dimension pipe. 
Problem is, it’s connected to the main through a head, in order to ensure that 
all the water doesn’t flow off to an early diversion, depriving tail-enders. That 
is, water bubbles up into the head before going into the connecting pipes, 
thus buffering flow uniformly in all directions. The bigger the dimension of 
this head, more pressure is required for water to raise and flow. So, 
apartment buildings with bigger pipes are at a disadvantage. (C59) 
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He was glad that the local Area engineer understood this problem even if he did not 
have the power to change this fundamental structure of Metrowater’s network. His 
building was also the first one in a seaward going road, he explained. Such roads 
often hid sand dunes under them. Despite their flat appearance, the water pipelines 
underneath might be traversing upward, pushing water against gravity. So, the use 
of buffer heads is justified, but useless without adequate pressure. Note the step-by-
step reasoning he adopted to put forth his complaint focusing on the structure of 
supply system, the composition and dimensions of its pipelines and the mechanics of 
flow through them. He had detailed and intricate knowledge of the water system in 
his neighbourhood, including its hydrology, pipes and how they have changed over 
the years. He used the right terminology for pipe components and knew their 
dimensions well.  
The Metrowater engineer’s expertise lay in distribution too, and not in new 
technologies like desalination which were planned and executed by external 
contractors, a sore point for some of the younger engineers in the public utility’s 
service. He was not in possession of any advanced techno-scientific knowledge that 
was beyond the grasp of the informed citizen. As Barry (2001: 3) argues, “The citizen 
of a technological society expects and is expected to be informed and updated.”  The 
citizen’s respect for the water engineer, then, stemmed from a shared inhabitation 
of this technological society. That the Metrowater engineer could be reliably 
expected to have knowledge of the techno-material city that this suburban resident 
knew is what sealed their relationship.  
The resident mentioned above, for instance, wasn’t impressed with the 
Corporation’s role in infrastructure building and urban governance: 
“We should be liaising with the ward councillor – he is our representative in 
urban matters, after all. But, his vote bank is only in the slum settlements and 
so he’s not interested in our problems.” (C59) 
The knowledge network that the middle class resident and the Metrowater engineer 
shared could engender a relational infrastructure in the same way that the 
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Corporation Councillor remained accountable and interested in the slum dweller 
through electoral politics. Thus, the relational infrastructures among engineers and 
urban residents is its own political claim. These claims were sometimes made at the 
global scale, as we saw in the trade event in London. At both scales, these established 
patterns were, however, getting reshaped by claims made from the private sector 
and parallel networks of knowledge and expertise. 
5.3.1. Where expertise comes from 
Several engineers in the private water sector in Chennai today trace their 
professional learning and expertise to having worked in West Asia where desalination 
and membrane technologies are used extensively. Accordingly, membrane 
technologies and purification come next only to borewells and pumps in the services 
provided by private firms in the water sector in Chennai. Signing in to visit one of the 
desalination plants, the visitor log listed a long line of addresses from UAE, Kuwait, 
Bahrain and the occasional one from Singapore or USA. Scholars, engineers and 
residents inevitably referred to the Middle East when advocating or criticising 
desalination in Chennai. It was an inter-Asian connection of sorts.  A senior engineer 
who was now a consultant explained: 
“The way it works there is that the engineering firms produce water, and then 
they get to sell it to customers. So, engineers have a free rein on designing 
water systems, which is how we learn so much.” (C26) 
The act of going to West Asia to work in water engineering is also framed as a 
conscious effort on the part of the engineer to become an expert: 
“Metrowater engineers can just do what their bosses tell them to do and get 
by. I, on the other hand, have to continuously keep updating my knowledge 
in order to stay competitive in the market.” (C13)   
This, he reasoned, was why he was a chief technology officer and his colleagues in 
the public sector were still engineers, clearly a title signifying no growth for him. Even 
at junior levels, experience in West Asia or Singapore can make the difference 
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between working as a contractor (C21) – someone who oversees projects including 
labour and logistics - and as a full time engineer (C33) for a private company – 
someone who is given a secure job and benefits for working on specific machinery.  
European expertise does come into the picture in Chennai sometimes, for example 
like the UK company Severn Trent providing training in water quality maintenance. 
Yet, Metrowater engineers, contrary to their private sector counterparts returned 
from West Asia, have not become experts from this water quality training, but clients 
for Severn Trent. One of the top water managers in the private sector (C75), similarly, 
did not like to talk about his experience of having worked in South West Water in 
Exeter, for he thought he did not learn much from the experience that he could use 
‘back home’. He had famously bought a German water engineering company that its 
parent owners thought wouldn’t work in India, a market unwilling to pay for water 
and so, offering very little returns. But, he knew better. Rather, he knew that the 
answer was not to get the users to pay for water, but provide the service to the 
government which could make room in its budget, with sufficient political obligation, 
for expensive water projects. He suggested that I turn my attention to the global 
south where such exciting innovation was happening in the water industry (C75).  
The movement of knowledge, practices and expertise between the south-south and 
north-south or south-north presented different and parallel mobilities; but in all 
these cases, the expertise transferred was that of water management techniques 
that involved navigating local regulation or politics among other socio-material things 
rather than singular technological prowess. If in the north, this involved the most 
efficient technique of compliance with standards and regulations, in the south, the 
adroit execution of public-private partnerships or balancing the imperatives of 
politics and business constituted expertise to be shared.  
Chennai Metrowater, for example, has been receiving visitors from states in the 
global North contemplating desalination, sharing with them their experience in 
executing two projects in the city. The Detailed Project Report (DPR) for the 
desalination plant, prepared by an external consultant, was a valuable document 
according to several of Metrowater’s desalination project engineers.  
179 
“It is a proprietary document, you know. We have obtained that after 
investing many millions. We are obviously not going to share it with states 
that intend to construct a similar project, even if we are not engaged in direct 
consultancy. But, that we have this report is what attests to our ability to plan 
and execute a project of this nature.” (C37)  
It did not seem to matter that the plants were planned, designed, constructed, and 
now, run and maintained by external private companies. It was still a desalination 
plant in Chennai, overseen by Metrowater. Nevertheless Chennai was also a node in 
this network where global water companies, from Europe or Asia, showcased their 
capability to execute a desalination project to their potentially bigger investors from 
the global North. As an executive engineer at Metrowater in charge of one of the 
desalination plants said:  
“When we are not receiving foreign delegations at the plant, our private 
company partners are. We prefer to be present at these visits so the city’s 
image is maintained. But, those guests are mostly interested in employing the 
private company for a project back in their cities.” (C49) 
Metrowater, at the moment, does not engage in external consultancies and has no 
explicit monetary gain in sharing its expertise on project management. But, it is 
invested in developing an ‘image’ for the city is inhabits, whose legacy as we saw 
above can itself be a valuable asset in global networks of technological and expert 
mobilities.  
5.3.2. The ebb & flow of research in the Thames Valley 
The London desalination project would have ideally been a flagship project for 
Thames Water’s expertise, according to former senior staff in the company (L1, L34). 
They entered the company in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when water supply 
stopped being the local council’s responsibility, and was organised into river basins, 
each managed by a single authority (see chapter 4 for details). It was revolutionary 
for young scientists hired at the time to be tasked with  researching how Britain’s 
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water resources could be managed in a scientific and holistic way, one of them (L34) 
impressed upon me.   
“It was exciting to be in charge of this resource that was of national interest, 
you know? It was the first time that water was thought of as something that 
needed to be approached in this holistic and what we might today call 
interdisciplinary way.” (L34) 
But, everyday work wasn’t all breakthrough and innovation, as they found out:  
“We would do plenty of studies on reservoirs and new pipelines, but we could 
only commit to projects that the government had agreed to fund through its 
borrowing. Additionally, we were overseen by public institutions with elected 
members, so things were slow to get approved and processed. I think, during 
the time, we did a good job connecting everything together, improving things, 
making them more efficient. But, we didn’t launch big projects.” (L1) 
When all water authorities were completely privatised in 1989, in theory, research 
continued as before. But, the means of funding had changed and that affected the 
research agenda, flipping the above situation, with risky or innovative singular 
projects, whose cost could be recovered through pricing, getting rewarded while 
works on the existing network that didn’t add something new to the system took a 
backseat.  
“When Thames Water spends on technology to build something new, it can 
make a case to Ofwat that it has put in capital expenditure on the project and 
so needs an increase in its tariffs. A maintenance project, on the other hand, 
only incurs operational expenditure and doesn’t add to its pricing 
calculation.” (L15) 
This meant that research teams could develop their own projects as long as those 
projects would create an asset for the company or contribute to its revenue.  
181 
“As Research & Development manager, I had 20 staff and £ 2-3 million budget 
one year, and suddenly, the next year, it became a budget of £ 7 million and 
70-80 staff. But, grants were always made to us on the basis that you deliver 
a project that saves the company money which you can invest in further 
research.” (L34) 
An example he gave is the Advanced Water Treatment programme of the 1990s that 
involved introducing ozone and activated carbon in treatment plants to purify water 
to a higher standard. This project stemming from internal research actually saved the 
company £ 50-100 million in complying with the drinking water directive thus saving 
its research budget for that year (L36).  
Thames Water’s research investments in the 90s coincided with its phase of global 
expansion. The company started bidding for contracts in East Asia and South 
America, executing water projects for governments around the world. In 2001, it was 
acquired by the German utilities conglomerate RWE, following which it either 
controlled or bought stake in municipal water works in Poland, Croatia, USA and 
China. It was when it acquired American Water in 2003 that Thames Water was at its 
most expansive form (LD7). This was also when the idea of a desalination plant for 
London was floated. According to a consultant who managed research projects for 
Thames Water for 30 years until 2010: 
“We were very interested in membrane technologies. We were actually 
focused completely on waste water recycling and potable water reuse. As you 
may know, similar membranes are used for desalination and recycling.” (L1) 
The Beckton desalination plant is, in fact, remarkably close to recycling as it uses 
water from the tidal Thames, which is closer to wastewater in its salinity than to 
seawater. In both Chennai and London, brackish water desalination is also used 
widely for small scale water purification. In London, this is mainly done to produce 
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bottled water26, while in Chennai it is a fitting in numerous homes and offices to make 
saline groundwater potable.  
While those discrete uses of desalination continue, the new millennium saw private 
companies exiting the municipal water supply business, thanks to lack of profitability. 
Consequently, the regulatory framework in England and Wales sought to prevent 
renationalisation by providing relative security and protection from competition to 
private companies. Conversely, this also prevented British companies from 
consolidating and expanding into expert conglomerates the way French companies 
did (Hall & Lobina 2007). In 2006, RWE sold Thames Water to a consortium of 
investors lead by the Macquarie Group, an Australian investment bank. The 
consortium has since been divested with Thames Water’s shares currently held by 
pension funds from Canada, UK, China, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi. As it should be 
expected from pension funds, Thames Water is now a low risk operation, running the 
city’s 150-year old system, needing no drastic strategies or investments. Desalination 
plants did not feature in Thames Water’s Resource Management Plan 2014 
(WRMP14 – LD8) as a future option, except as small scale units recycling brackish 
water, that can be put to use in contingencies. A feasibility report exclusively on 
desalination prepared by external consultants towards finalising  the WRMP19 has 
also recommended the same (LD9). A senior engineer in the company summed it up 
when he said: 
“By the time the desalination plant was built, it wasn’t as if we had developed 
any expertise on that. It was all contracted out to fill a brief but crucial gap in 
our water resource management. We can maybe claim to be efficient 
operators of that plant.” (L13) 
The Innovation Department in Thames Water today is back to ‘fixing’ and ‘bettering’ 
things. An example given by an innovation engineer there was studies of corrosion 
of pipes and modelling of leakage based on place and average age of the pipe: 
                                                          
26 Sophie Elmhirst. ‘Liquid assets: how the business of bottled water went mad’ The Guardian 6 Oct 
2016.  https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/oct/06/liquid-assets-how--business-bottled-
water-went-mad 
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“We also work on prediction models for risk and demand – yeah, we use a lot 
of prediction models! But, London is such a complex place with too many 
human interventions. So, modelling is extremely difficult and when done, it 
may go unused.” (L33) 
In the thirty years since the privatisation of water in England and Wales, Thames 
Water has gone from scientific management of a national resource to annual cycles 
of cutting edge technological innovation to finally modelling based on user behaviour 
within the city. The global relational networks described earlier in this chapter 
involved almost always British consultants interacting amongst each other and with 
utility managers abroad, whether in trade events or industry conferences (LE1, LE2). 
However, the legacy of water supply in London and the urban imagination it evoked 
around the world play a role in these networks. The maintenance of the urban water 
network in terms of enabling efficient user behaviour and controlling leakage present 
research and development opportunities for Thames Water. 
Yet, the company is perpetually at odds with regulators and urban managers on this 
issue and has been hauled up numerous times for failing to curb leakage in its 
network and for not having performed necessary maintenance. In 2017, it was fined 
the maximum fine of £ 8.5 million by Ofwat for failing to meet leakage reduction 
commitments in its supply network (LD10); and a ‘record’ amount of £ 20 million by 
EA for polluting water bodies with leaks in its sewerage networks27. The company’s 
failure to tackle leakage was one of the key contentions against its desalination 
project. Contrary to the Chennai case of water engineers liaising with groups of urban 
residents, if in exclusionary ways, London’s water experts engage in socio-technical 
othering that deems users unreliable participants in their project of urban 
conservation and maintenance.  
 
                                                          
27 Damian Carrington. ‘Thames Water hit with record £20m fine for huge sewage leaks’ The 
Guardian. 22 Mar 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/mar/22/thames-water-
hit-with-record-fine-for-huge-sewage-leaks 
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5.4. Leakage: banal socio-technicalities of othering 
In Chennai as in the global discourse, leakage is an issue often associated with illegal, 
amoral and unskilled practices on the part of the urban poor, the presumed racial or 
caste inferior, or the gendered other. As mentioned before, unauthorised buildings 
or ad-hoc settlements which have gradually come to house the urban poor can only 
be supplied by stand pumps or water lorries. It’s common to see lorries spilling water 
as they go around the city, and water flowing hesitantly down standpipes 
unattended. Often in poor neighbourhoods, there is no fixed schedule for when 
either of these services come bearing water. It’s mainly word of mouth and the sound 
of the water pump or the lorry that alerts residents to the coming of water. 
Consequently, despite elaborate monitoring and sharing mechanisms that those 
neighbourhoods come up with, it’s likely some water is wasted from standpipes 
before they’re harnessed. As for lorries, their supply now extends to many affluent 
and planned homes in central neighbourhoods, thanks to groundwater depletion. 
But, because these two visibly leaking sources are associated with urban poverty, 
leakage is linked to a state of moral poverty.  
A retired public works department official in an affluent south Chennai 
neighbourhood was offended by questions on the water he uses for his garden: 
“You should go down the road and look at the slums; they have public taps 
which leak all the time. How is gardening a waste of water?” (C18) 
Several households with reverse osmosis units fitted for purification of groundwater 
routinely used the saline residue for their toilets or their gardens and this was an 
environmental subjectivity that allowed a view of leakage in public facilities with 
suspicions of criminality and ignorance:  
“Every time I see one of those lorries splashing water on the roads, I think 
that there needs to be an awareness programme!” (C20) 
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“Not only does my neighbour tap water illegally, his DIY arrangement is 
shoddy and leaks too. If I point this out to him, he calls me a Brahmin 
chauvinist28. How can we reason with these people?” (C31) 
The formal political system, these residents were convinced, was incapable of dealing 
with this problem, because:  
“…people like you and me who talk about it don’t go and vote. The guys who 
get everything free, they go and vote. It doesn’t matter to them if water leaks 
all over the city. During elections, just give them Rs. 100 and a Biryani, they’ll 
go and vote.” (C41) 
For these residents, fixing leakage was a cause for the greater good than something 
that they saw as affecting them personally. They would ‘put in a word’ to their local 
engineer that something needs to be done about leakage, as a reformist agenda. 
Leakage became another issue over which their relational network of shared 
knowledges gets assembled.  
In reality, the urban poor have more reason to be worried about leakage. Firstly, it 
means that the water they could be using gets wasted. Secondly, the leaked water 
stagnates around their less insulated houses, becoming a hygiene issue. A resident 
of a coastal fishers’ settlement explained:  
“It is a bigger problem when drain pipes leak, of course. You know that 
drainage and supply are handled by the same authority, right? Children love 
playing in the sand. But, the inadequate drainage system in our village means 
there are frequent leaks and frequent illness.” (C1) 
When that happens, the village, as they called it, take it up directly to the Metrowater 
headquarters or the Corporation by writing a letter from the village association. In a 
inversion of Partha Chatterjee’s (2004) distinction between civil and political 
societies, it was the urban poor who were using formal written forms of civic action 
                                                          
28 Caste, much like race, may not translate into a strictly economic definition of class. It is construct 
of moral and intellectual superiority as in the case of class, nevertheless. 
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here, while the middle and upper classes turned to their relational networks and ad-
hoc methods of ensuring supply and sewerage services. Given this two-pronged 
guerrilla pressure on its distribution systems it was logical for Metrowater to address 
the leakage problem. It also bestowed upon Metrowater’s in-house engineers, 
whose experience lay in distribution more than anything else, a techno-political 
expertise, not attributed to specific technologies, but to the art of navigating the 
city’s relational networks, material and social.  
In London, reducing leakage by a tangible amount would count as savings for the 
company as it could save expenses on sourcing more water, using, for example, a 
desalination plant. It would count towards ‘reducing demand’, an objective water 
companies in the UK are allowed to fulfil instead of ‘augmenting supply’ to meet 
future water needs (Water Industry Act 1991). But, that’s one goal for which the 
temporalities of finance, regulation and water flow never seem to match.  
“We could save 100-150 ML per year by spending £ 1 billion to replace about 
5% of London’s total network (about 100 km) over a 5 year period. If that was 
all we did, we would run out of water by 2020-30. The leakage reduction 
programme wouldn’t reduce demand quickly enough.” (L34) 
In its Water Resources Plan 2006  (LD15)where the company lays out its arguments 
for why demand or leakage reductions will not be sufficient and a desalination plant 
is needed for the city, it argues that in a place like London, such measures involve 
methods to control and modify user behaviour, and so may not work. Two of its 
arguments are reproduced below: 
“The greatest benefit from metering is from curbing discretionary water use, 
such as from garden watering. With such a high proportion of flats in London 
it is not practical to assume that such savings will materialise. 
There is no guarantee that any demand savings will be achieved since it 
depends on changes in customer behaviour which are beyond the direct 
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control of the company. Indeed, there is a risk that demand could increase as 
customers decide to use what they pay for.” (LD15, p. 101) 
As with other aspects of water supply, leakage is another boundary-marker, 
distinguishing the engineers from the users. An engineer, who worked with 
membrane technologies in Thames Water, but was often tasked with conducting 
user perception surveys, fumed:  
“People are like children. If we start on a comprehensive leakage reduction 
project, they’ll complain that we’re digging up roads or stopping their supply, 
even if it’s only a one-time thing for a few hours.” (L33) 
She should know, for she has been hearing complaints even at the mere suggestion 
of potable water reuse or wastewater recycling in London. She was weighing cost 
against benefit for brackish water desalination and wastewater recycling when I met 
her. She showed samples of user responses to surveys conducted on recycling, the 
most colourful of which read  
“Thames Water taking the P@ss as usual” (sic) 
“the answer to the water shortage is to repatriate 2 million immigrants that 
have no right to be here!” (L33) 
She felt strongly that it was a sense of entitlement born from believing water is a 
basic right and living in what feels like a rainy, water-abundant place that made 
people averse to innovation in water technologies that were popular elsewhere 
(L33). For her, there was a clear divide between the expert – who knew the ecology 
of water supply in the city – and the user, who remained ignorant and reactionary to 
changes in water supply. As one of the top water managers in Thames Water made 
it clear: 
“The mark of good water supply is that people shouldn’t know or need to 
know what we are doing for them to be able to open their tap every morning 
and get their water flowing.” (L18) 
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However, in the global relational networks in which Thames Water and the UK water 
sector is embedded, leakage could be easily ascribed to illegal practices and the so-
called populism of the global South, where the poor are supposed to be getting free 
and unmetered water. In the London water trade event discussed above (LE1), 
metering came up as an issue several times, always associated with how the poor 
might take advantage of the situation.  
[Q] “Don’t you give water free to people?” 
[A] “Yes, but only on the condition that they install meters soon. In the longer 
run, it’s more important to get people into the network than keep them out 
of it.” 
[Q] “It’s not clear from your presentation what opportunities your city 
presents for businesses here. Could you clarify that?” 
[A] “Well, district metering authorities are a priority, to detect leakage and 
ensure payment.” (LE1) 
As accounts of metering in various countries and cities around the world has shown 
(see for eg., von Schnitzler 2008), leakage is code for theft by the urban poor or for 
human carelessness in less automated, more flexible systems. In London too, such 
association of leakage with wasteful or at least unusual water use abound.  
“During Ramadan, there is a clear spike in water usage in the mornings and 
evenings. We used to calculate that as leakage.” (L33) 
“Showers leak more than baths, because they are turned on and off more 
often. Young people these days, especially my girls, are all about showering.” 
(L20) 
By associating leakage more with user behaviour than with how the city’s 
subterranean pipes are maintained, the issue becomes less a subject on which to 
develop technical expertise than one which demarcates the knowing expert from the 
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wasteful user. It however opens up opportunities for Thames Water and social 
scientists alike to research user behaviour and affects related to it across the city’s 
wide and varying water use at the household level.  
5.5. Conclusion  
Isabelle Stengers (2013), in her formulation of an ecology of practice, challenges the 
characterisation of practice as a compromise on truth.  
“The contrast between technology and the power of Truth is an ethical one. 
With technology comes a sense of responsibility that Truth permits us to 
escape.” (Stengers 2013: 187) 
She was writing in the context of physicists’ response to social constructivism of 
science, equating physics with reason and reality. Practitioners do not have to erect 
this self-defensive border, she argues. Practice could be about pushing the 
boundaries of the truth and working with factors that have nothing to do with 
principle or reason (Stengers 2013). Theirs ethics and practice are instead mutually 
constitutive, emerging from the responsibility of acting and having to take decisions 
that might not be perfect or consistent with a personal logic. In this way, practitioners 
do not have the shield of truth to protect their actions, hence their sense of 
responsibility. As technological practitioners, unable to escape to Truth, water 
engineers were obligated to their everyday work performed as others have before 
them; but also, to use their practice as a conscious means of production of knowledge 
as well as material infrastructures. Several engineers saw themselves this way rather 
than as disenfranchised cogs or powerful agents in the neoliberal machine.  
Yet, ethics and practices are far from individualistic. They come into being in the 
milieu (Stengers 2013) of the infrastructural city where certain knowledges carry 
greater credence than others, and reinforce unequal distribution and social relations. 
Yet, engineers and water managers carry on with their work even if they may not 
benefit from the social relations so constituted, as in Chennai, for example. 
Metrowater engineers were at the losing end of a battle with water managers and 
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were critical of several of the city’s water projects. But, they continued to have 
‘attachments’ to the overall project of water engineering they had undertaken. So, 
rather than a binary between agency and structure, what we get is an iterative 
constitution of practices and social relations over urban water infrastructures. These 
iterative processes, this chapter has argued, could be understood as osmotic – that 
is, continuously negotiated. As the trajectory of research and development in 
Thames Water over the years when its ownership, funding and global relations 
changed constantly showed, the flows of water, power and expertise are messy and 
do not fall into a narrative of causation or circulatory metabolism. It is these messy 
relations that an osmotic view can instead excavate productively.  
Drawing from observations of reverse osmosis filtration, which is a technology widely 
prevalent across cities today and is the point of departure for this thesis, this chapter 
contends that the idea of interactions between semi-permeable membranes 
determined by electrochemical gradations and carefully maintained pressures is 
useful in understanding the socio-technical work of engineering and building urban 
infrastructures. For example, it indicates the interaction between the porous yet 
compartmentalised identities that a Metrowater engineer traverses between his 
interest in community-oriented systems of water harvesting and ensuring adequate 
water supply to the next neighbourhood caller (section 5.2). The membranes were a 
useful lens to have in noting interactions between water managers, calibrated 
through their identities and possibilities for exchange, at the trade event in London 
(section 5.2.2).  
These interactive practices, this chapter has argued, constitute relational 
infrastructures over which shared knowledges and technical expertise are built. The 
distribution of these knowledges over the network is its own political claim (Simone 
2004) as they delineate the gradations and pressures determining which ones are 
validated as expertise or social relations and which ones get othered, as in the case 
of water use practices held responsible for leakage (section 5.4).  
The complexity and unpredictability of the city and its material networks, 
paradoxically, heighten the banality of its infrastructure (Anand 2018). 
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Infrastructures have always been known to be banal in the sense of being invisible or 
dull elements of urban life (Star 1999). This is precisely what makes them political 
(Anand 2018) as their legibility is distributed over a wide set of knowledges and 
practices, each performed as everyday work by a range of actors. The capacity of 
infrastructures for unsustainable or unequal distribution of resources is wrought 
banal through the ‘will to ignore’ on the part of the engineer, the regulator, the 
citizen or the policymaker. The nature of engineering agency, then, is banal in the 
way it is exercised as everyday contributions to urban development rather than as a 
grand vision. Yet, it is by no means a purely technocratic contribution, deliberately or 
unwittingly disconnected from socio-spatialities of the city or global hierarchies of 
knowledge. It actively mobilises them towards technologies of infrastructure-making 
(Lancione & McFarlane 2016).    
However, can engineering agency and knowledge really be understood as a 
generalisable concept? Is it only the gradation in identities, personalised 
compartments or geopolitical origin that introduce variation in these knowledges? 
The following chapter explores the variance in engineering epistemologies 
encountered in Chennai and how they are sought to be bridged through a 
standardising framework in London.  
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6. MULTIPLE EPISTEMOLOGIES OF ENGINEERING 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Until the late 18th century, engineering as a profession was tied to the military, 
developing machinery or building water and road infrastructures for purposes of 
warfare. There have, of course, been public works and non-military infrastructures 
built across the world before. But, the planners and builders of such structures did 
not bear the title of the engineer. They were associated with institutions of rule, 
kinship and state-making, perhaps more accurately reflecting the socio-technical 
nature of engineering work. It was when the Institute of Civil Engineers was founded 
in London in 1818 that there was designated a professional practice clearly distinct 
from military engineering and intended for civilian development (Florman 2014). 
Today, infrastructure projects, because of their sheer complexity and owing to the 
development and specialisation of the field of engineering, involve diverse 
disciplinary backgrounds – civil, chemical, electrical or environmental engineering. 
These engineering specialisations carry with them distinct epistemologies and social 
relations that are co-constituted with the institutional framework and technological 
materialities they work with. From the often conflicting multiplicity of engineering 
knowledges, it then follows that there is no single uniform rational engineering or 
technocratic logic that determines the construction of infrastructures. Following 
from the arguments in the previous chapter, this chapter stays with the idea of 
engineering knowledges, exploring how their relationality and sociality are shaped 
by the epistemologies of particular engineering disciplines.  
Engineers have long been understood as mediators between the technological and 
the social (Bell et al, 2011), the technology being a modernist application of value-
free science, a tool in professional hands. Historian David Channell (2017) writes:  
“The new scientific theories that emerged during the Scientific Revolution are 
assumed to be the basis for the transformation of technology from its pre-
Industrial Revolution status as a craft based on cut-and-try empiricism and 
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rule of thumb techniques to a scientifically based discipline based on precise 
mathematical models.” (Channell 2017: 27) 
This was the ‘standard’ positivist view of technology that influences technocratic 
modes of governance today because it positions technology as apolitical and hence 
capable of clean or scientific development. But, as sociologists of technology have 
pointed out, peak technological development during colonial, wartime and cold war 
periods were experimental rather than applied science (Bijker 2001, Mitcham 1994). 
Rather than a one way relationship between science and technology, the idea of 
‘technoscience’ refers to the condition of our time when science is necessarily tied 
to and often in nexus with technology, and so, by extension, to engineering and 
technocracy (Nordmann 2011). But, when Latour famously used ‘technoscience’ as 
shorthand for ‘science and technology’ in 1987, he made a distinction between the 
two phrases. Technoscience, for him, referred to the ‘heterogenous 
components…including the social ones’ (Latour 1987: 62) that come together in the 
production of scientific knowledge. In other words ‘technoscience’ is the outcome of 
science and technology, and much more. Technology, here, is not a mediator 
between science and culture, but a culture in itself. Building on this premise, this 
chapter posits engineering epistemologies as ‘technoscience’ that acculturates 
material infrastructures into urban social relations. What can the technoscience of 
water infrastructure in Chennai and London tell us about the nature of urbanisation 
and indeed, the values associated with technological networks in cities? How are 
those networks, in turn, influenced by the values their own history and materiality 
thrust on the city?  
The socialisation of technology has never been value-free, its capability for 
‘development’ itself being a value-laden proposition. In cities, technological 
networks have been associated with a hygienic modernity as in the case of 19th 
century London when newly built sewerage networks separated from water supply 
improved health and sanitation (Gandy 2006). Perhaps owing to the documentation 
through which it is known, history gives a clear distinction between how this techno-
science of bodily hygiene influenced urban networks in London and the colonies. 
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While bacteriology hastened Londoner’s desire for a universal system that regulated 
bodily hygiene, in colonial cities, notions of purity and pollution have manifested 
themselves through race (Kooy & Bakker 2008) or caste (Gandy 2008), acting against 
integrated networks. Racial and feudal differences in bodily integrity were 
rationalised, in fact, through the science of textual reproduction and codification of 
culture as an essential bodily difference. But, the establishment of inflexible and 
centralised infrastructural systems in European and North American cities made 
networked water supply an urban ideal of its own. Without this ideal, Graham & 
Marvin’s (2001) influential theory on infrastructure argues, the urban fabric would 
be ‘splintered’ by global capital driven fragmented infrastructures dividing the city 
along race and class lines.  
Planned and built in Chennai and London by consortia of international builders and 
consultants, and developed as discrete projects at moments of crisis, desalination 
plants fit the bill of what Graham & Marvin (ibid.) call the “growing crossover 
between private finance capital and infrastructural development” (p. 97); and 
“overlaid patchworks of unbundled networks now emerging.” (p.189) However, this 
type of infrastructure development, they argue: 
“undermines the notion of infrastructure networks as binding and connecting 
territorially cohesive urban spaces. It erodes the notion that cities, regions 
and nations necessarily have any degree of internal coherence at all.” 
(Graham & Marvin 2001: 16) 
In Chennai as well as London, there exists a tension between a modernist 
infrastructural city and a fluid city of flexible technological projects. But, far from 
splintering, there emerge technoscientific rationalities that negotiate this tension 
and bring about a dynamic coherence that may not fit into an idealised vision of 
infrastructural cohesion, which has perhaps never existed (Coutard 2008). In London, 
this rationality, in fact, takes the form of resilience planning, towards ensuring that 
the city’s legacy – its unified 24-hour networked water supply system – is left 
undisturbed and invisible to the city’s residents as far as possible. Whereas in 
Chennai, the desalination plants are seen as the first step towards the creation of 
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such a seamless water supply system. The ideal of infrastructural modernity, then, 
persists into infrastructures birthed by global capital and built on an ad-hoc basis.  
This chapter will problematize the idea of infrastructural cohesion by placing the 
discourse of sustainability and resilience in London alongside plans to expand 
Chennai’s water supply network. Despite the exceptionalism accorded to a fantastic 
technology like reverse osmosis and its purported role in preparing London for 
climate change, it is but one of the many additions that have to be made to keep the 
city’s inflexible unified water system running. Juxtaposed against Chennai’s meagre 
water system building up into unified infrastructure through privately built 
megaprojects like desalination, the malleability and relativism of the techno-
modernist imagination becomes apparent. The chapter traces the dominant sources 
of knowledge or techno-scientific approaches that co-constitute water infrastructure 
in Chennai and London today. It considers how the introduction of a new 
technological project like desalination restructures existing techno-scientific 
relations; and if some infrastructural formations are less cohesive and more divisive 
than others.  
The chapter is broadly divided into two sections, one on each city – Chennai and 
London. The section on Chennai elaborates on the variety of engineering 
epistemologies that prevail in the city today across government institutions and the 
private sector. It begins with the role of chemical engineers in matters of 
environmental impact and water quality, especially when it comes to reverse osmosis 
desalination (section 6.2.1). It then explains why the values associated with this form 
of engineering are distinct from those espoused by civil engineers working on 
distribution systems. It also delineates civil from environmental engineering and the 
institutional arrangements in which they find their place in Chennai (6.2.2). In 
discussing all three disciplines, what emerges is a picture of intense complexity that 
requires a rethink of what modernist infrastructure might mean in the global south 
and how cohesion can happen outside the bounds of technological and global capital 
flows. So, the subsequent sections (6.2.3 & 6.2.4) demonstrate, through the everyday 
socio-technical work done by water engineering contractors in housing 
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development, how dynamic forms of cohesion and exclusion emerge in discrete 
technological systems of water access in Chennai. The London section (6.3) focuses 
on the overarching epistemology that attempts to bring together this complexity 
under objective calculation – of risk and the associated discourse of resilience. It 
traces the history of risk as a discipline to understand technoscientific rationalities 
as, in fact, likely irrationalities or unequal agencies made legible through calculative 
governance structures (section 6.3.1). It then traces the temporal transition of risk to 
resilience in water infrastructure planning to argue that the attempt at resolution of 
multiple technological knowledges works to keep the city’s infrastructure in a unified 
singular form.  
6.2. Chennai: Intersecting fragments of technical knowledge 
6.2.1. Operational chemistry of water engineering 
“Have you seen the 1955 Alfred Hitchcock movie ‘To catch a thief’?” was a senior 
water engineer’s (C12) cryptic question, when asked about the environmental 
sustainability of water projects.  
“To catch a thief, you send a thief. Same way, to detect chemicals in the 
environment, you send more chemicals. They test for foreign particles, 
pollutants in the environment – soil, residue water etc. – by introducing some 
other chemical which will detect the undesirable one.” (C12) 
Predictably, he translated environmental sustainability implicitly as chemical testing 
of the environment. Yet, it was unexpected that he would liken colorimetric testing 
– used to assess safety of treated effluents - to a Hitchcockian chase, involving heroic 
action rather than banal execution. It was what came afterward that was 
illuminating:   
“The chemical engineers doing the testing know it’s all a formality. So, they’ll 
make sure the values they enter are within limits, unless there is something 
dramatically wrong in the readings.” (C12) 
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He was remarkably blasé about his certainty that environmental impact monitoring 
was an exercise in merely reading a measurement, which was not always recorded 
precisely. To be sure, it was not the testing engineers’ doing that the environmental 
impact of a water project is reduced to a number indicating chemical concentration. 
But, rather than the routine oversight in banal infrastructural work that Nikhil Anand 
(2018) critiques recently, they held the agency to exercise discretion. When their job 
involved recording a number, they recorded an unambiguous number – that is, a 
number which would allow the project to continue. It was only when the reading 
exceeded limits dramatically that the desire for lack of ambiguity might work against 
said project. They worked as part of the team to make a contribution, which negative 
readings didn’t seem to count as.  “Well, that’s what engineering education teaches 
us, isn’t it?” another water engineer wondered aloud:  
“In our laboratories, we knew what the outcome of our experiments or tests 
were supposed to be. So, we made sure that we entered the appropriate 
values in our record books even if that’s not exactly the result we got. I mean, 
it was important to learn to work the machines, but at the end, the record 
needed to short the correct values. So, we learnt to work the machines to 
give us the values we desired.” (C7) 
In a sense, this is what engineering is about – manufacturing a world that fits into 
one’s expectations and values. It is the imagination of the material world as 
modelling clay that drives fantastic innovation or a project like desalination. 
Irrespective of whether it was heroic discretion or banal teamwork, the outcome is 
of making the socio-material fit within pre-calculated rationalities. One of the 
questions that introducing desalination in Chennai or London might provoke is 
whether some technologies or infrastructural forms could be more divisive, 
bureaucratic or legible than others; and whether those are related to specific 
epistemologies of engineering.  
Desalination and other membrane technologies have certainly attracted attention 
from chemical engineers more than other elements of water supply had in Chennai. 
College of Engineering Guindy, Chennai’s top engineering college and the seat of the 
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prestigious Anna University collaborates regularly with Metrowater and various 
water companies to conduct research on water engineering. Their Water Resources 
Institute is housed under the department of Civil Engineering. But, queries about 
desalination are directed towards the department of Chemical engineering, whose 
laboratories host interests in solute concentrations and semi-permeable 
membranes. This difference between the engineering epistemologies of mechanical 
and membrane technologies extended to the industry too, as was evident in a 
massive trade fair conducted in Chennai every year called the Water Expo & Watman 
Conference. At the 8th edition of the fair held at the Chennai Trade Centre – a 
sprawling complex of exhibition and conference halls along the southern industrial 
corridor built jointly by State and Central Government trade development agencies 
– the extent of water’s longstanding relationship with technology and the growing 
influence of membrane technologies was quite literally showcased (CE15).  
In the exhibition hall crammed with stalls displaying pumps, motors, chemical 
purifiers, efficient dispensers and various aids to irrigation, rain water harvesting, 
heating and cooling, the frontline of stalls, also the largest with the most dazzling 
displays, were of membranes – for desalination, effluent treatment and recycling. 
Since this was a business-to-business exhibition, the displays focused more on how 
the technology worked and what their features were rather than on what they did. 
The manager (C10) of a stall with a giant flowchart explaining the process of effluent 
treatment introduced himself as a researcher from the University of Côte d’Ivoire. 
That wasn’t unusual, he clarified. Engineers interested in water technologies could 
be found studying in unexpected places, wherever they could manage to learn the 
technology and trade affordably.  
“Water technologies evolve according to local necessity and innovation could 
happen in any place. For desalination, the major breakthrough was not in 
reverse osmosis itself, but in preventing fouling – the clogging of pores by 
scaling and bacterial deposits. Developing resistant membranes involved a lot 
of chemical engineering, testing materials, using chemical anti-scalants etc. 
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This, for instance, might have developed in a place that has had to deal with 
scaling issues in general with water.” (C10) 
Unlike the civil engineers who narrated an experience of training in discipline with a 
long illustrious tradition of public service, membrane engineers stressed their 
adaptability, their reflexivity in reacting to a fast changing industry and environment 
and the novelty in their work. But, they would also argue that there is very little room 
for negotiation with the technology, which runs on strict parameters. This is partly in 
response to the illegibility of reverse osmosis feeding fears of its potential danger in 
the future, but partly because the membranes themselves were manufactured units 
installed in warehouse style desalination or recycling plants. So, the extent of 
involvement a private sector engineer has with membrane technologies depended 
on his position in the project’s hierarchy.  
There were only about 10 engineers working in the whole of the 150 MLD 
desalination plant in Minjur to the north of Chennai, all in the control room (CE17). 
One of them was a control engineer (C33) who had a diploma in chemical 
engineering, which meant he went to a polytechnic college rather than an 
engineering degree college. He called the control room the SCADA room, SCADA 
being the application used to programme the computers that run the desalination 
plant. The PLC or the programmable logic control used in these desalination plants is 
taught to students of electronics engineering through plant visits and industrial 
training programmes (C28). But, according to the control engineer:  
“There is very little that the SCADA can do to modify the desalination process; 
and even lesser that I can do with the SCADA as a process engineer. Every 
modification or variation in the systems outside correspond to a value or a 
parameter in the SCADA, like 3 units or 0.3 units or 33 seconds etc. That’s 
where efficiency or sustainability would have to be fine-tuned. But, that can 
only be done by the PLC programmers or SCADA designers working behind 
that glass door.” (C33) 
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He had worked in the desalination plant of a power company in southern Tamil Nadu 
before. He, then, went abroad to East and then, West Asia to work on more industrial 
water systems, sometimes involving desalination. The SCADA engineers were 
programmers, who may have studied any branch of engineering, but dabbled in the 
writing of universal logics that could be applied to various machine systems i.e. 
programmes. Even they could only make small changes to the parameters which 
came as part of the plant design essentially. 
What were these all important parameters on which the desalination plant seemed 
to pivot? “The three vital stats for water are pH, turbidity and conductivity,” the 
control engineer (C33) explained. But, this was a desalination plant. Salinity had to 
be an important parameter to monitor. There was even a technical term which was 
commonly used in the city: TDS, total dissolved solids, referring to the concentration 
of minerals which gave water the saline taste.  
“Oh, that is conductivity. Salinity = Conductivity * 0.55. Water engineers just 
prefer to use salinity because it makes it seem like a lower numerical value. 
So, desalination brings down conductivity of water; and finally, lime is added 
to equalise its pH.” (C33) 
Is that what gave the water some taste finally, I queried. “It equalises pH,” he (C33) 
repeated refusing to budge from technical terms.  
The chemical engineer’s epistemology remained firmly techno-mathematical. It was 
concerned with measuring chemical parameters of running the plant and not with 
the water supply system per se. If engineering was about the conquest of nature and 
building an environment according to human desire, engineers closely working with 
the desalination plants or reverse osmosis technologies hardly ever were those 
heroic engineers. Instead, they exercised their will to modify the environment only 
in reporting or recording data, their technological approach often in tension with a 
traditional idea of engineering as negotiated environmental work. Historian of 
Technology Colin Divall (1996), writing about the development of chemical 
engineering in the UK in the early 20th century, argues that ‘chemical engineering’ 
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was something of a misnomer because it referred to the materials those 
professionals worked with in a manufacturing or a ‘physical’ environment. 
Professionals who worked with chemical processes were chemists, who did not 
become chemical engineers by merging their profession with that of engineering.  
“The principal tasks of the chemical engineer were to ensure the containment 
of chemicals during the manufacturing process, to secure their movement 
from one stage of the manufacturing process to another, and to provide the 
physical conditions that would permit chemical reactions to work on the large 
scale.” (Divall 1996: 678) 
Chemical engineering has, later, been identified as a practice well-suited for 
sustainability transitions (Clift 1998) owing to the discipline’s core concepts:  
“…material and energy balances (for the most part exclusive to chemical 
engineering curricula), the systems approach to which these constructs 
relate, the second law of thermodynamics and the associated concept of 
entropy.” (Byrne & Fitzpatrick 2009: 24) 
As one of the desalination plant engineers (C40) observed, “This is a rare moment 
when our colleagues in environmental engineering are joining us – those from a 
chemistry background.” According to him, more students of chemistry, not 
necessarily engineers, were also finding work in the field of membrane technologies 
for water treatment. He also explained the conductivity and salinity conundrum:  
“We use electrical control instruments to run the plant, right? So, we need to 
convert chemical measurements of the water – things like salinity – into a 
measure that the machines understand – an electrical measure. Hence, 
salinity becomes conductivity. Chlorine content becomes oxidation reduction 
potential (ORP). Looks like the other desalination plant employs some poorly 
trained chemical engineers to just operate the machine, and not necessarily 
know it well.” (C40) 
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He worked in the Nemmeli desalination plant (CE16), which was better known and 
more politically important to Metrowater as well as the ruling government. It was 
located in the south of the city on a popular roadway, very visible and known to the 
affluent residents of the region. The other plant, located in an industrial zone to the 
north of the city, was nearly hidden and not owned by Metrowater. Both plants were 
built and run by private companies. But, the first one in the north continues to be 
owned by the private company, with Metrowater simply purchasing water from it. 
The second one, built after the success of the first one, is Metrowater’s own plant, 
contracted out for building, operation and maintenance functions (see chapter 4 for 
details). This is a closely monitored plant where visiting consultants and policymakers 
are usually taken to showcase Chennai’s expertise and innovation. Beyond 
epistemology and disciplinary background, there was an institutional politics to the 
nature of knowledge held by engineering professionals.  
6.2.2. Institutional divergence of civil and environmental engineering 
Chennai’s institutions of water governance have neatly divided up the engineering 
functions of handling the city’s waterscape. Metrowater concerns itself with the 
supply of water and the disposal of sewerage; the public works department takes 
care of its water bodies; the city corporation looks at how those water bodies can be 
made ecological services that the city can use. In this triad of engineered water 
management, Metrowater’s engineers believe they represent an older school of 
public health engineering amidst emerging enthusiasm for environmental 
management. When asked about how environmentally responsible Metrowater’s 
projects were, an engineer had this to say:  
“We are civil engineers! We work with the environment to see how it can be 
put to civil [sic] use. This does mean that we have to be aware of how the 
environment works and make sure that it gets utilised in a judicious way. But, 
all this emphasis on environmental sustainability changes our fundamental 
obligation - which is towards people, and their needs for water.” (C14) 
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His boss, a senior engineer who managed allocation of engineers in projects 
confided:  
“We are encouraged to hire more environmental engineering students – 
because colleges have those courses now, no? But, environmental 
assessments can be done by consultants. That’s what we did for the 
desalination plant. It doesn’t seem like a job for our full time engineers, you 
know?” (C36) 
Two epistemologies of engineering are indicated here. In the eyes of the first 
engineer, civil engineering is inherently a public practice, that is obligated towards 
people. Even though the word civil itself was formulated in opposition to military 
engineering, for him, the word was tied to civic obligations towards the city’s 
residents. This is, in fact, a shared view held by water engineers across public and 
private sectors as this chapter will show. The second engineer is not sure that 
environmental knowledges are necessarily an engineering function at all. At any rate, 
it didn’t have to be a component of Metrowater’s engineering, for him. The civil 
engineer’s or at least the Metrowater engineer’s take on environmental knowledges 
became significant since the institution’s renewed search for water sources like the 
desalination project is often criticised as modernist techno-solutionism disconnected 
from the region’s traditional ecological systems. Environmental researchers from 
other institutions found Metrowater’s functional focus on the city’s water systems 
exasperating. To this end, they attempted to transfer their knowledge to 
Metrowater.  
A senior water researcher bequeathed his painstakingly surveyed map of 
disappeared and deteriorating water bodies in the city’s hinterland to Metrowater, 
in aid of reviving the historical waterscape of the region. “It is for you to make use of 
it to build more sustainable water systems for the city,” he (C52) told a gathering of 
Metrowater engineers. A geologist at the Institute for Water Studies (IWS), a newly 
created institution of the public works department, said:  
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“We collect data from different departments and use it to inform the data 
that we, in turn, supply to them. It’s all about the data [chuckles]. For 
example, we get information from the agriculture department on crop 
patterns that season and use it to extrapolate what the water usage could be 
like. We also suggest plans like where to get water for a particular supply – 
from foothills? From the village or town itself? Where to sink borewells for 
irrigation. But, the departments are free to listen or not to us. When they 
make plans, sometimes they ask us for reports – like with Veeranam scheme, 
we had to show what was the best way to get water from there and transport 
it to Chennai. They anyway have to engage independent consultants. We are 
in more of an advisory role.” (C23) 
Institutions of environmental research or governance are tasked with literally 
producing comprehensive knowledge on the environment, as data points. This data 
however seldom feeds into plans already made for water engineering., according to 
staff in the IWS. It was a similar narrative in the Tamil Nadu Environment Directorate, 
whose functions included the generation and publication of periodic environmental 
data, which might nevertheless have limited relation to how engineering and state 
institutions mediated socio-environmental relations.  
“Look, it is a national project to publish environmental data. But, there is no 
guidance or monitoring on exactly what kind of data needs to be published. 
So, we look up publicly available information and post it on our online 
publication system. We don’t have the resources to do primary research even 
if we were interested in it! You can see for yourself – there are three of us in 
this office. Which one of us is supposed to collect all this data?” (C50) 
He was referring to the national project of environmental data collection called ENVIS 
(Environmental Information Systems) which aims for “integration of national efforts 
in environmental information collection, collation, storage, retrieval and 
dissemination to all concerned.”29 
                                                          
29 See: http://tnenvis.nic.in/Content/TNDatabase_1160.aspx  
205 
It was only in the Chennai city Corporation that a different approach towards the 
question of the environment was emerging. They were increasingly getting more 
interested in environmental engineers, and regularly brought in experts on ecology 
from universities or worked with environmental activists and NGOs (C42). They 
recruited students of environmental engineering, but not necessarily for jobs 
involving their specialisation. A top official in the Corporation said:  
“They are like all our other recruits. They’ll be on training and then on a 
rotation of jobs.  But, it is all part of an initiative to build up expertise on the 
subject in some years’ time. All recruits are trained on the city’s biodiversity 
– what kind of flora and fauna live here, apart from human beings and what 
are the conditions in which they live.” (C53) 
For an organisation that had been at the forefront of engineering the city in the past 
– building roads, canals, water supply and sewerage – recent developments in urban 
ecological governance converged with the possibility for environmental engineering. 
The Corporation’s role in the urban waterscape has been changing over time. It was 
originally in charge of water supply in the city – hence the shorthand of ‘corporation 
water’ used by an older generation of residents in the city. Metrowater has been 
around long enough now and active in the city’s public sphere for the colloquialism 
to have become eponymous. That is, residents are more likely to refer to networked 
supply simply as ‘metrowater’ these days. A project engineer in the Corporation 
commented:  
“That meant our interaction with water was only to drain it. We saw Chennai 
as four basins – Kosasthalaiyar, Cooum, Adayar and Kovalam. The first three 
are river based drainage systems and the last one is a marshland ecosystem.” 
(C63)  
But, there are efforts to change this mental map of the city now. Rather, there have 
been efforts to rethink those water systems as ‘ecological services’ rather than as 
drainage basins. According to another project engineer:  
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“Frankly speaking, we haven’t had the incentive to maintain water bodies 
because we are not using them for water supply. But, now, this concept of 
ecological services means there is a purpose to maintaining them.” (C64) 
That’s how the Corporation has been involved in widely publicised and criticised 
projects like the Adyar Poonga (Coelho & Raman 2010) – a park at the estuary of the 
Adyar river, the Cooum river restoration project and the restoration of the Chetpet 
lake. Criticism has largely fallen in the categories of bourgeois environmentalism or 
neoliberal urban regeneration accompanied by economic and aesthetic cleansing. 
They have also been ‘special initiatives’ rather than institutionalised changes in 
planning for water in the city, meaning that work on the projects is done by teams 
constituted specially for this purpose and not by the Corporation’s in-house 
engineers as part of their routine jobs. An environmental consultant who is part of 
one such team said:  
“So, who trains environmental engineers recruited by the Corporation? 
External consultants or designers, who can push their own agenda. We’re an 
environmentally conscious NGO working with them, but I could easily just be 
advocating slum eviction as the primary means of cleaning up water bodies. I 
suppose we all work within the constraints of the system and make the best 
of it.” (C42) 
Yet, the Corporation was recruiting more environmental engineers with a view to 
expanding its expertise on the subject over years.  The senior official in the 
Corporation explained this newfound interest:  
“I don’t know that economic activity in Chennai is getting hindered by its 
imperfect water management or lack of environmental harmony. People are 
buying houses, foreign firms are investing. When senior corporate executives 
settle here, they may look for good international schools or elite hospitals. 
Presence of great parks or water bodies doesn’t seem to have been a factor 
for them. For the institution, though, this is a chance to consider water bodies 
from an entirely new angle – the beauty and biological richness they bear 
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rather than as a source of water or drainage. It is exciting to do that! Plus, 
because of the limited funding that such projects get, it makes sense to do 
them as special initiatives with partner organisations than completely in-
house.” (C53)  
Neither romanticisation of traditional environmental wisdom nor modernist techno-
utopia, this presented a pragmatic yet desirous approach towards an environmental 
epistemology of water governance in Chennai. What is framed here as a deep 
ecological approach to Chennai’s water bodies is, in fact, a more utilitarian approach 
to the environment than the imagination of ‘four drainage basins’, which would have 
theoretically taken into account the complex interplay of soil, water and the life 
forms they house in determining Chennai’s urban development. So, what the 
corporation was espousing was an infrastructural epistemology of water.  It was still 
an engineering epistemology, as the senior official put it: 
“We had civil and mechanical engineers first. Then came the electrical 
engineers and now, we have environmental engineers.” (C53) 
The natural environment was on its way to becoming a significant infrastructure of 
city building – like electricity and roads and needed to be engineered to fit urban 
lifestyles. But, this was neatly compartmentalised in parallel to the civic function that 
water served for Metrowater.  
The institutional ecology in which engineers in the corporation and Metrowater 
worked co-produced distinct epistemologies of water resource management along 
with the material and political environments that they interacted with. The publics 
that each of these institutions of water governance co-opt are different and defy a 
clear definition of what urban cohesion or individualising modernism might mean. 
The Corporation, in planning for ecological infrastructure, was enthusiastic about 
inviting participation from NGOs and academics, reposing its faith in traditional civil 
society models. An environmental consultant who has been working in NGOs since 
the 1980s, and goes along with the pragmatic approach to water resources that the 
Corporation puts forth said:  
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“We do work within the realm of the possible and keep away from rigid 
posturing. The advantage in doing this is that now, government departments 
including the PWD and the pollution control board (PCB) have come to rely 
on our data and reports for their meaningful functioning. We have become 
reliable and credible and get access to their planning processes. The 
Corporation has been approaching us more often than before too.” (C22) 
This NGO is prominent in the field of environmental activism in Chennai, and is often 
accused of legitimising the state’s destructive policies (CE8). But, there is hardly any 
other organisation that fits the bill of a civil society organisation working with the 
government in environmental matters. This, according to the above consultant is a 
matter of lack of knowledge about the natural environment. She continued:  
“When it comes to water supply, though, even we don’t have the required 
research background. I mean, the state of our water supply is so fragile that 
I’m really not sure anyone can put up a meaningful opposition to the projects 
that Metrowater comes up with to augment water supply, even if they are 
sometimes problematic and never holistic.” (C22) 
Metrowater, simultaneously, was quite clear it didn’t need to consult with 
environmental NGOs. Said an engineering director in the organisation:  
“The desalination plant goes through environmental clearance from the 
Ministry of Environment & Forests of the Union Government. There were two 
consultants involved – one to prepare Tender documents, another to 
evaluate Tenders. They had to take environmental impact into consideration. 
The district Collector (a revenue officer) has to get a no-objection from the 
local residents. I don’t think there’s any room for environmental consultants 
to get involved here.” (C36)  
Metrowater’s institutional interface, then, remained within a technocratic circle, but 
its engineers shared their knowledges and drew from the experiences of local 
residents widely (see Chapter 5). Their engagements spanned an organic civil society, 
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fostered by the socio-material linkages their work created. They recognised this civil 
work as ‘public’ work, intended to better public health, sanitation and the city. It 
wasn’t just Metrowater’s civil engineers who associated their work with public health 
and welfare, though. Civil engineers in the private sector working with water supply 
and sewerage expressed a similar sentiment; their work arguably could be said to 
contribute towards urban cohesion as much as towards fragmentation.  
6.2.3. A civil infrastructure – connecting people across time 
The designation of a civil engineer was historically applied to builders and designers 
who put their skills to civilian rather than military use. This usually involved 
constructing public things like roads, bridges and sewerages. This ‘public’-ness 
remains inherent to the identity and practice of engineers in Metrowater; and is 
mutually constituted with the structure and function of the things they built. As one 
of them explained: 
“A networked supply or sewerage system runs on the logic of collective 
numbers. That is, the water network needs to have sufficient subscribers in 
order to be carrying a volume of water capable of exerting the necessary 
pressure to reach the length and breadth of the city.” (C16) 
But, like other cities around the world, Chennai’s rapid development has also meant 
that piecemeal water supply options like water trucks and small scale reverse 
osmosis units abound in areas that have been built up far before urban 
infrastructural networks have caught up. But, even in those neighbourhoods and the 
so-called gated communities in the outskirts of the city, water engineering emerges 
necessarily as a public enterprise connecting disparate people spatio-temporally. 
Rather, the materiality of water infrastructure renders a network inevitable.  
For instance, until recently, multi-storeyed apartments seeking to build their own 
sewage treatment plant (STP) or potable water reuse units needed to get a No-
Objection-Certificate (NOC) from Metrowater (C36). The reason was that 
Metrowater requires a certain volume of sewage running through its system in order 
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for it to function properly. This was when Metrowater had started expanding its 
system to reach the newly incorporated areas within the expanded city limits:  
“Around three years back, small scale STPs started becoming affordable to 
building associations and definitely, to real estate companies. It was a 
nightmare. Suspended solids were getting stuck to pipelines, we couldn’t 
circulate the sewage well enough because subscription was so low. Every day 
was spent dealing with one issue or the other.” (C15) 
It wasn’t unusual for households in several cities of Tamil Nadu to have a localised 
sewage tank which disposed their waste until recently. So, the idea of STPs in 
apartment complexes was not far-fetched to home owners or renters. But, for 
Metrowater engineers, sewage treatment needed to be public in order to work. It, 
then, made sense for engineers to think about water supply or sewerage systems as 
‘bundles’. There is a fundamental paradox to modernist infrastructure that this 
exposes. If modernist infrastructure indeed enabled individualised water access from 
the privacy of the home (Gandy 1999), rather than in shared resources in public 
spaces, it also connected all the individual water users through a network over which 
they had very little control. They were inevitably part of a network, whose operators 
are then tasked with the initiative to public welfare and urban cohesion.  
The NOC-requirement for private apartments to set up their own STPs was recently 
made discretionary since environmental responsibility obligates newly built multi-
storeyed apartments to incorporate wastewater treatment units within their 
premises (CD6). Builders set these up as wastewater recycling units instead to take 
care of watering shared gardens. An engineer who worked for a leading developer of 
several large residential apartments and IT parks described his obligation thus:  
“If a development has more than 20 dwelling units, we would need to build a 
sewerage treatment plant within the premises. Most new development 
happens in the outskirts where a connection to the main sewer is unlikely to 
be available. So, we’ll need to show that we are taking care of sewage to get 
building approval.” (C21) 
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A specific kind of infrastructural cohesion or exclusion was encouraged by this 
framework – a private developer building homes for the upper middle class could 
build their STP, independent of the networked supply and bringing together those 
households under a shared infrastructure. Real estate companies had, at their 
service, an array of consultants and contractors to take care of such building 
approvals and infrastructural requirements. As the engineer put it: 
“There are external consultants for everything – architectural, structural, MEP 
(Mechanical, Electrical & Plumbing). Only the civil engineers are internal.” 
(C21) 
He meant engineers like himself. But, unlike Metrowater engineers who had Masters 
and research degrees to their name from the top technology institutions, he had 
competed chemical engineering at one of the hundreds of private colleges that 
cropped up across south India around the turn of the millennium, catering primarily 
to the global software industry, and subsequently to the local construction industry 
as well. He now managed MEP for the real estate company. MEP had become a 
crucial function for the construction industry because of the multi-layered, 
negotiated knowledge and tasks it entailed. If a building development were to be 
planned, it is likely to be outside the city limits now, and required the approvals and 
STP construction detailed above. “The first step would be to test the soil and find out 
if it can withstand pumping groundwater for the whole building, actually,” the 
engineer (C21) explained.  
As we spoke at his makeshift office in a project site at the southern margins of the 
city, a steady stream of assistants and contractors popped in to consult with him or 
get some purchase signed off. One such assistant was assigned to show me the water 
treatment facilities in the campus; needless to say he was not pleased, when he 
needed to be negotiating over labour and payments for jobs done by the external 
contractors (CE18). Even for individual houses, the first step of the construction 
process has, of recent, been sinking a bore well to extract groundwater, available 
anywhere between 5 and 250 metres below ground, according to the Central Public 
Works Department that researches groundwater in the city (C99). This is the water 
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that would be used even for construction - to mix concrete, to cement bricks in place, 
to plaster over them. 
 
Figure 17: Residential development in Chennai with the STP (sewage treatment plant) 
shed in the foreground. 
Source: Fieldwork photo. 
 
According to the assistant MEP at the project site mentioned above:  
“The groundwater in these parts is too hard even for construction. So, along 
with borewell, we also need to install a treatment plant with a reverse 
osmosis filter. Residents would need to treat the groundwater to make it 
potable when they move in and so, we might as well start doing that even at 
the building stage. Also, the labourers, as you know, will be staying in the site 
itself. They will have to end up drinking the hard water if we don’t treat it on 
site.” (C66)  
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Construction labourers are almost always migrant workers who are hired on contract 
from further north of Chennai. They would move from project to project, setting up 
house with their families in the very sites they work in. With little stability, protection 
or entitlement in their contracts, they depended on such rationalities of their 
employers to access basic services like water, child or healthcare (CE18). But, 
interestingly for engineers, who are often charged with being technocratic, the socio-
materialities of water infrastructure enabled a networking across class lines if only 
through a temporal separation. That is, far from sharing a network, the home-
owner’s use of the water treatment plant would come only after the workers’ use. 
The engineer’s or the developer’s consideration of workers’ needs is influenced by 
their demands on site on a daily basis. But, it was only because a civil engineer on a 
construction job is typically in charge of labour as well as technical components that 
they needed to develop a socio-technical engagement with the construction site. 
There were people involved in this work as much as a filtering unit or pump was.  
There was a parallel material logic to it as the MEP engineers identified treatment of 
hardwater and recycling of waste water as similar functions executed with nearly 
identical equipment (C21). So, once the basic apparatus for treatment had been set 
up, they repurposed it for wastewater recycling once the apartments had been 
occupied. Wastewater recycling involved constructing a series of pre-treatment units 
that prepared the greywater to be filtered through reverse osmosis to satisfactory 
quality. So, while groundwater would be passed through a dual media filter of sand 
or pebbles and activated carbon before being passed through the RO filter, 
wastewater would go through a 2-step pre-treatment before it goes into the filter. 
Groundwater is usually sent into the dual media filter directly from storage. 
Wastewater is first kept in an aeration tank, where it is extensively blown to remove 
any putrid odours. Then, it goes through a pressure sand filter followed by an 
activated carbon filter and then finally through the RO filter (CE18).  
The MEP engineers also had a complex understanding of the preferences of their 
clients – the potential residents of their buildings.  
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“One of the reasons why the groundwater treatment plant needs to be 
repurposed after occupation is because residents prefer not to receive a 
centralised groundwater supply. It makes them feel like they have no control 
of their water. But, recycling can only be done at the building level and is not 
possible at the household level. So, the treatment units are repurposed as 
recycling units.” (C66) 
“In households, they are unhappy to use greywater for flushing. They might 
even use it for washing, if it can be proven that it doesn’t damage their 
clothes. But, they want their toilets to be clean. But, in office buildings, flush 
toilets are the biggest use for recycled water, along with cooling systems for 
air conditioners.” (C67)  
This engineer was from the company that had taken up the contract for water 
treatment in an IT park. None of these engineers mentioned the environment or 
sustainability of water systems as rationale for waste water recycling. It was only 
implied in discussions with senior managers, if at all, as cost-effective and efficient 
solutions to ‘Chennai’s water problem’. Recycling technologies, nevertheless, were 
seeping into the city’s waterscape incidental to this managerial discourse.  
Writing about modernist water infrastructure development in 19th century Paris or 
‘Haussmannization’, Gandy (1999) traces a shift from communal attitudes towards 
the body and personal hygiene embodied by pubic baths and night soil collection, to 
a retreat of water consumption into private dwellings, contained within the new 
institution of the household bathroom. This “sharpening sense of self-identity under 
modernity,” he argues was leading to a “breakdown in premodern conceptions of 
the organic cycle linking the body and the city.” (Gandy 1999: 25) Yet, the evolution 
of water infrastructure in Chennai today defies a simple narrative of modernisation, 
where each infrastructural assemblage comes about through inevitable linking of 
bodies, through land, water and membrane technologies. Even individual households 
relying on private property rights to draw groundwater from their backyard were 
acutely aware of the continuities in the underground water table (CE19). That didn’t 
necessarily translate into communal action or a commons approach to groundwater. 
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But, they were embedded in a socio-material waterscape that they negotiated on a 
daily basis. Initiatives towards rainwater harvesting started in 2003-04 accentuated 
an urban identity of shared water usage even if it lead to no radical political action 
(see chapter 4). Water engineering, as such, is a public project in Chennai. At this 
point, it helps to understand the significance of engineering to Chennai’s 
urbanisation at the turn of the millennium.  
6.2.4. Fragmented but not splintered 
Chennai is arguably criss-crossed by institutions of technical education as much as by 
water bodies and connecting canals. When information technology industries took 
off in India around the turn of the century, south Indian cities were at the forefront 
of training and employing young people in technology, encouraging both activities as 
profitable business. Chennai, consequently, housed numerous engineering colleges, 
apart from hosting Nehruvian era central government institutions of advanced 
research like the Indian Institute of Technology and the National Institute of Ocean 
Technology. Interestingly, several of them were built over existing water bodies or 
areas of sensitive biodiversity, miring students in urban hydro-politics even before 
they joined a particular trade30. The above institutions still only reflect the top rung 
of technical education. The second tier is comprised of government-funded ITIs 
(Industrial Training Institutes) and Polytechnic colleges enabling students to acquire 
a trade accreditation or diploma in a technological discipline (CD7). With its history 
of affirmative action and investment in primary education, Tamil Nadu saw 
widespread interest in young people from eclectic backgrounds taking up these 
avenues of technical qualification. The many tiers of technical education and its 
alumni, thus, form a spatial and hierarchical infrastructure supporting everyday 
urban life and the physical built environment. This also means that there exists a wide 
range of engineering knowledges, out of which emerges a pragmatic quasi-
                                                          
30 Chennai’s “IT corridor and a Knowledge Corridor consisting of engineering colleges constructed on 
waterbodies, and automobile and telecom SEZs and gated residential areas built on important 
drainage courses and catchments.” Jayaraman, N. 18 Nov 2015. Available at: 
https://scroll.in/article/769928/chennai-floods-are-not-a-natural-disaster-theyve-been-created-by-
unrestrained-construction 
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technocratic approach to everyday water issues that looks nothing like modernist 
conquest of nature or local knowledge steeped in traditional environmental wisdom.  
Most households rely on a combination of groundwater and centralised water supply 
for their needs. They have a household motor and purifier, usually installed by a 
plumber, who is likely to have developed his expertise on the job rather than through 
formal training (CE6). Residents, then, negotiate their anecdotal and experiential 
knowledge on the materiality of water infrastructure with a similar experiential 
knowledge held by the plumber. A resident who built his house in the 90s chuckled 
that he chose the water closets for his bathrooms by talking to a truck driver who 
transported plumbing equipment around the city. “It helped me get an idea of what 
type of closet was being ordered the most across the city,” he (C46) explained much 
to the chagrin of his building contractor who fumed that his sophisticated knowledge 
on water systems was wasted on clients like this one (C44). A retired engineer (C26) 
had scoured the market for a sensor to be placed in the overhead water tank to warn 
when it overflows. A couple of years later, when the city suffered from an extended 
drought, the sensor became a widely available and used product.  
“There are such simple technological solutions if you knew how to look for 
them. Obviously, the water sensor must have been made outside Tamil Nadu, 
that’s why it gives warnings in English and Hindi, rather than in Tamil.” (C26) 
And then, there was the Treatment & Transmission engineer from Metrowater who 
hadn’t gotten over his wonder at the size of the consultant reports on membrane 
bioreactors (MBR) that adorned his shelves. He had just been posted on the job, but 
was retiring in 5 months.  
“I joined the Regional Engineering College [institutions on a tier just below 
IITs] in 1974, then transferred to a Tamil Nadu State college because I was 
worried about bullying. And now, I’m learning about biofilters and ultra-
filtration. What a journey! It’s amazing being an engineer. You never know 
from whom and how you will learn technology. But, I really don’t know much 
about reverse osmosis or filtration technologies. You should talk to my 
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predecessor about that – he had a Masters degree, you see, and was more 
clued into latest developments in technology.” (C16)  
This cacophony of contradictory voices, actions and practices could make a classic 
case for unbundled infrastructures and a splintering urbanism. But, far from 
fragmenting societies, each of these technological interventions were what Simone 
(2004) describes as: 
“incessantly flexible, mobile, and provisional intersections of residents that 
operate without clearly delineated notions of how the city is to be inhabited 
and used.” (Simone 2004: 407) 
This, he (ibid.) calls ‘people as infrastructure’ because the intersections “depended 
on the ability of residents to engage complex combinations of objects, spaces, 
persons, and practices” and were “a platform providing for and reproducing life in 
the city” (p.408). Urban fragmentation might only come about where infrastructure 
has necessarily lead to a singular urbanisation and technology has meant efficient 
ordering of urban space. Instead of a divided urban functionality of engineering 
experts and responsible water users, there is an ‘all hands on deck' approach to 
technologies, knowledges and practices of water access and use in Chennai. This also 
meant that there was a sense of a shared material city, where there were 
nevertheless agencies and hierarchies of power acting to claim a larger share of 
resources than others.  
Older and richer residents of the city, for instance, were infuriated by what they think 
the growth in multi-storeyed apartments and rapid industrial and residential 
development in the city does to their supply of water. Their concerns are about 
groundwater which they have been able to pump freely from their backyards using 
borewells so far.  
“But, it’s not like a storage tank behind my house, you know? Groundwater is 
like a continuous river under the ground. So, if a builder pumps water for a 
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large apartment complex in the next street, it will affect my water table too.” 
(C47) 
The rainwater harvesting campaign of 2003-04 emphasized the need for individual 
houses to build these systems in order to improve the groundwater table of the city 
as a whole, cultivating a biopolitical subjectivity, linking bodies to the urban and its 
material ecologies. Gandy observes of modernising Paris:  
“The  reconstruction  reflected  the  needs  of  an  urban  mercantile  class  
that  faced the consequences of modernity not by an escape into romantic 
anti-urbanism but through a celebration of the possibilities for the 
technological mastery of urban space and progressively greater degrees of 
social and spatial order.” (Gandy 1999: 29) 
Deployment of water technologies in Chennai was hardly leading to any ‘mastery of 
urban space’ or ‘greater degrees of social and spatial order’. But, the city’s middle 
classes would certainly identify with the sentiment of celebrating possibilities to 
negotiate urban life through the aid of these technologies. In this way, they have 
much in common with what Simone argues about African cities:  
“…these flexible configurations are pursued not in some essential contrast to 
non-African urban priorities or values but as specific routes to a kind of 
stability and regularity that non-African cities have historically attempted to 
realize.” (Simone 2004: 410) 
Simply put, global technologies that circulate in Chennai are among the various 
strategies and socio-technical manoeuvres that its residents adopt to fulfil deeply 
personal needs. They are indeed in pursuit of modernity, just not the same one that 
European cities might have pursued before; their methods are indeed full of flaws 
and injustices, and cannot be essentialised as a fundamentally distinct philosophy to 
that of European modernism or informed by ecological wisdom. Furlong & Kooy 
(2017: 888) analyse these spatialised power relations as “distinct forms of 
fragmentation” brought about by a water supply system “where neither water nor 
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nature are wholly contained by infrastructure.” But, as seen above, infrastructure 
does not have to be defined as necessarily a physical network that works seamlessly 
in the background. In many ways, ‘people as infrastructure’ captures the 
interconnected, even invisible nature of urban relations that characterise the 
epistemologies of water engineering in Chennai. They could indeed be described as 
fragmented infrastructures, but they are far from being splintered (Graham & Marvin 
2001) by the introduction of global capital or private partnerships. If anything, it is 
the building up of a unified network that could ultimately splinter the networks of 
people as infrastructure, by making locally negotiated relational infrastructures 
redundant or unnecessary. In London, on the contrary, water engineering does not 
focus on networks, but seeks to keep the water supply system as unified and 
monolithic as possible. To this end, as we’ll see in the following section, it works to 
isolate any risk of that system getting disturbed and seeks to ensure that the urban 
fabric is as little disturbed as possible.  
6.3. London: Cyclical epistemologies – risk and resilience 
Engineers in British water companies, it was recently revealed, are sometimes in the 
practice of using divining or dowsing rods to check for leakage in pipes underground. 
When a science blogger31 spotted this happening and tweeted to the water company 
concerned, almost all UK water companies including Thames Water responded 
confirming that they indeed did use this ‘technology’32. The reasoning they gave was 
that detecting leakage was notoriously difficult and an inexact science. So, they tried 
every trick in the book to get it done. The concern here is that ‘divining’ is in no book. 
It wasn’t a method accepted by modern science or engineering practice; nor was it 
known to work, however inexplicably, except in obscure anecdotes. These anecdotes 
are usually accounted for by statistical randomness (the chances of detecting water 
at a place would have been the same if it had been dug up at random) or unconscious 
                                                          
31 “In 2017, UK water companies still rely on ‘magic’”. Salle Le Page. Medium. 
https://medium.com/@sallylepage/in-2017-uk-water-companies-still-rely-on-magic-6eb62e036b02  
32 “UK water firms admit using divining rods to find leaks and pipes”. The Guardian. 21 Nov 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/nov/21/uk-water-firms-admit-using-divining-rods-to-
find-leaks-and-pipes  
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motor movements by the engineers who have a sense for where the water leak could 
be through prior experience or environmental data33. This is an extreme example of 
UK water companies’ outcome-oriented rather than practice-determined or 
scientifically reasoned approach to water management. Nevertheless, it is an 
example of how water engineering in the UK takes the path of least risk. It also 
indicates the ‘irrationality’ of certain modern practices, which would usually be 
attributed to superstition or insufficient modernity elsewhere in the world, but in the 
UK with its claim to the longest and strongest legacy of scientific water engineering, 
forces analytical thinking about the socio-material assemblages that nurture its 
existence.  
‘Divining’ for leaks, for UK water companies, was an inexpensive and one of the least 
risky means of getting measurable output, even if that measurement could be 
discouraging. The output or the number of leaks detected might be the same as the 
number of leaks guessed through random probability. But, it is also a zero cost 
technology, meaning it was very low risk, but still an action against leakage. For an 
engineer working on membrane technologies, on the contrary: 
“Our projects, anyway, require rigorous modelling before it can be executed, 
to ensure safety and elimination of possible risk. Water quality is, after all, 
defined in terms of risk. But, for the recycling project, it was necessary to do 
even higher risk assessment, by conducting public perception studies.” (L33) 
“In Thames Water Authority, the public body, there was political reluctance 
towards borrowing for or spending on risky projects. Now, between 
regulation and investors, something like wastewater recycling is risky because 
of public perception. If something goes wrong, it is a higher risk of failure.” 
(L34) 
                                                          
33 “Water divining is bunk. So why do myths continue to trump science?” Philip Ball. The Guardian. 
22 Nov 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/22/water-divining-bunk-
popular-myths-science-sally-le-page  
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It was an interesting articulation of risk as something heightened by or measured 
through public perception, since risk as a professional concept involved quantifying 
perceived uncertainties into calculable numerical values (MacGillivray et al. 2006). 
Among the myriad of engineers, consultants and managers working on water in 
London, several scientific knowledges converged on this epistemology of risk. It was 
the theme most repeated in my interview codes, with concepts like cost, politics, 
climate change and resilience all translating into risk in unscripted conversation. As a 
senior official in the Government Office for Science, talking about a collaborative 
project with scientists on the future of cities, said:  
“Resilience is a key component of the ‘Future of Cities’ project. Imagining 
what British Cities would look like in the next 50 years involves imagining and 
preparing for a lot of risk and ways to mitigate or reduce that.” (L7) 
Water was framed as particularly risky business by those in the industry like the 
‘Global Water Business Leader’ of a leading consultancy in London: 
“Water presents big risks in the future because that’s how the effects of 
climate change will be felt – through shock events like floods and storms and 
through incremental changes like sea level rise.” (L8) 
Risk, as historians of technology have argued, has been a field that did intentionally 
bring together a wide range of knowledges and disciplinary backgrounds (Hansson 
2005, Jasanoff 1993). It was an interdisciplinary epistemology to begin with, meant 
to tackle the increased or distinct nature of risk that modern society was perceived 
to be facing (Beck 1992). It is precisely because risk is imprecise as a pure scientific 
concept – that is, it is a social attribute assigned to events in the material world – that 
it attracted interdisciplinarity and a governance approach to techno-scientific 
initiatives. Yet, the statistics and numerical values attached to risk perception are 
often construed as an objective rather than a subjective measurement of a socio-
material world, in some technocratic circles (Aven et al 2011). For engineers and 
consultants in London, the imminence and quantifiability of risk made it a legitimate 
scientific epistemology. Various engineering and resource management 
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epistemologies were sought to be bridged through a governance framework 
structured around risk and resilience.  
Some of these quantified risks are easily traceable to subjective perceptions or even 
strategies, like the 2014 annual water report prepared by the London-headquartered 
global thinktank CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project) titled From Water Risk 
to Value Creation. A report ostensibly about risk in the water sector or of water 
problems is, in fact, attempting to answer the question “what shareholder value is 
put at risk by poor management of water exposures?” (LD14, p.8) A director of cities 
in the thinktank explained its approach to assessing risk:  
“It is a survey methodology. We send questionnaires to companies and cities 
about their environmental futures. Most businesses do respond with concern 
– nearly 68% said that water poses a substantial risk to their business; 22% 
said it constrains their growth. Cities have a lesser response rate – only about 
30% responded totally.” (L9) 
The risk reported by the thinktank is clearly a calculation of the perception of how 
much a company stands to lose through potential problems with water, which could 
range from specific local climactic variations to institutional or political issues in the 
geography they operate in. But, the above figure of 68% of companies reporting risk 
becomes objective data on global water risk.  
6.3.1. Quantifying and materialising uncertainties of an invisible environment 
In the UK water sector, risk is a factor built into the regulatory framework governing 
water companies. Regulation attempts to bridge the disciplinary differences in water 
management through a shared formula of risk mitigation. For Thames Water, the 
Security of Supply Index (SOSI) – a measure monitored by Ofwat – was important in 
explaining the desalination project. Ofwat explains the index as:  
“The index allows us to assess each company’s compliance with its duty to 
ensure the security of its water supplies. It does this by assessing the extent 
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to which a company is able to guarantee its planned level of service at the 
end of the report year.” (LD11) 
Scored on a maximum of 100, the SOSI allows for companies to place restrictions on 
their service, like hosepipe bans under exceptionally dry conditions, by measuring 
supply against the company’s own ‘planned level of service’. To declare this planned 
level of service, companies have to work out the estimated demand and plan for a 
‘headroom’ over their existing supply (LD15, p. 8-9). The calculation of SOSI, is then, 
based on a range of techno-material variables including a private company’s planned 
level of service for a given year and a government’s expectations of a certain level of 
service and its stipulation of what counts for a drought. In conversations with water 
managers, the SOSI is often explained in the language of risk, with the regulatory 
formula standing in for an objective calculation of that risk.  
“What the regulatory system does is to run on a risk basis and they want the 
water companies to take that risk. There are environmental or demand 
conditions beyond the control of the regulators or the companies, which is 
what leads to risk of shortage in water supply or imposing use restrictions. 
Companies are obliged to plan for these changes in demand by investing in 
new infrastructure or demand control measures. They have to then plan for 
it in such a way that there is no corporate risk in making those investments. 
As far as the regulators are concerned, the risk is transferred from the 
environment and users to the companies.” (L17) 
From a governance perspective, the concern raised is that water companies might 
then declare a lower headroom, thus risking water supply as well as the environment 
by being unplanned for water shortages. A House of Lords committee on science & 
technology examined the effectiveness of this regulatory framework in preparing for 
drought in 2006 when the south east of England faced low rainfall and potential 
water shortages. It observed:  
Companies that underestimate target headroom values are likely to need to 
apply customer restrictions far more frequently than claimed and may be 
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placing the environment at risk as they seek drought permits—which allow 
them to take water from new sources or to alter restrictions on existing 
abstractions—in periods that are not exceptionally dry. (LD1, p.18)  
But, as seen in the case of the desalination plant, environmental risks are 
financialised into assets through material infrastructure, working in the company’s 
interest to estimate a headroom than not. As Loftus & March (2016) point out, it was 
rather ‘convenient’ for Thames Water that their estimated headroom was exactly 
150 MLD, matching the capacity that the desalination plant was planned for. The 
Beckton desalination plant, by most accounts, was conceived and built over this 
period of low rainfall in the Thames Valley, which ostensibly faced a potential 
shortfall of about 150 MLD in available supply or estimated headroom.  
“Under drought conditions only, the desalination plant needs to be active. At 
other times, which is most of the time, it’s just sitting there, not using up 
much of the company’s resources. But, it fulfilled the regulatory obligation 
and goes into the company’s assets, which will enable an increase in charges 
that can be collected for water.  From a corporate perspective, not a bad 
plan.” (L17)  
Since water supply is essentially a private monopoly in England & Wales, Ofwat 
regulates the price that users pay for water in each river basin. This is determined by 
a measure called the Regulatory Capital Value (RCV) which assesses the capital base 
of the company each year. The RCV is supposed to incentivise investment in the 
water infrastructure by allowing companies to charge the user for the benefit of 
those investments. So, the desalination plant, for example was an investment that 
Thames Water made for which it will be allowed to charge users, who, in theory, 
benefit from improved security of water supply. The initial value of RCV was 
calculated in 1990, the year after privatisation, as the sum of each company’s average 
capital value in financial markets and the value of its debt. With this as the base, each 
year, RCV is calculated as follows:  
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“Capital expenditure to enhance and maintain the network, which is assumed 
in setting price limits, is added to the RCV. Any capital grants or contributions 
towards the cost of the new assets are deducted. Current cost depreciation, 
which is assumed in setting price limits, is deducted from the RCV each year. 
Expenditure in any one year to maintain and replace infrastructure assets 
(infrastructure renewals expenditure or IRE) is not directly added to the RCV” 
(LD12) 
Simplifying it, investments in new infrastructure are rewarded by price increase while 
maintenance is expected to be financed through the company’s own means. As an 
assessment of RCV as a model for utility markets submitted to Ofgem’s (the gas & 
electricity regulator) review of energy network regulation in 2009 argues:  
“…when utility prices are set to cover current cost depreciation, and to earn 
a market interest rate of return on the current cost capital value of the 
industry, (as happens under current cost RCV pricing), then the very act of 
investing in capital assets yields a large cash surplus to the utility. Investment 
itself thus becomes a highly profitable activity - largely irrespective of 
whether or not the investment yields an adequate physical return” (LD13) 
Essentially, the risk conception of a regulator turned out to be very different from 
that of a private company, which converted it quite literally into an opportunity. But, 
as a former civil servant (C37) who consults extensively with regulatory agencies 
observed, what works for a single company’s shareholder value may not work for the 
industry as a whole.  
“The water industry has financed its huge capital expenditure (£108 billion 
from privatisation in 1989 to 2013) by borrowing rather than through raising 
share capital. This trend has been encouraged by very low interest rates…the 
financing structure is too risky as losses would quickly wipe out many 
companies rather limited equity bases, leaving them insolvent.” (L37) 
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In other words, the risk, once financialised, might not have been converted into an 
opportunity but spatialised through material infrastructures. Unlike engineering 
knowledges, different epistemologies of risk obscure the transformation of 
environmental uncertainties into public infrastructures of material and financial 
flows (Bear 2015), through a seemingly objective calculative framework. The 
calculations, in attempting to make legible subjective perceptions and expectations, 
reinforce the boundary-marking quality of water infrastructure. They are meant to 
be known and deciphered only by experts in water management, yet they involve 
the city and its residents in the risk through the materiality of the boundary object 
(Star 2010) – the essential role that water supply plays in urban society.  
6.3.2. The temporal transition of risk to resilience 
Risk wasn’t only spatialised but also went through a temporal translation. It was 
always a prediction of what was to come, of course. The desalination plant built 
presently was not as a response to existing need, as in the case of Chennai, but meant 
to address a potential need or problem that might arise in the future. What’s of 
interest here is how far into the future infrastructural planning is allowed to look.  
“The whole regulatory model inspires small increases; it encourages you to 
take small bites. You’re still under short term risks, but you’re not allowed to 
take a big bite. That’s partly why, when Thames Water worked out their plans 
during the low rainfall years, a desalination plant that could be built in under 
4 years took precedence over their long term plan for a reservoir at Abingdon. 
The shortfall was only about 150 MLD; sure, a reservoir would have taken 
care of long term shortfalls, but it would have required huge capital 
investment which would not be allowed to be passed on to the user through 
pricing. Long term risks were out of the question.”  (L17) 
A big risk is reduced by planning for it over a long term, because the capital cost is 
recovered over a very long time period. But, an asset like a reservoir depreciates in 
the 30-40 years over which its cost is to be recovered, eventually making little 
difference to the company’s RCV and potential increase in water pricing. The water 
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companies could make those investments without passing on the price to the users, 
which, naturally, is not in the interests of a private for-profit business. So, the gradual 
yet perceptible processes of climate change and urbanisation, occurring over 
decades or centuries is sought to be handled in instalments of annual planning cycles. 
The risk is, then, renewed each year, and kept alive, driving the process of calculation, 
infrastructure building and further risk assessment.  
“In London, we work with what we call the risk of two dry winters. Summer 
showers are too minimal and lost to evaporation. It’s the winter precipitation 
that replenishes our reservoirs and aquifers. If it’s one dry winter, we have 
enough storage capacity to keep going. But, two dry winters and we’ll have 
to declare drought. There are an average of about two such droughts over 
twenty years. So, there is always a risk of two dry winters.” (L38) 
When there is a drought, Thames Water, as a first step can issue a hose pipe ban – 
preventing use of hosepipes to water gardens or clean cars etc. This, as the above 
respondent (L38) explained, took 12-16 weeks to be approved after public 
consultations.  
“The Environment Agency would also put pressure on you to implement this 
ban to protect ecological reserves. But, from a supply point of view, by the 
time the ban is approved, you’ve already crossed halfway through the 
drought period and it’s already too late to implement meaningful demand 
control.” (L38) 
Not only is the long term risks posed by climate change distilled down to a matter of 
annual drought, but its control measures are determined by a time period of 12-16 
weeks. Risk also inevitably increased over time or in a given time period:  
“In 2005-06, we could predict that in the next 5 years, the risk of moving to 
standpipes and stopping piped water would increase. We couldn’t say which 
year that might happen, but the water system was under stress and that 
would only keep increasing. We were calculating risk based on predicted 
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demand and population increase; but we couldn’t predict that the rainfall 
would be better next year or the year after.” (L34) 
Standpipes here were only an imagination of the stress that the water system was 
under. The risk of standpipes, water managers freely admitted, was only a bogeyman. 
The very purpose of the institutions of water management was to ensure that the 
standpipes never materialised and remained an image of risk in planning processes 
(LD11). This was called the ‘resilience’ of water systems. 
“Perhaps some residents may not mind interruption of supply or reduced 
water supply. But, on behalf of populations at risk – the elderly, hospitals etc. 
– water systems have to be resilient. They have to at the very minimum supply 
water 24 hours per day on all 7 days of the week. This is a reasonable 
expectation.” (L34) 
“For any British water company, there are literally hundreds of options at 
disposal to augment supply or control demand. But, there is the matter of 
resilience to take into account. That’s why brackish water desalination 
emerged as the ideal solution to London’s supply gap.” (L38) 
For desalination is termed a drought-proofing technology or climate-change 
mitigation measure in that it was not dependent on rainfall or other annual climactic 
vagaries to function. But, it still formed only a finite back up of 150 MLD, which was 
bound to fall short very soon. Beyond simply balancing supply and demand, a senior 
executive at Thames Water even gave risk of a potential terrorist attack on London 
as reason to build a desalination plant.  
“Resilience planning is not simply about checking if we have enough water in 
the pot to last this year. We have to take all kinds of factors into account – 
what if there was an attack on London? The city has been constantly under 
threat – we need technological projects, then, that can handle any kind of 
crisis.” (L18) 
229 
It was unclear why technologies like desalination were more resistant to unknown 
threats than other options like pipes with reduced leakage. When asked, the 
executive declined to explain further as it was a matter of national security that 
Thames Water had to handle with caution. Risk and resilience then formed a virtuous 
cycle. Prediction of risk would need planning for resilience, which being non-
negotiable, will always prevent any predicted risk. In the absence of predicted risk, 
there were always unknown risks like the ones the executive above mentioned.  
As scholars from a wide spectrum of disciplinary backgrounds and political 
approaches have pointed out, it is necessary to understand that resilience is a 
multifaceted thing (Anderson 2015) and that it is a way of working with the 
fundamental uncertainties of socio-environmental relationships rather than avoiding 
them definitively (Dessai et al. 2013). There has been attempt to separate the 
ecological and social aspects of resilience (Cote & Nightingale 2012) or rethink how 
the descriptive concept of resilience can be converted into a normative agenda 
(Weichselgartner & Kelman 2015). But, these studies still maintain that there does 
exist a scientific or normative idea of resilience that needs to be reconciled with social 
needs. Critical analyses of resilience, as Anderson points out (2015), can swing to the 
other end, terming resilience more often than not a neoliberal construct. He posits 
instead that we take the ‘diversity of resilience’ seriously and understand how they 
actually assume a certain form and practice.  
It is precisely this question that Patricia Gober raises about the water industry when 
she contends:  
“…the water resources community has been slow to embrace new paradigms 
for long-term water planning and policy. Too much attention has been 
focused on reducing, clarifying, and representing climatic uncertainty and too 
little attention has been directed to building capacity to accommodate 
uncertainty and change.” (Gober 2013: 955) 
Her arguments are based on findings in North American water industries, and so, 
indicate that it is not strictly the regulatory framework in England and Wales that 
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drives Thames Water towards this mode of resilience planning. They direct towards 
a broader rethink of how we understand socio-natural interactions and what we 
believe the social agency in managing them is. The attempt to quantify risk and plan 
for it as an objective measure to be overcome also has: 
“a tendency to reinforce a long-standing blame culture that drives interest in 
the development of behaviour change initiatives while the relatively 
unchallenged hydraulic mission to provide safe drinking water and sanitation 
progresses.” (Pearce et al. 2013) 
The ‘hydraulic mission’ of building a desalination plant in London, however, was 
challenged, by the then Mayor of London, who questioned the practice of resilience 
by disrupting the annual planning cycles that the water sector followed, demanding 
that the longer term issue of fixing the city’s leaky pipes be undertaken instead. This 
was however possible only because of the individual discretionary power vested in 
the Mayor, and was not successful in the end. The next chapter will explore the 
contestation between the Mayor and Thames Water in detail.   
6.4. Conclusion 
The framing of technical networks as socio-technical in the social sciences has been 
echoed in the engineering disciplines, where there have been calls for a paradigm 
shift in the approaches needed to tackle issues of the Anthropocene like 
sustainability or climate resilience (Halbe et al 2015, Marlow et al 2013). Engineers 
have been urged to take further interest in the institutional, political and social 
structures that their work is embedded in, in order to achieve sustainable changes in 
technical networks (Clift 1998). To this end models and methodologies such as 
integrated water resource management (IWRM) or Life Cycle Analysis have been 
developed (Lundin & Morrison 2002). However, these approaches start from the 
premise that engineering work is scientific and technical, and unaware of its social 
embeddedness. The above chapter considered what those technological 
epistemologies might be and how they interact with the socio-political environment. 
It has traced how the multiplicity of engineering knowledges constitute the 
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compartmentalised identities of water professionals discussed in the previous 
chapters.  
In Chennai, distinct engineering disciplines were visible in the work performed for 
urban water supply, especially in new technologies and efforts directed towards 
more consistent and integrated flows. Each of those disciplinary knowledges were 
co-constituted with the institutional structure they were part of and the larger 
political geography of the city in which the work was embedded. In other words, 
engineering work was already social and political. Engineers were far from being 
unaware of this, and frequently used their knowledge of the surrounding social 
ecology in their work, sustainability being incidental to it, even if working on green 
technologies like recycling. In London, the diverse technological functions that make 
up a water management system were sought to be reconciled through standardised 
calculations and regulatory formulas. This chapter paid specific attention to the 
calculation of risk and how it came to be a dominant epistemology of water 
management. Through the ‘scientisation’ of risk i.e. adhering to mathematical 
models using supposedly objective data, “the epistemological ambiguity – implicit 
multivalency – of ‘realist’ environmental and risk discourse” (Wynne 2002: 460) was 
made into technocratic truth.  
In the light of this renewed attempt at infrastructural networking in cities, across 
disparate contexts and very different consequences, their ‘multivalent reality’ is 
ignored by Graham & Marvin’s (2001) theory of splintering urbanism, which reposes 
far too much certainty in the cohesive power of centralised networks:  
“In the broad shift from the single, coherent infrastructure networks laid out 
during the modern ideal to the competing, overlaid patchworks of unbundled 
networks now emerging, we would argue that the geographies of topological 
connection and exclusion, as manifest within contemporary cities, are 
becoming much more complex and uneven. Single geographies where 
networks bind spaces and cities are giving way to multiple, overlaid and 
customised grids that unevenly connect parts of cities together and to 
intensifying interactions elsewhere.” (Graham & Marvin 2001: 189) 
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What they have described here is fundamentally the nature of urbanisation, even in 
the era of peak modernisation. The mushrooming of several discrete technologies of 
water access and the associated knowledges they sprout, this chapter has argued, 
need attention at the micropolitical level and cannot be taken to be agents of 
splintering necessarily. They also exist to bring the network together or keep a 
centralised network as unchanged as possible. This, however, does not mean that 
there aren’t spatial hierarchies or divisions produced through the planning and 
construction of infrastructure.  
In cities of the global South discrete bundled networks engender dynamic forms of 
coherence as seen through the shifting uses of reverse osmosis filters in the building 
sites of Chennai’s suburbs. This was enabled through the work of engineers who 
utilised the membrane technologies in multiple and efficient ways to cater to what 
they conceived as their social constituents. However, the coherence they achieved 
through temporal separation of their uses also maintained the class-based divisions 
across those temporalities (section 6.2.3). Attention to the everyday practices of 
infrastructure-making, especially the people who constituted the networks though 
their physical mobilities, here allowed excavation of the lived experience of resource 
access and exclusion within a bundled network. Additions to London’s water 
infrastructure, on the other hand, are driven towards keeping it as unchanged and 
unitary as possible through planning for risk and resilience. Tracing these concepts in 
practice in Thames Water’s planning for the desalination plant, it is evident that this 
is oriented towards a goal of hydraulic continuity rather than achieving the 
simultaneous goals of preparedness for environmental change and universal supply 
that ‘resilience’ is expected to address.  
Tensions between environmental and hydraulic or engineering rationales are 
however not limited to conservation of water and the maintenance of networks for 
consistent urban water use. As the following chapter will show, contestations against 
the desalination plants rooted in the realm of the environmental emerged in Chennai 
as well London, albeit from very different places.  
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7. POLITICS OF CONTESTATION 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents an account of political contestations around the desalination 
project in Chennai and London, both of which, however, did not manage to alter the 
project or the larger infrastructure planning for the city in any immediate sense. Yet, 
they gave rise to a mode of doing politics and to specific political groupings. The 
recent surge of interest among social scientists in the study of infrastructure, in fact, 
reflects precisely such inevitable political possibilities that complex socio-technical 
projects present. That’s why infrastructures have been called res publica, even if they 
were privatised and run for profit – their materiality and utility make them a public 
matter (Colas & Kharkhordin 2009), no matter their governance structure. Andrew 
Barry (2002), however, goes a step further to argue that technological projects have 
unique political potential precisely because the rationalities that make them legible 
and the metrological work done to depoliticise them produce contestable outcomes 
or objects.  
These objects usually take the form of information, published or circulated, which 
are contestable not necessarily for their content but because of the attention they 
draw in the public sphere.  
“Metrology puts new objects into circulation. It multiplies realities by creating 
objects that can be regarded neither as reflections of reality nor as the 
expressions of the social subjects who created them.” (Barry 2002: 277) 
This approach to infrastructural politics, then, limits the extent to which the state, a 
particular institution or private company could be held accountable for public affairs, 
especially if they pertain to a distributive resource like water. Instead, it distributes 
responsibility through social and material networks to reveal the complex and 
intricate connections that sustain infrastructures the way they are. This means it also 
demands attention to the marginalised concerns and connections that those 
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infrastructures give rise to (Coutard & Guy 2007). In some cases, these contestations, 
much like traditional politics, manage to effect long lasting change in institutional 
structures, policies or the spatial and material construction of the city.  
However, in social studies of water, desalination plants continue to be viewed 
through the lens of technological solutionism and depoliticising technocracy. They 
have been called a hydro-scalar fix: 
“Whereas terrestrial waters are marred by complex property rights, inserted 
in dense regulatory and institutional arrangements, infused with all manner 
of social, cultural, and ecological conflict, and integral parts of often 
intractable geopolitical tensions, seawater appears to be free of these highly 
charged meanings, claims, and practices. As such, the incorporation of the sea 
into the politics of produced water can be usefully identified as a scalar fix” 
(Swyngedouw 2013: 262) 
As the case of Chennai and London will show below, the coast or any littoral space is 
far from being free of meanings, contentious or otherwise. Making use of them for 
urban development, as seen through the history of the coast in Chennai and of the 
Thames in London (Kelly 2018), involves a continuous negotiation of claims and 
practices. Despite the analytical similarities, though, the political opposition in the 
two cities were very different in terms of who it came from and how. In Chennai, it is 
the physical materiality of desalination that gave rise to it; and in London, the 
abstract discourse that justified desalination. So, the chapter will deal with them on 
a case study basis, delving into coastal Chennai first followed by the corridors of the 
London government in the second part. Section 7.2 explains the coastal ecology of 
Chennai, followed by an ethnographic encounter with the socio-ecological condition 
of its northern coast where the first desalination plant was built (section 7.2.1). 
Section 7.2.2 discusses how coastal development in the city has been challenged 
through ontological manoeuvres on the part of two prominent groups of activists. 
Section 7.2.3 then traces the emergence of an organic but contradictory and 
contingent practice of political contestation from the city’s southern periphery where 
the second desalination plant was built. Section 7.3 sets out the background for the 
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contestation of the desalination project in London by delineating the background of 
sustainable development objectives that formed the basis of the constitution of the 
London government in 1999. Section 7.3.1 introduces the political background of the 
first elected Mayor of London and what this meant for the agenda of the London 
government. Section 7.3.2 discusses the Mayor’s contestation of the desalination 
plant on detail, arguing that the discretionary powers vested in the individualised 
authority of the Mayor enabled an antagonistic politics that had not been common 
in planning for water infrastructure in the city.   
7.2. Chennai - Between sea and land  
Along Chennai’s long, nearly unbroken coastline, neither the sea nor the coast are 
uninhabited spaces outside urban politics. It social ecology is unique owing to the 
persistence of fishing communities, settled at regular intervals along the coast. 
Between river estuaries, ports and popular beaches, there are settlements 
comprised of a mix of huts, self-built homes and low income housing complexes 
where these communities of urban poor reside (see Figure 18 & 19). When there is 
an industrial or beautification project proposed along the coast, voices of dissent 
almost always emerge from those communities who, rightly, fear eviction or a forced 
end to their life in that part of the city. The arguments put forth in protest are usually 
two-fold – of lives and livelihoods.  
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Figure 18: Nochikuppam, a coastal settlement in the heart of Chennai, near the Adyar 
estuary. 
Source: Fieldwork photos. 
Since they were fishing communities, displacing them would affect their access to 
the sea thus placing them at severe disadvantage towards their means of survival. 
The term ‘livelihood’ carries with it the connotation of a job performed by the poor 
for bare survival; and often firmly coupled with the identity of the people in question. 
Thus, if fishers were denied their livelihood, they would then be unable to do any 
other work just as well because fishing was not just their job – it was their very way 
of life, tied to their bodily ability and social identity. That fishers might have to end 
up doing some other job also constituted a collective failure to protect a purer, more 
organic way of living and a loss of ecological heritage.  
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Figure 19: Map of key coastal sites, Chennai.  
Source: Map data from Google. 
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The case of Nochikuppam located near the city’s iconic Marina beach was one such 
high-profile instance of feared eviction.34 Environmental and rights activists adopt 
the same strategy in putting forth a case against undemocratic anti-poor projects, 
forced evictions and environmentally destructive planning as well.35 
The desalination plants, located on the coast, have, in the course of being 
announced, planned and built, attracted similar criticism and protest36. But, located 
far away from the city centre, the coastal communities they could potentially affect 
were not really related or even allied with the more politically experienced and visible 
coastal communities within the city. So, while there were occasional reports of 
protest against desalination by local residents and environmentalists raised concerns 
about how the discharge of residue from the plants could affect marine life, there 
wasn’t the kind of consistent mobilisation as in Nochikuppam. This section will 
attempt to understand how and why this happened, through interactions with the 
coastal communities concerned combined with observation and follow-up on the 
ecological politics that have developed around those areas. It argues that the 
category of fishers is a political subjectivity, one that has evolved recently in response 
to the littoral development of the urban. The subjectivity is also often something 
thrust on an imagined community, whose politics can be understood better using the 
concept of desire than of collective environmental sustainability. Coastal 
development in Chennai including projects like desalination provokes amongst these 
communities:  
                                                          
34 “Fisherfolk flag concerns over Marina Loop Road extension”. The Times of India. 25 Jun2 2017. 
See: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/fisherfolk-flag-concerns-over-marina-loop-
road-extension/articleshow/59305599.cms 
 
35 For further information on opposition to the beach beautification or coastal development 
projects, see:  
http://theothermedia.in/fishers-oppose-beach-beautification-project/   and 
https://coastalresourcecentre.wordpress.com/2015/03/13/eviction-notice-given-to-fishing-
communities-on-marina-loop-road/ 
 
36 See: http://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/a-salty-resort-53979 and  
https://www.thenewsminute.com/article/nemmeli-desalination-plant-ruins-ecology-and-
livelihoods-tn-govt-plans-two-more-units-54145 
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“complicated emotional investments that induce a range of sometimes 
counterintuitive responses and distinct, if ephemeral sensibilities.” (Larkin 
2013: 234) 
The divergent and often contradictory ways in which coastal communities responded 
to the two desalination plants and yet, fed a uniform narrative of fishers’ livelihoods 
demonstrates the tension between Chennai’s dynamic hydro-ecology and its rapid 
infrastructural development.   
7.2.1. Placing fishers in coastal resistance 
The two desalination plants in Chennai are in vastly different locations – one in the 
northern outskirts and the other longitudinally opposite in the southern end of the 
city’s coastline. Both plants are carefully situated just outside the city limits, thus 
falling within the administration of the local Panchayat rather than the Chennai city 
corporation. It isn’t just their positioning in the city’s extremities that make them 
differently situated, but also the distinctive spatial politics of those locations.  
The first desalination plant was opened in 2010 in a village called Kattupalli, about 30 
km to the north of the city centre. The village was located on a long island that, in 
maps, appears to have inadvertently detached itself from the city in allowing the 
Kosasthalaiyar river to join the sea. Its efforts might be in vain though, as the river 
estuary, known as Ennore creek locally, is the site of massive industrial development 
and so, is in danger of silting up and blocking the river’s flow into the sea. But, the 
island’s detachment from the city stays unchanged, the industries on its fragile land 
hardly accessible or visible to the city-dweller.  
“They pick the island for industrial development because there, it’s only 
nature they have to deal with, not as many people who may object or demand 
accountability. They can use technology on nature, but people can’t be 
silenced with the same tools, can they?” (C32)  
This was from a supervisor (C32) at one of the industries in the island; he was also an 
activist and a co-ordinator for journalistic visits or political mobilisation in the area. 
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He seemed to have spoken too soon, though, as the road that lead us from Chennai’s 
northernmost commuter terminal of Ennore to the Kattupalli plant was gradually 
reverting to its presumably original marshy state. Nature, it appeared, couldn’t be 
taken over by technology, either. He didn’t have to take that road on his daily 
commute because he lived even further north of the island in the town of Pulicat, a 
historic trading port with links to the Arabian peninsula and would-be European 
colonisers37.  
The town was on the banks of the Pulicat lake, one of the largest brackish water lakes 
in India, formed at the estuary of the river Arani. The whole region defied the binary 
between land and water or salt and fresh, with rivers and sea intertwining among 
villages. It nurtures an ecosystem rich in aquatic life; attracts migratory birds 
annually; and is home to diverse communities with trading histories. Yet, all that one 
sees north of Ennore are huge warehouse style buildings, chimneys spewing smoke 
and lorries carrying things, leaving clouds of dust behind them and pockmarking 
roads beyond usability for other commuters. Ennore is home to thermal power 
stations, oil refineries, fertiliser and cement factories and a port. To the north of 
Pulicat lake, there is even one of India’s two main space stations – in an island called 
Sriharikota in the neighbouring state of Andhra. It is in this setting that Kattupalli 
island’s recent industrialisation fits in. A private company has been building a 
shipyard cum port in the island since 2009; so at the time of fieldwork most of the 
island sported fences and large signs warning that work was underway, but without 
much by way of built structures. The public sector Ennore port was also located in 
the island, with conveyor belts taking goods across the river’s breadth, connecting 
materials seamlessly across land and water.  
The island had an air of something of a large scale industrial development about it, 
giving away no clues about its history or human settlements. It serves as the supplier 
of essential materials for sustaining Chennai – power, oil, cement and now, water. 
But, like the rest of Chennai, coastal settlements co-exist, if uncomfortably, with 
                                                          
37 “The Pulicat Story”, The Hindu, 04 Jul 2013, see: http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-in-
school/the-pulicat-story/article4878802.ece  
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heavy polluting industries. To the south in Ennore and to the west, on the other side 
of the river in Minjur (the name translates as ‘fish town’), this has been the case for 
decades now. But, it would be difficult to encompass the experience of those villages 
and its residents within a uniform paradigm of fishers’ livelihoods. In one of 
Kattupalli’s villages, Koraikuppam, a resident said:  
“We have never fished in the river before, but now, all the industries 
discharge their effluents in the sea. So, we’re having to make do with river 
fish – we don’t have the knowledge to catch those efficiently.” (C34) 
Some of the villages around there had disappeared or ‘moved’ to make way for 
industries. But, the next village, Sathankuppam, and the one after that, 
Kattupallikuppam, had a different story:  
“People here don’t go out to fish in the sea because the river has so much to 
offer. They are river fishers. So, we don’t know much about how the 
industries might affect life in the sea. But, if the river silts up, yes, we can’t go 
fishing.” (C79) 
“Fishing was not really our traditional occupation. Our ancestors kept moving 
from the north, in Andhra, until somehow they ended up in this swampy area. 
So, fish was just one of the many things we ate and in order to eat it, we had 
to catch it first.” (C80) 
This fishing activity is not necessarily performed exactly where a coastal community 
lives. For one, fishing involves going out to the sea, which is usually not on a straight 
line from a point on the coast. Small scale fishers also have a common dock to unload 
and sell their catch south of Ennore at Kasimedu Harbour, which comes under the 
control of the Chennai port. The fish that is sold in markets along coastal settlements, 
as in Nochikuppam, is a mix of catch brought in by the local fishermen and fish bought 
by the traders, almost all women, in the Kasimedu market. In some households, it 
was only the women who was engaged in fisheries by being a trader in the market 
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while the men went for work in the city, neatly inverting the expectation that fishers 
are men, helped by the women in their family.  
In coastal North Chennai, both men and women went to work in the industries 
around there. 
“You came down the road, so you know what that’s like. We rely on company-
provided transport to get to work and back. Without that, we wouldn’t be 
able to get anywhere. Some of the women in the area have pooled together 
to get a ‘share auto’ to serve the area. That still means they have to leave very 
early in the morning and return when the auto driver is willing to spare time 
for this area.” (C34)  
The new private port in Kattupalli and the desalination plant may be recent; but 
residents in the area have lived next door to power plants, oil refineries, cement and 
fertiliser factories, if only in an unhealthy relationship.  
“We have been crying ourselves hoarse about fly ash from factories 
dispersing in the wind. Some political parties take interest sometimes, but not 
much changes. Well, the fly ash is now discharged into the water rather than 
let out in the air. That’s change, I guess. The desalination plant is simply 
adding to this marine pollution by discharging their brine residue in the sea. 
I’m not saying that their pollution is excusable or lesser in any way. But, you 
have to understand that they are the least of our problems here.” (C80) 
“There are so many industries here that it is difficult to find out from where 
which effluent comes. But, we know the different discharge pipes, where they 
are let out into the sea and at what times to expect effluent flow. We can 
show you exactly – just last week, we took some environmental activists from 
south Chennai who wanted to know the extent of damage to the waters 
here.” (C81) 
This claim could be independently verified with the said environmental activists 
(C77), although there was no way to know if the effluents and their sources were 
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identified correctly. It was hardly possible to knock on factory doors and ask to see 
their backyards. The residents of coastal north Chennai were up against the same 
cordoned off walls and invisible authorities of too many polluting industries that any 
researcher or journalist investigating the area would be. Additionally, many of them 
worked there and did not feel as strongly about environmental pollution as about 
how the polluting substances might get into their food or their lungs through the air 
they breathed.  
The problem, as several of them saw it, was to do with the mode of effluent discharge 
rather than preservation of their ecological systems, as Chennai’s environmental 
organisations argued. Those organisations have also, over the years, developed a 
close working relationship with coastal communities in south Chennai, through a 
particular settlement called Ururkuppam along the estuary of the Adyar river. This is 
why some of Kattupalli’s residents felt obliged to explain why they hadn’t protested 
against the desalination plant, or other industries, especially on the island.  Coastal 
community leaders from the city centre or south Chennai, along with environmental 
groups, often urged them to mobilise. But, Kattupalli was more involved in industrial 
work than fishing at this point.  When fishers in north Chennai do mobilise, it is for 
concrete demands like preferential allocation of waters for them in fisheries policy; 
the protests, then, are carried out through official fishers’ unions and not through 
their residential affiliations as it happens with middle class mobilisations elsewhere. 
Even though the protests happened just off Ennore around the Kasimedu harbour, it 
did not mean that the protestors – the fishers – lived right there. They were fishers 
from various parts of Chennai and the surrounding districts.  
Conversely, when there were protests held by local residents against pollution by 
industries, the protestors were not all fishers and it was often their lives that were 
more affected than their livelihood. Some villages along the northern coast, for 
instance, experience a ‘carbon rain’ in the evenings.  
“When the factories close, that’s when they disperse the fly ash in the air, 
showering us with minute particles of carbon. Our kids come back from school 
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at that time, they buy snacks and eat it along the way. It is sickening to think 
they are inhaling and ingesting those carbon particles.” (C80) 
The concern about kids’ health and industrial pollution is a universal one rather than 
one specific to fishers. Yet, a coastal identity is expected of residents in Ennore, 
Kattupalli or Pulicat, the title of fishers ready to vest in them the authority of 
environmental knowledge and the political inclination to defend that. The head of 
the Tiruvallur District Traditional Fishers’ United Association resided in Pulicat. 
According to him:  
“Associations like ours exist for the political purpose. So, we haven’t tried 
simply persuading the whole village to protest. We would rather write 
petitions or meet with the local politician. There are many traditional fishers 
in this town. This is an ancient community, after all. But, even here, many 
people prefer the development of industries than sticking to fishing. I mean, 
where is the ambition in doing that when the whole world is moving ahead?” 
(C73) 
A resident in the nearby village of Arankuppam who worked as a security guard in 
one of the factories echoed his views: 
“Why do you expect us to protect coastal ecology? There are mechanisms to 
do that. Like the Pollution Control Board, which visits every six months and 
routinely certifies that emissions and effluents are under the limit. There are 
public consultations where only favourable responses are recorded. Those 
are hardly coastal or fishers’ problems, are they?” (C78) 
There were a few respondents who pointed out the irony of a water supply plant in 
Kattupalli, where the local Panchayat taps groundwater from further west or north 
to supply households because the local groundwater table was heavily 
contaminated.  
“Why would we oppose desalination? It’s an excellent idea – to supply water 
to us!” (C78) 
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“They should have brought desalination plants to us a long time ago; instead, 
now, they only give us its brine discharge.” (C80) 
Rather than form a consistent pattern of fishers’ consciousness or provoked coastal 
political mobilisation, the responses from around Kattupalli suggest an urban politics 
of desire, where people expressed individual ambitions and views rather than work 
towards the collective restoration of a lost ecology. This may hardly be 
environmentally progressive, but it reflected urban life as lived by most of 
Chennaiites, whose identities and politics may be shaped by what they wanted rather 
than hark back to a primordial identity of ecological belonging. Rather than born of 
lack – of livelihood, of resources, of water – it is born of an active want. It is not 
because they have lost a way of life or livelihood that there is contestation of coastal 
developments, but because of how they want their homes, the region and 
themselves to be treated in the course of the development.  
7.2.2. Ontological challenges to coastal development 
There is a coastal village called Ururkuppam on the Adyar estuary nestled within an 
affluent part of south Chennai. The traditional fishers in this village have been quoted 
more in the media about problems with coastal projects in the city than any other 
fishing association. This has to do with an active elite environmental group in the 
Adyar neighbourhood that has cultivated a relationship with Ururkuppam’s fisher 
community and reposes faith in the revival of a dwindling pool of traditional 
environmental knowledge in the city. To this end, it has created an institution called 
the Coastal Resource Centre (CRC) in Ururkuppam that helps communities planning 
political action and provides information to the media on what it deduces are serious 
coastal and hydrological issues in and around Chennai.  The environmentalist who 
spearheaded the initiative was convinced that the contradictory and lacklustre 
responses to coastal development was bravado towards a changing city and its 
demanding development trajectory: 
“The fishers are not interested in saving the coast or maintaining its ecological 
aesthetic. But, their livelihood and way of life is under threat. So, they have 
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aspirations or compulsions for upward mobility, unlike in southern Tamil 
Nadu where there is some pride in the traditional occupation.” (C77) 
According to the CRC, there were multiple desalination plants along the northern 
coast, built and run by the industries that needed to source their own water. This 
produced a cumulative brine discharge that couldn’t be accounted for only by the 
Kattupalli plant that sold to Metrowater.  
“Why do the fishers care whether it is a plant that supplies drinking water to 
the city or manufactures water for the industries. They only see the effluents 
in the sea and tell you about that.” (C77) 
The environmentalist agreed, however, that it was difficult to condense the diverse 
coastal communities of Chennai and surrounding districts into a single category of 
fishers. Each coastal village could be made up of a different community, with some 
holding fishing as an occupation and others not. There was no easy way for them to 
work together for a common cause given that there was so much in terms of work, 
culture, practices and beliefs that differed between them and there might not even 
be an agreement on what the common cause would be. A writer from one of Tamil 
Nadu’s many fishing communities and a chronicler of Tamil Nadu’s coast pointed out:  
“Fishing is not the only way in which coastal residents interact with the sea. 
It is by no means the only traditional coastal occupation either. They may be 
mangrove-dependent; or use water simply for transport and ferrying. Yes, 
there is an ecological basis to all of this. But, like everyone else in modern 
Chennai, there is no community yearning to doing their traditional job just as 
their forefathers did.” (C70) 
Even if a coastal identity and cause could unite these disparate communities, there 
was the issue of space. They may reside contiguously on the coast but are certainly 
separated by large physical distances. An activist from another NGO, Human Rights 
Advocacy and Research Foundation (HRF) was more blunt about the differences:  
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“They all belong to different castes. Fishing wasn’t one of the caste 
occupations traditionally in most places. So, it would be different 
communities, migrant or otherwise, who would have settled at a particular 
place in the coast and started fishing, sometimes along with another 
traditional caste occupation like trading. There are also rich and poor fishers.” 
(C76) 
While these two activists agreed that fishers included a diverse group whose 
mobilisation was however essential for environmental activism in Chennai and Tamil 
Nadu, they differed in their strategy to do so, representing two broadly different 
philosophies towards environmental sustainability. The human rights approach was 
to secure the status of a protected tribe for fishers, thus protecting their traditional 
occupation, cultural practise and the coastal ecology required to carry them out. This 
is currently how certain forests and their tribal dwellers were supposed to be 
protected, in theory.  
“Don’t get me wrong – we know the value of coastal ecology independent of 
its utility for fishers. We fought for eight years to save Kattupalli island, in fact. 
But, focusing on protecting the land rather than the people is risky. It will 
come down to who protects the land and how. The government can easily 
take over land from fishers even if they were given title deeds for the informal 
settlements they live in.” (C76) 
It is, however, the land-oriented approach, spearheaded by the CRC, that has become 
popular now in Chennai with even movie stars and political parties taking notice. 
Coastal land, that is the beach, where desalination plants or other projects are built, 
this approach contends, is treated as ‘poramboke’ – a land use classification 
popularly understood as ‘wasteland’ that’s managed by the government (CD20). The 
many rain-fed lakes around Chennai, for instance, dry up during the summers when 
they are poramboke rather than used for cultivation. Because poramboke is waste, it 
then follows that it can be taken over for urban development. Poramboke is 
traditionally an agrarian distinction between cultivable and uncultivated land. 
Activists in Chennai today argue that such uncultivated land were traditionally the 
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commons, meant to provide some form of communal benefit that may not be 
immediately apparent to a profit or property oriented system of understanding land 
values. These commons are essential for contemporary Chennai to serve as the city’s 
ecological buffer – protecting it from floods and absorbing rainwater to replenish the 
groundwater table. Therefore, it cannot and should not be taken over by the 
government or for any other private interest (Kumar et al. 2014).  
Unlike in the case of Ururkuppam where individual residents, presumably fishers, 
settled there over a long period and were given title deeds for their houses, 
reimagining coastal land as commons prevents any form of ownership and so, cannot 
be taken over for development. Assisted by a local policy institute and researchers, 
coastal residents in central Chennai mapped their usage of the beach – to park boats, 
dry nets, sort and cure fish etc. - to establish how coastal land serves as commons 
(C68). A prominent musician composed a song38 about environmental destruction in 
north Chennai titled ‘Poramboke’ to draw attention to the useful ways in which the 
word and the land it denotes can be understood. The song and several other 
proponents of the ‘poramboke’ approach stress the ecological function served by 
marshes, mangroves and other ‘wasteland’ - urban flood protection, if nothing else.  
If infrastructures are ‘ontological experiments’ i.e. “emergent systems that produce 
variable practical ontologies—novel configurations of the world and its elements” 
(Jensen & Morita 2015: 84), then, it only seems natural that resistance to them is 
framed as an ontological reinterpretation of one of its many socio-material elements 
as well. Yet, in practice, the argument for protection of coastal sands often boils 
down to its use by fishers. Both approaches discussed above – based on tribal rights 
and common lands – hinge on fishers continuing to practice their traditional 
occupation and remaining in the coastal settlements. It also presumed that coastal 
settlements would be occupied largely by fishers in the foreseeable future, whereas 
several coastal settlements in Chennai were home to a large number of migrant 
workers in the construction, manufacturing and other industries. Ururkuppam, for 
instance, was a relatively secure settlement because of the title deeds that many 
                                                          
38 The music video is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=82jFyeV5AHM 
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houses had been given and the political action it was involved in (CE12). So, many of 
its residents were able to rent out a room or build-to-rent particularly to young 
women from outside Chennai working in the city’s factories or its service industries. 
They are typically not accounted for in activities that happen in the village or when 
issues affecting the coast are discussed.  
“I don’t think we have even interacted with the Urur Fishers’ Society. You 
have to be part of the fishing community and then, they issue you a card to 
be part of the Society and its schemes. They know about our existence, of 
course. They allot separate quotas for us – the tenants - for water and such 
public services. I think it’s fine. I mean, they have fought a lot to get the kind 
of services they do now. It is only fair that they take the responsibility of 
distributing it to us.” (C83) 
“I come from the North East (Darjeeling) and work in a beauty parlour around 
here. I can speak the language and everything now. Like tenants everywhere 
in the city I just pay for my water, electricity and boarding and get on with my 
work.” (C84) 
In fact, a whole section of Ururkuppam, with poorly constructed houses, was 
comprised of migrant workers. Given Chennai’s rapid development, rising cost of 
living and the insecurity of living in informal housing anywhere in the city, coastal 
settlements were some of the most reliable places for migrant workers and the urban 
poor to occupy.  
Despite the demographic flux, there was emergent coastal resistance and fishers’ 
identity, albeit contingent on variable and unpredictable desires. As seen in the case 
of Chennai’s desalination plants, they emerged in response to coastal projects in an 
inconsistent but inevitable manner.  
7.2.3. Dissent emerges in the southern periphery 
There is a road that begins in the affluent neighbourhood of Thiruvanmiyur in south 
Chennai and runs along the coast all the way to the southern tip of the country and 
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the state of Tamil Nadu. Called the East Coast Road (ECR), it is considered a scenic 
drive and is popular for weekend getaways from Chennai. It was formed in 1998 by 
connecting several villages and cutting through coastal features for a aesthetic 
parallel with the seashore39. A resident of Soolerikadu, the village adjacent to 
Metrowater’s desalination plant in Nemmeli explained: 
“That’s how we ended up on the beach and the agriculturalists on the other 
side of the road. Not that we formed a united community even before. They 
are Vanniyar40. But, this road divided us clean, leaving us firmly attached to 
the sea and disconnected from the rest of the village.” (C39) 
This is a theory about how the ECR came to be dotted with coastal communities at 
regular intervals – that it was the construction of the ECR that cleared mangroves 
and created pristine sandy beaches as well as allowed settlements on the coastal 
sands, whereas traditionally villages had to have been beyond the mangrove forests 
and not right on the sand (C35). Villagers along the coast were vague about their 
history tracing their lives along the seashore to about 50 years, but not specifically 
this part of the coast. In any case, residents of Soolerikadu pointed out, they weren’t 
wedded to the sea or the coastal land. They would be happy to be relocated if the 
government would house them in an accessible location. In fact, the desalination 
plant there was built on land acquired by the government from a temple trust (CD3), 
to which it was bequeathed by a 19th century philanthropist.  
Unlike Kattupalli, the Nemmeli desalination plant was a lone industrial unit right off 
the ECR, visible for motorists on their way to one of the many beach resorts in the 
area or simply traveling south from Chennai. It was owned by Metrowater but built 
and operated on contract by a private company. So, when the plant was proposed to 
be built there, villagers around weren’t sure of what to expect out of it; but it also 
presented a change in status-quo.  
                                                          
39 “East Coast Road Project”, Tamil Nadu Road Development Company Ltd. – project details, see:  
http://tnrdc.com/ecr/  
40 A common name for an intermediary caste in northern Tamil Nadu. 
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“NGOs did approach us asking if we wanted to protest; fishing community 
leaders from Ururkuppam warned us it was bad news. But, we were swayed 
by the prospect of development.” (C56) 
The NGO referred to here is the Human Rights Advocacy & Research Foundation, 
which viewed fishing as a right to life and livelihood for coastal residents.  
“It’s not that we don’t want to do fishing. But, it is honestly tough work with 
meagre returns. It is not a modern occupation our children would want to do. 
But, some of them are already taking up fishing now, because their education 
isn’t fetching them jobs. One can, however, dream…” (C39) 
“It may seem foolish in retrospect, but for some reason, we thought we’ll find 
jobs in this water factory. It wasn’t just that, though. It was like…something 
different from daily existence, trying to eke out a living between fish and 
various jobs in Chennai. Something that was almost stable compared to the 
uncertainty of living here. The factory was coming next door to our village, 
amidst all this coastal land.” (C56)  
There is no recorded promise of development or jobs associated with the Nemmeli 
desalination plant. It might have been mentioned word-of-mouth. It is not recorded 
in the public consultation proceedings, because there is no such document. A clerk 
at the Nemmeli panchayat said:  
“If the government was putting up a plant, why would they ask for permission 
from the village? You have strange notions. Metrowater would have sent a 
letter to the panchayat leader who would have approved it.” (C58) 
In theory, consent is needed from local residents; in practice, it is always obtained. 
The panchayat leader explained this further:  
“It wasn’t me who gave consent to the plant. It was the previous leader. He is 
technically supposed to consult with the villagers – but, he didn’t. But, 
request for consent usually comes as an order from the district collector’s 
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office. He could hardly say no to that - he would have been threatened that 
he would be removed from his post. So, he can’t really be blamed.” (C57) 
But, as the villagers had said before, a public consultation may not necessarily have 
attracted dissent. In any case, the plant was set up in Nemmeli without much 
opposition. That was when trouble began.  
 “You see that building? That was demolished by sea intrusion. This has 
started happening only after they built the plant. The seashore erosion that 
happens in north Chennai hasn’t affected us so far; we were safely away from 
the port and other industrial development. But, after the plant came, we face 
regular sea intrusion and soil erosion. The sea is now chipping away at our 
homes.” (C56) 
Two men who took tourists from nearby resorts out to sea on their boats explained:  
“On the shore we experience the sea as waves coming to the load from the 
sea - so we think all the water is moving towards that wave motion. But, there 
is flow of water under the surface in different directions – as currents. When 
they built the plant, they dredged underwater and disturbed these currents. 
That’s why the sea is now entering our village more often.” (C71) 
It was for this issue that the residents of Soolerikadu started holding protests and 
petitioning for relocation or government built housing. By then, any jobs that the 
villagers had got during construction of the plant had dwindled as running the plant 
did not require much labour, except from trained chemical engineers. The villagers 
were paid a one-off compensation for their trouble. But, that wouldn’t have taken 
care of housing or relocation.  
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Figure 20: Building reportedly damaged by sea intrusion, Nemmeli, Chennai. 
Source: Fieldwork photo. 
 “We continued protesting. In 2013, during a demonstration, the police came 
and told us we needed to go over to the police station to get permission for 
our protest. When some (21) of us went to get this done, we were detained 
for over a month. The whole village then had to focus on getting us out on 
bail rather than protest against the desalination plant. Typical tactics to 
suppress dissent.” (C39) 
Interestingly, this also prompted residents of Soolerikadu to reach out to more 
politically active fishers in the nearby village of Kovalam and in Chennai. Kovalam was 
a village off the ECR located at the point where the Buckingham canal joins the sea 
at the backwater of Muttukadu, forming a marshy system once contiguous with the 
Pallikarnai marshes further west. On the beach are some of the most popular resorts 
on the ECR. Residents of Kovalam had a history of guerrilla resistance to 
encroachment on their beach use space by resorts – parking boats on their driveway 
254 
or dumping rotten fish in their backyards. Kovalam, like other villages on the coast, 
could not be described as entirely a fishing village either. But, material artefacts of 
fishing became a symbolic as well as the most direct mode of protest for them. As 
the human rights activist pointed out: 
“Fishers can make for powerful protestors. When we organise them, they are 
ready with their boats for blockade; carrying oars in their hands, they look like 
they mean business. Plus, their clustered living on the coast enables quick 
mobilisation and a powerful image with the sea in the background and the 
materialities of coastal living apparent.” (C76) 
The question that arises then is whether this is a case of an organic community 
mobilising or of an organic politics emerging through technologies of identity 
building. Interaction with coastal communities around the two major desalination 
plants in Chennai suggest it is the latter. Consider the argument made by the writer 
on the politics of fishers in the rest of Tamil Nadu:  
“Inland residents imagine that the destruction of the coast only affects 
fishers, thus keeping their eyes wide shut.” (C70) 
Since fishers have been neglected by inland residents, they allow coastal 
development to their own detriment, according to him. However, in Chennai today, 
it is this very imagination that has created the political category of fishers who are 
expected to be resisting ecological destruction in support of activists in the city. They 
are also expected to possess unique knowledge to carry out this resistance. 
Irrespective of whether coastal residents are traditional fishers or experienced in the 
ways of the littoral to have developed significant knowledge on them, they are able 
to make use of their spatial position to invoke this political image. They access boats, 
oars and other such materials in ways that make political objects out of them41.   
                                                          
41 During the floods of late 2015, the fisher community rowed into the flooded streets of Chennai on 
their boats to aid the rescue efforts. See: “Flood of kindness as the skies open up”, The Hindu, 02 
Dec 2015, Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/features/metroplus/society/chennai-residents-
lend-a-helping-hand-in-the-rain/article7940986.ece  
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Even though they are labelled fishers, it is their residence on the coast that enables 
them to formulate this identity and use their space for resistance. It is also only 
because they interact with the water either as fishers or simply as coastal residents 
that they have the need to raise these objections. The coast typically lies outside the 
planning area and even the permitted space for urban development in Chennai. The 
coastal regulation zone (CRZ) typically bans housing and any other construction 
within so many metres of the High Tide Line42. But, the traditional residence of 
coastal communities have paved way for continued settlement of the urban poor in 
those coastal areas, thus allowing for a coastal identity to emerge. The politics of 
dissent against desalination, then, was distinctly urban and informal.  
Ajantha Subramanian, in her account of the political contestation by fishers in 
southern Tamil Nadu, describes a coherent community of fishers of the same caste, 
living under a common leadership of religious authority,  who “constitute themselves 
as subjects of rights in relation to existing histories and hegemonies.” (Subramanian 
2009: 4) The case of Chennai’s coastal residents is, in many ways, the opposite. 
Neither a contiguous spatial community nor united in their common occupation or 
caste, their claim to political citizenship was embedded in an urban spatiality with all 
the material and desirous assemblages it entails. The constitution of their identity as 
fishers followed from the mechanics of their contestation, which mobilised practices 
and material artefacts of littoral living. Where their position does parallel 
Subramanian’s analysis is in their urban living being a “subalternity…that is 
relationally constituted and politically mobilized for particular ends.” (ibid.: 27)            
7.3. London - Strategically Sustainable 
London’s desalination plant is located within Thames Water’s existing sewage 
treatment works campus in Beckton in the eastern borough of Newham. One of the 
poorest boroughs of the city, Newham has of recent seen several regeneration 
projects including the 2012 Olympics (LD22). But, it is still not a borough that takes 
                                                          
42“Building norms for coastal zones”, The Hindu, 17 Jun 2016, see: 
http://www.thehindu.com/features/homes-and-gardens/Building-norms-for-coastal-
zones/article14428006.ece  
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exception to further saline discharge in the river or access to a clean river; in any 
case, Londoners’ interaction with the river is unlike that of coastal residents in north 
or south Chennai. It is also unlike that of their counterparts in Oxfordshire, who have 
successfully prevented Thames Water from building a large reservoir in Abingdon for 
the past 10 years. The reservoir was proposed in 200643, but deemed ill-conceived 
after public enquiries in 2007 and 2010. The campaign against the reservoir, called 
‘Group Against Reservoir Development (GARD)’, is driven by residents of the Thames 
Valley outside London and their ties to nature through private property and leisure. 
Employing consultants and water industry experts to advise them, they suggest bulk 
transfer of water from the River Severn to the Thames Valley and more desalination 
plants on the Thames Estuary as ‘environmentally sustainable sources’44.  Thames 
Water has once again included the reservoir in its Water Resource Management Plan 
for 2019-2045 and GARD has responded promptly by mobilising against the plan and  
voicing its objections to it with the media. In Newham, there was no such local group 
that rose in dissent against the desalination plant. Sustained opposition to the plant, 
however, came from unexpected quarters – the Mayor of London – and played a role 
in determining the nature of political power that his office could wield. This section 
will offer a brief account of this contestation and what that means for water 
infrastructure and urban governance in London.  
In water sector conferences or interactions with engineers, consultants and water 
managers, the word sustainability almost never came up. As explained in the 
previous chapter, resilience was the concept driving projects like desalination. It 
wasn’t that sustainability had gone into disuse – on the contrary, it appeared 
sustainability had become part of the public sphere and incorporated into city 
governance. It was no more a specialist practice, instead becoming a popular political 
term. In a major water industry conference, for example, it was only the 
                                                          
43 "Britain's "leakiest" water supplier Thames Water has announced plans to build a £1bn reservoir 
to meet increased water demand." BBC News. 14 September 2006. See: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/5343646.stm 
44 The Group Against Reservoir Development meticulously documents its opposition to Thames 
Water's plans. See http://www.abingdonreservoir.org.uk/index.html  and 
http://www.abingdonreservoir.org.uk/gardsalternatives.html   
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representative from the Greater London Authority (GLA) who spoke on sustainability 
issues. He (L11) was the Policy & Programmes Manager (Resilience & Quality of Life) 
at the GLA; but, his message stayed on the sustainability initiatives taken by the GLA, 
which revolved around quality of water bodies, long term water security and 
sustainable handling of drainage in London. Sustainability, here, was largely about 
ensuring availability of clean and accessible water for use by future generations.  
The GLA also had a London Sustainable Development Commission45, set up in 2002, 
to advise the Mayor in fulfilling one of its core strategic objectives of sustainable 
development. In fact, when the GLA was established through an act of Parliament in 
1999 (LD23), the powers and responsibilities of the institution were heavily oriented 
towards environmental objectives. One of its three ‘principal purposes’ as laid out by 
the Act was ‘promoting the improvement of the environment in Greater London’, the 
other two being social and economic development. However, in balancing between 
its three principal purposes, the GLA is advised to take into consideration how its 
actions might affect or contribute towards ‘sustainable development in the United 
Kingdom’. Accordingly, the authority is assigned a set of environmental functions, 
which the London Plan as formulated by the Mayor attempts to address as per the 
GLA Act’s strategic objective (LD24).  
As per the law and the institutional mechanism in place for London, its urban 
governance is based on sustainable development as a strategic objective.  The GLA 
was meant to replace and co-ordinate functions of London’s development planning 
so far shared between various borough councils, the central government and special 
institutions like London Transport and the London Ecology Unit. That is, the GLA 
wasn’t setting out these objectives and responsibilities for the very first time in 
London. But, it was the first time that these objectives were given the body of an 
institution to be housed in. The unique nature of this institution and the political 
agenda of its office holders will necessarily shape how its policies affect the city then. 
It is also of interest that the GLA was expected to function with the environment as 
                                                          
45 For further details on London Sustainable Development Commission see:  
http://www.londonsdc.org.uk/lsdc/default.aspx  
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a strategic objective, indicating that London’s multi-scalar political relations were 
sought to be institutionalised.  
For the UK water industry, the EA was the institution in charge of sustainability. Much 
like how Ofwat was expected to protect the interests of customers keeping water 
companies from over-charging them or providing inadequate service, the EA was 
expected to ensure that water companies acted in the interest of environmental 
sustainability. The regulatory framework that governs water companies includes 
restrictions on the level of abstraction that companies are allowed to make on 
surface and groundwater; and requirements for maintaining the quality of those 
water bodies.  
“The EA is the guardian of the environment – its job is to ensure health of the 
environment. It takes a multifaceted view of abstraction licenses for different 
sources - groundwater, surface water. It also licenses discharge contents. 
These are arrived at on the basis of complex catchment level calculation, 
balancing flow, dilution, demand and environmental demand which are in 
turn determined by soil type, level of urbanisation and hydrological patterns. 
Using all of this, they create a model to say this is the sustainable amount of 
water to be abstracted – not just in total but peak daily, monthly and annual 
rates.” (L17) 
“In the case of desalination, the EA didn’t have to do much modelling. Water 
was to be abstracted from the Tidal Thames which came under the Port of 
London Authority; the EA would have only been concerned about water 
quality, which is not so much of an issue in the tidal part of the river.” (L34) 
Modelling is techno-mathematical work that can only be performed by skilled 
professionals with access to data on all the components that the above consultant 
claims inform EA’s sustainability model. Sustainability is then, outsourced to the EA, 
and externalised from concerns of the water industry. It works as a boundary object 
marking the government from the governed, at least until the Mayor of London 
decided to take matters into his hands.  
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The regulatory model in which the EA plays guardian of the environment has been 
credited with achieving record quality in England’s rivers and other water bodies 
(LD31, LD32). But, this model does not take into account the sustainability criteria for 
how that quality is achieved. That is, whether the water companies used high energy 
consumption technology to produce clean water is not subject to institutional 
scrutiny, except as carbon emissions commitment that private companies might 
have. 
“Since the Blair era, there has been significant political push towards reducing 
carbon emissions. That’s why desalination is disliked by the public – it is 
perceived to be unsustainable and expensive. It is, despite advances in 
efficiency. But, the widespread alarm over it is because of how sustainability 
became a political issue in this country.” (L17)  
This consultant may have been overestimating the disapproval of desalination in the 
public sphere to emphasize the pressures of sustainability that private companies 
were under. The London desalination plant is not even widely known outside the 
water sector; if it was once a contentious issue, it has simply disappeared from 
people’s memory. Its harshest and most vocal critic at the time – Ken Livingstone, 
then Mayor of London – is widely believed to have engaged with it due to the political 
contingency of the Green Party’s support in the London assembly (L21).  The Green 
Party held a significant position in the first and second elected London assembly in 
2000 and 2004 because the two major parties – Labour and Conservative – held 
nearly equal number of seats. Considering the importance of environmental policies 
to the formation of the London government, the Green party was also heard more in 
the London than in national politics. So, when the desalination plant was planned in 
2003-04, its energy consumption became an issue for the London Mayor.   
7.3.1. Livingstone vs Thames Water  
London has had a municipal government from 1889, first as the London County 
Council with an arguably smaller mandate and then as the Greater London Council 
(GLC), established in 1965 with the aim of rationalising planning in post-war London, 
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through wide and large scale rebuilding of housing and roadways. This was where 
Labour politician Ken Livingstone rose to prominence, elected as one of its members 
in 1973 and then its Leader in 1981 (Carvel, 1984). His tenure, until the GLC was 
abolished in 1986, came to be known as controversial for its policies on transport and 
policing in London, but more so for the radical political stance it took on central 
various issues not directly related to urban planning – economic, defence and 
minority affairs. Those views, especially on minority rights, may not look as radical 
today (Campbell & Jacques 1986). The GLC, housed in County Hall (now converted 
into an aquarium and tourist kitsch) opposite the Parliament to the south of the river, 
under Livingstone was also visually demonstrative in its opposition, famously posting 
London unemployment figures on its rooftop for Parliamentarians to see on their 
way to work (Hebbert 1998). In 1986, the conservative government under Margaret 
Thatcher abolished the GLC as part of a manifesto promise to cut out this wasteful 
tier of government. 
Eleven years later, when an elected government was set up for London under a 
different era of New Labour’s consensus politics, Ken Livingstone was elected as 
Mayor, clearly bringing with him some of those policy and political ideas from his GLC 
days. For instance, there were sweeping changes brought to London’s transport 
system under his Mayorality including the introduction of the Oyster card and the 
congestion charge. Till date, one of the key policy announcements expected from the 
elected Mayor is on transport – fares mainly, but also the congestion charge or 
technological change in the system. In other words, the introduction of the Mayoral 
system in 2000 allowed for the first holder of the office to explore and define the 
kind of politics and powers it could espouse. The first Mayor happened to be Ken 
Livingstone, who brought with him an interesting political history for us to consider 
London’s contemporary urbanisation with.  
If Livingstone’s views on sexual minorities or transport were considered radical in the 
1980s, the environmental focus of the GLA at the turn of the millennium brought 
forth from him ideas practised elsewhere in the world but considered unusual for the 
city’s water infrastructure: 
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“There were two things I wanted to do about the water system. One was to 
fix the massive leaks we were suffering because of years of underinvestment 
in repair and maintenance of our very good Victorian mains. Then I wanted 
to explore the possibility of a dual system – greywater for flushing and treated 
water for all other uses. But, Thames Water was not interested in any of these 
things.” (L30)  
The high energy consumption of reverse osmosis desalination, then, became a hook 
to get Thames Water to take interest in alternative projects. The Mayor’s office was 
public about its opposition to the plant, denouncing it as ‘energy guzzling’ and linked 
it to a national narrative calling it a ‘retrograde step in UK environment policy’ (LD16). 
Livingstone uses the same idiom of a shared London legacy that engineers and 
consultants use to refer to the city’s water system; but rather than establish an 
expertise through it, he attempts to initiate a popular politics of water. But, he does 
draw the line between a professional politician and the general public.  
“People aren’t invested in the water system because they haven’t been 
invited to be. Besides, one they’ve elected representatives, they don’t expect 
you to keep asking them what you should do. It is then your job to lead public 
opinion. They are worried about air quality as shown by polls. So, why not 
water leaks and carbon emissions?” (L30) 
The idea of ‘leading opinion’ echoed his political stance and working in the GLC from 
the 1980s. It was also well-suited for the newly created office of the Mayor, which 
was not vested with much in terms of institutional authority, but gave the directly 
elected Mayor a hefty personal mandate, thanks to the size of the London electorate. 
The three London Mayors so far have built a personal brand for and through their 
Mayoral actions, linking personal identity and practices with their political position. 
Boris Johnson (2008-16) modelled himself a cyclist with a penchant for green spaces 
and ease of doing business with; Sadiq Khan (2016-) has called himself a feminist and 
campaigned for a London open to migrants, religious minorities and of course, 
international business. Even if their goals were similar, each Mayor has worked 
towards it through a uniquely crafted personal identity. Livingstone had a well-known 
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political identity long before he became Mayor of London. He used it to define what 
the Mayor of London could and couldn’t do.  
“I am an activist. I wanted to bring about change in the city by putting every 
agency I had to use. In the process, I developed the capabilities and powers 
that the Mayor could have. I regretted some of it because I lost the election 
to Boris, who was then able to get away with the agenda he wanted.” (L30) 
Livingstone was always known for his deep involvement in the politics of London and 
his interest in urban government. In his role as a Blair-era Mayor, he initiated a 
network across 18 ‘megacities’ around the world with the sole focus of tackling 
climate change. The network, called C4046, has today grown to 90 cities and is a data-
driven institution working to deliver ‘measurable’ action on climate change. This time 
around, Livingstone was clearly set to make environmental sustainability a legacy. 
Interestingly, the mode of politics he adopted to push for it in London’s water supply 
clashed with the same kind of technocratic policy-making that his legacy institution 
proudly claimed to do. In any case, the assemblage of urban networks, institutions, 
regulatory texts and professional expertise that the London desalination project was 
embedded in would serve to mellow the Mayor’s claims to political leadership and 
legacy.  
The London desalination plant, to be built within Thames Water’s existing treatment 
works in Beckton, required planning permission from the borough of Newham, which 
approved the plan as per recommendations from its own committee. Acknowledging 
the strong objection it received from the Mayor on the project’s sustainability 
credentials, it wrote, in its report: 
“It is concluded that there is a need for additional water supply in the London 
and Thames Gateway area over the short and medium term, and that out of 
all the various alternatives that Thames Water considered, the WTP47 was the 
most sustainable… it is considered that the impacts associated with the WTP 
                                                          
46 For the history of C40 and Ken Livingstone’s role in its inception, see: http://www.c40.org/history  
47 WTP – Water Treatment Plant 
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will be minimised wherever possible and will not be of such a degree as to 
justify refusal on the basis of the relevant planning policies.” (LD17) 
The Mayor had submitted a letter to the Newham council stating his objections as 
per the provisions of The Town & Country Planning (Mayor of London) Order 2000, 
since the desalination plant was deemed to be of ‘potential strategic importance’. 
The letter covered substantial ground, drawing attention to not only reverse osmosis’ 
high energy consumption but also the lack of sufficient reasoning for not working on 
leakage reduction, the economic rationale for favouring desalination over leakage 
reduction, the lack of evidence towards the commitment to generate renewable 
energy from the premises, and the potential impact the pipelines could have on local 
biodiversity. The letter argued:  
“The strategic need for the plant must be demonstrated against the overall 
sustainability argument in terms of energy use, biodiversity, design and 
impacts on Metropolitan Open Land.” (LD17) 
If the desalination plant were to go ahead, it needed to use more renewables than 
the London plan typically expected businesses to do, which was 10% of overall energy 
use. The letter added for good measure:  
“The overall design of the reverse osmosis building is bland and 
unimaginative.  The industrial process within the building should be and the 
focal point for views, should be redesigned using strong, simple lines and by 
making the industrial processes within the building more visible to passers-
by.” (LD17) 
Seeking aesthetic construction of a reverse osmosis unit to be located near an 
existing sewage treatment plant, while objecting to its high energy consumption, 
Livingstone’s objection was a text that brought together the antagonist politics of the 
Mayor and the evidence-based institutional role of his office in an intriguing, if 
peculiar, fashion. Livingstone was direct about what his opposition really was to:  
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“I have nothing against the technology, in general. My opposition was to the 
ideology of cutting expenditure and not investing in infrastructure – leaking 
pipes, in this case. Water offers a natural monopoly in a given geography. This 
simply cannot work in private hands.”(L30)  
Sustainability here was a political technology that enabled the Mayor to contest what 
he saw as a problem of economic governance. He did espouse a traditional political 
contestation based on macro-economic theory; but, the institutional, technological 
and urban framework he was working in shaped how it played out in the public 
sphere and eventually affected the material ecologies of the city. 
7.3.2. Clash of political technologies 
The objection letter was sent in October 2004, following which the Newham Council 
approved the plant, subject to referral to the Mayor and the GLA. The Mayor’s 
objection had not been simply a formal one for he then used his power to direct 
refusal of permission. Newham had received planning application from Thames 
Water in June 2004. Exactly a year later, it sent the water company a notice of refusal 
for planning permission, on the Mayor’s directions (LD18). The refusal, of course, 
allows for a right of appeal, based on which a public enquiry was held by the Planning 
Inspectorate between March and June 2006.  
The Mayor’s evidence in the enquiry argued that it was wasteful to use energy to 
desalinate water from the Thames when the city was potentially losing 915 MLD of 
purified water to leaky pipes. He pointed out that water shortages in London and the 
city’s increasing vulnerability to tidal flooding were both potential consequences of 
climate change.  
“[the desalination plant] will use more energy and therefore make a greater 
contribution to global warming than the alternative of Thames Water 
managing its supply network more efficiently. It would mean that London was 
responding to climate change with a solution that adds to climate 
change.”(LD19) 
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The repeated appeal to common sense that the Mayor’s arguments made did not fit 
into the complex and strict regulatory framework that governed water companies in 
the UK. For instance, the enquiry report submitted by the Planning Inspectorate, in 
assessing the Mayor’s evidence, says:  
“The GLA seems to suggest that the energy hierarchy requires that the 
TGWTP proposal should be assessed against other proposals to determine 
whether the proposal itself is essential. I find no such test in the policy, or the 
supporting text; the energy assessment is only required of the proposal being 
promoted.”(LD20) 
Since the provisions of the GLA Act and the London plan policy use broad concepts 
like ‘conservation’ or health of the environment, the enquiry report also concluded:  
“According to the GLA, policy 4A.11 requires the consideration, as a matter of 
preference,  of whether there are alternative means of securing larger water 
contributions through better leakage control and demand management 
measures. However, the policy indicates that 'the Mayor will work...to protect 
and conserve water supplies'… I can find no sequential testing of resources in 
the wording of that policy or in the supporting text.” (LD20) 
Livingstone’s message, on the contrary, was deceptively simple: 
“I want to send out a clear message that as Mayor of London, I will not back 
new developments that contribute further to the problem of climate change.”  
(L19) 
The enquiry was heard by the Secretary of State for Communities & Local 
Government and the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, who 
gave Thames Water planning permission to go ahead with the desalination project, 
without needing referral to the Planning Inspector. The Mayor was up against the 
Central Government once again, and he took the decision for judicial review by the 
High Court.  
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The enquiry report (LD20) starts by pointing out that the lawful regulators of Thames 
Water were the Environment Agency and Ofwat, both of whom were accountable to 
the Parliament and satisfied with the plan for the desalination plant; thus setting the 
state for a tussle between the authority of the central and city governments. The 
report also makes it clear that the technologies under consideration were only 
desalination and indirect effluent re-use (wastewater recycling). On leakage, it states:  
“It is also necessary to appreciate the concept of Economic Level of Leakage, 
which is the level where it would cost more to make further reductions to 
leakage than to produce water from another source” (LD20). 
The Mayor’s challenge to the economic rationale for choosing to produce water over 
fixing leakage was then inconsequential. In many ways, the Mayor’s challenge to the 
desalination plant was a challenge to the framework of governance and planning 
itself. In the enquiry, while the evidence given by the Mayor questioned logical flaws 
in planning for a desalination plant, including the absence of an alternative plan to 
deal with the stated dire risk of drought that the city was in, Thames Water’s 
response reiterated the calculations based on which the necessity for treated water 
was determined and desalination chosen to deliver that volume of supply. The kind 
of political contestation that the desalination plant provoked then was not simply 
about its energy consumption or environmental credentials or even about 
infrastructural policy. It was about the very mode and scale of doing politics.  
London’s water supply had long been a managerial system, mired in issues of 
governance rather than popular politics. Thames Water, for instance, had long failed 
its leakage targets and was fined by Ofwat for that only over the course of the public 
enquiry for desalination (LD10). Fifteen years since privatisation of water in the UK, 
Ken Livingstone’s campaign against desalination introduced an antagonistic politics 
into this mode of government, not only challenging the economic and risk basis of 
the regulatory framework but also contesting the very governance approach that has 
dominated water infrastructure as res publica in London. A senior official in Thames 
Water was none too pleased about this confrontation:  
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“He was running a one man show of opposition to us – even his advisers 
agreed with our view point. In consultations with the Mayor’s office, we tried 
explaining the risk and resilience calculations that we have to use to ensure 
our level of service for London. But, he simply said he was willing to take that 
risk and that he wasn’t really buying into our resilience framework.” (L18)  
It was an unusual intervention marked by Livingstone’s pledge that the ‘colossal’ 
leakage that London’s pipes suffered at a time of increasing scarcity was “the most 
important issue of my second term as Mayor of London.”48 But, it clearly wasn’t an 
issue that people rallied behind for he lost his third election for London Mayor in 
2008 to Boris Johnson.  
Johnson withdrew the legal challenge to the planning permission given to Thames 
Water soon after he was elected, based on a deal with Thames Water to not block 
roads while doing mains replacement work. By then, Thames Water had also finalised 
a biofuel plant within the premises of its Beckton treatment plant, thus making 
desalination 100% fuelled by renewable energy. Under Johnson’s tenure, the Climate 
Change Adaptation Manager became Thames Water’s point of liaison and close 
working contact to decide on water management strategy. Yet, following the 
controversy and more importantly, planning delays, triggered by Livingstone’s 
opposition to the Beckton desalination plant, Thames Water has been cautious in 
proposing the technology as a possible resource option again. In its most recent 
Water Resource Management Plant (2015-40), it rules out any recycling options for 
London’s future water infrastructure development on the basis of “public 
acceptability and potential water quality and environmental considerations” (LD21). 
It then weighs the benefits of desalination:  
“On a cost basis, desalination would be chosen over other large resource 
options such as transfers and reservoir development. However, selection of 
desalination results in a significant increase in the environmental, social and 
                                                          
48 Telegraph 18-Jul- 2007,  Desalination plant approved for London. Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/earthnews/3300864/Desalination-plant-approved-for-
London.html  
268 
carbon cost of the programme and the locations of both plants on the Thames 
Estuary has identified wider environmental concerns.” (LD21) 
It then decides to assess only Thames catchment reservoirs and Severn-Thames 
transfers as potential options, setting desalination aside for the moment. The 
company’s sustainability head appeared for a hearing on climate change pressures 
on London at the GLA’s Environment Committee in October 2015: 
“…there is a good deal of discussion with all our stakeholders both in London 
and outside about what those options should be and a lot of very detailed 
modelling work on the costs and benefits of different options. That does not 
include desalination.” (L39) 
Later, discussing the option of wastewater reuse, he said:  
“The problem there is that to do that safely - and we have had an 
international panel of experts looking at this - they believe we would need to 
use a reverse-osmosis membrane. Not everybody agrees with the panel but 
that is the best advice we can get. Of course, reverse osmosis is the same 
technology that you use in desalination and it is very energy intensive.” (L39) 
During the hearing, he (L39) also stressed that there was time to develop water 
resource options this time and the plans they were discussing then were pertaining 
only to the next water resource management plan, to be published five years later. 
But, the desalination project had taken four years since its first planning application 
was submitted until it was finally given the go-ahead. The techno-politics of water 
infrastructure in London emerged as much out of temporal friction as it did from a 
clash of ideologies and modes of politics. In fact, a significant point of dispute in the 
public hearing on desalination was on the time period it would take to execute the 
alternative of wastewater recycling – 7 years or 10 years. This minor distinction was 
said to be critical for London’s existing drought and scarcity, of which the Mayor was, 
of course, sceptic. The length of the Mayoral tenure was, eventually, the temporality 
that paved way for the building of the desalination plant in London.  
269 
Thus, in London, the objects created by the development of the desalination plant – 
the planning approval sent to the borough of Newham for example - set in motion in 
a series of events that developed into a tussle for political authority in the city. The 
newly created position of the elected Mayor of the city enabled this politics as much 
as drawing authority from it and constituting its discretionary powers.  
7.4. Conclusion 
This chapter started on the premise that technological projects, even if calculative 
and anti-political, spur an organic form of politics that may not be easily reducible to 
an already existing small range of contestations – public vs private; state vs society; 
or class divisions (Barry 2002). Instead the kind of political action they spur may be 
contradictory, contingent and emergent, taking shape along with the infrastructural 
formations that they are embedded in. So, this chapter presented an empirical 
engagement with the political contestations that arose around the desalination 
plants in Chennai and London. This approach allowed for a discursive narrative of the 
politics of dissent that emerged in the two cities, albeit from very different urban 
actors. 
 Chennai’s defining topological feature – its long coastline, which enabled it to 
harness the sea for its water supply, also houses settlements of the urban poor in its 
stretch from the north to south. They were traditionally fishing villages that have 
undergone similar demographic change as the rest of the city to now be comprised 
of a mix of migrant workers and low-income groups engaged in a wide range of 
occupations. However, the urban imagination of fishers’ livelihoods as well the 
coastal residents’ variegated approach to development along and in the sea has 
meant that the fisher has emerged as a political identity and environmental 
subjectivity in the city. This identity, in turn, has been put to use by activists for an 
ontological reinterpretation of the coast and its urbanisation. In following these 
developments, the chapter noted how the spatial contingencies around each 
desalination plant shaped the politics of its neighbouring coastal communities in 
different ways. It has thus traced a narrative of environmental knowledges and 
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politics as highly situated and constantly shifting in response to infrastructural 
development in the city. 
In London, the construction of the desalination plant was challenged by the then 
elected Mayor of the city, in an unusual employment of his discretionary planning 
powers. In picking apart the framework of water resource planning that justified the 
desalination plant using an idiom of popular politics and common environmental 
knowledges, the Mayor’s efforts may be read as an attempt to constitute the powers 
of his newly instituted office. His challenge, however, was enabled by the elaborate 
process of technocratic infrastructure-making, which generated contestable ‘objects’ 
(Barry 2002). Despite this form of contestation being far more concrete, direct and 
clear than the discursive and contradictory coastal politics of Chennai, its longer-term 
effects are less observable.  Both cases delineated above, despite their vast 
differences in the who, how and why of political contestation, however, 
demonstrated that environmental subjectivities as well as action on them are highly 
contingent on a range of socio-material factors in cities. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
The construction of large infrastructures is frequently considered a phenomenon of 
modernism and 20th century national development agendas. However, recent 
scholarship in the social sciences has excavated processes of infrastructure-building, 
alive and well today across the world, even if they may take forms different from in 
the era of centralised planning (Furlong 2014, Graham & McFarlane 2014). They are 
often built by private companies in collaboration with quasi-state institutions and 
global finance; they sometimes involve little building and more organisation or 
installation. Their purpose, while continuing to encompass goals of development and 
universal access to resources, is also to address rising concerns about environmental 
sustainability and resilience to climate uncertainties, particularly in the case of water 
infrastructure. Cities, whose growing importance in global circulations and changing 
place in national polity have spawned new institutions and mechanisms of urban 
governance, have been at the forefront of this infrastructure building. Changes in the 
way infrastructures are conceived, funded and built have thus raised valid concerns 
about who they benefit, and what kind of knowledges and politics they engender. In 
short, the ‘public’ value of infrastructures has been a central theme of their social 
investigation (Collier et al 2016).  
This thesis locates its endeavours in this line of scholarship, exploring recent 
developments in water supply infrastructure in two cities across the global South and 
North – Chennai, India and London, UK. It places them in a comparative analysis, 
where ideas and empirical material from one city inspires critical thought in the 
other, finally resulting in a set of common themes that becomes a starting point for 
theory building. The point of departure in both cities is the opening of large scale 
desalination plants (initially one in each city, followed by one more in Chennai), 
standalone projects driven by globally circulating technology that nonetheless lead 
to a dense web of social, political and ecological entanglements constituting 
infrastructure. It isn’t just the socio-technical effort of supplying water in pipes, 
seamlessly or otherwise, that is identified as infrastructure here, but the continuous 
practice of engaging a wide range of knowledge and political claims in shaping urban 
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waterscapes and consequently transforming the status of water as well as the 
institutions and practitioners involved in shifting, always incomplete ways.  
As the review of literature in chapter 2 showed, dominant approaches to the study 
of urban water systems have tended to analyse these developments through the lens 
of metabolism or metabolic circulations. In bridging the nature-culture divide 
prevalent in the social sciences, they visualised cities as sites where natural resources 
were ‘metabolised’ by circulations of capital and technology, resulting in hybrid 
techno-natures (Swyngedouw 2006). While this was an outcome driven by early 20th 
century bacteriology and then modernism in cities of the global north, urban 
infrastructures in the colonised global south came to be ‘fragmented’ because of 
their incomplete networks and partial circulations (Gandy 2008). Recent modes of 
infrastructure building described above deviate from this northern experience and 
have thus been termed ‘splintering’ in their potential for changing what we 
understand as cohesive urban form (Graham & Marvin 2001). Useful in mounting 
overarching critiques of urbanisation under late capitalism, these analyses, however, 
have little to say about how the myriad of urban residents and practitioners, 
including engineers, city managers, and government institutions, work towards 
actually materialising any form of infrastructure or urban development. What if we 
take seriously precisely these techno-environmental quotidian relations involved in 
the making of infrastructures without reducing them to a circulatory logic? What if 
the dense assemblage of competing political claims and contradictory practices that 
characterises infrastructure-making, in fact, determines the nature of urbanisation?  
This question is usually framed as the distinction between privileging agency and 
structure or between a descriptive and critical approach (Brenner et al. 2011). But, 
as the chapters in this thesis delineated carefully, individual and material agencies as 
well as technological practice constitute an accumulation of relationships between 
the city and its waters, or an ‘infrastructure of relationality’ (Simone 2014), which 
forms the shifting, constantly negotiated and processual structure of urbanisation. 
Description, in this approach, is thus an identification of such an infrastructure at a 
particular place and moment of working, tracing a ‘genealogy’ of how the city came 
to be (Simone 2011). Water, the material of concern here, becomes a ‘boundary 
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object’, whose varying ontology is mutually constituted with its modes of access, use 
and government, and is the plane on which a range of practices and relationships are 
negotiated, leading to political and knowledge claims, often shaping environmental 
epistemologies. Its agency is thus neither a straight-forward resistance to be 
overcome by technology nor ‘equal’ to human intent and action, but rather 
something holding ontological and epistemological uncertainties to be negotiated 
through socialisation. Eventually, water becomes infrastructure not only through the 
planning and construction of a socio-technical project but also through its 
multivalent use, socialisation and governance in the city.  
As Brian Larkin (2013: 336) points out, in his seminal article on the politics and poetics 
of infrastructure, challenging the widespread presumption or idealisation of their 
invisibility: 
“Infrastructures are metapragmatic objects, signs of themselves deployed in 
particular circulatory regimes to establish sets of effects….Invisibility is 
certainly one aspect of infrastructure, but it is only one and at the extreme 
edge of a range of visibilities that move from unseen to grand spectacles and 
everything in between.” (Larkin 2013: 336)  
That is, within the presumed invisibility of infrastructure lies a spectrum of constant 
work mobilising urban imaginations, environmental subjectivities, political 
affiliations and embodied relations to the ‘ambient’ (ibid.) environment to deliver a 
sense of infrastructures as abstractions like ‘modern’ or ‘colonial’ or indeed invisible. 
This is not to argue that the making of infrastructure is a perfectly orchestrated 
process capable of controlling how it is used and experienced. On the contrary, it is 
a recognition of the more-than-material work that goes into the construction of 
infrastructures requiring sustained practices of negotiation and socialisation from 
professionals largely considered technocratic, say engineers. It is also to posit that 
‘public’-ness persists as an ideal of infrastructures because they are realised through 
necessarily interactive and relational experiences of urban materialities as well as 
shared imaginaries. In other words, it isn’t just a coming together of material and 
human agencies that constitute infrastructure, but the layered iterations by which 
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knowledge and uncertainties about the urban environment come to exist and are put 
to use in further shaping cities through interactive technological practice. 
This iterative process of building socio-natural relations in cities, this thesis has 
termed as ‘osmotic’, drawing from popular and engineering understandings of the 
process of ‘reverse osmosis (RO) filtration’ that runs desalination plants in Chennai 
and London, and in most parts of the world today. Osmosis or reverse osmosis is a 
process that mediates electrochemical gradient between organic material, in this 
case between saline and freshwater, by constant calibration and recalibration of 
pressurised flow, through a semi-permeable membrane that acts as a filter (chapter 
5). For engineers working on desalination, this presented a continuum with other 
forms of water engineering that required continuous negotiation and delicate 
calibration of competing pressures and political or technological claims. Their 
preoccupations were with the layers of membranes and the repeated iterations of 
reverse osmosis operations that could eventually lead to a steady flow of 
synthesized, desalinated water. Since technological mediation and engineering work 
is inevitable to urban water access, the thesis draws on this technoscientific process 
to further its understanding of infrastructure-making in cities.  
It conceptualises socio-natural relations or relations of infrastructure-making as 
osmotic rather than metabolic, characterised by semi-permeable membranes that 
allow interaction or restrict flows between the categories of technology, the 
engineer, the urban resident, material structures etc., sometimes inhabited by the 
same profession or institution in their hybrid thinking and practice. Any discourse or 
knowledge emerging from this is not necessarily a convergence of various interests 
but a practice that seeps through the membranes of conflict and communication. By 
the same token, interactions are constantly negotiated, always in a state of 
development or incompletion and contingent on continuing interaction. This also 
reflects the shifting and transforming being of water within infrastructural 
formations, where its multiplicity is channelled towards a singularised ontology or is 
further diverged into a hybrid of permeable categories. 
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The thesis has traced such osmotic relations across the historical trajectory of water 
supply and development in the two cities, revealing the boundary-making role played 
by water in the process (chapter 4). Contemporary engineering practices of 
infrastructure-making in so-called fragmented urban developments, similarly, reveal 
dynamic forms of cohesion, but carefully calibrated by temporal membranes of 
separation (chapter 6). Significantly, engineering epistemologies and practices, far 
from being technocratic or mere outcomes of structural changes, emerge as 
contingent on the networks of relationality and political pragmatics in which 
infrastructures are embedded. These may include global mobilities of engineering 
expertise or the spatial positioning of the desalination plant within the city (chapter 
5 and 6). Osmotic relations can also be observed in contestations of and resistance 
to the urban infrastructural project, which do not necessarily follow a consistent logic 
or stick to fully formed political identities. Instead, they are processes over which 
multiple identities, political leanings and desires come together or diverge, flitting 
between semi-permeable membranes of action (chapter 7).  
In all these cases since osmosis is a useful metaphor to explain the contradictions and 
complexity of the urban condition, the notion of osmotic relations, therefore, can be 
seen seeping through the thesis rather than present itself as the overarching 
analytical framework. Mediation by a semi-permeable membrane has allowed an 
understanding of human or material action as capable of occupying multiple political 
identities and ontological uncertainties. Yet, however negotiated and constantly 
changing this practice is, it still forms an infrastructure – an underlying ‘structure of 
contact’ (Amin & Thrift 2017: 33) that evolves and changes over time, but through 
‘recurring moments’ in cities accumulates ‘multiple layerings’ (ibid.). Infrastructures, 
then, present the indefinite potential as well as the inertia of cities.  
The thesis has presented its findings using three main themes – articulation of a 
mode of governance or idiom of the state through infrastructures; the role of 
engineering knowledges in building connections and cohesions in and across cities; 
formation of urban political configurations through contestations of the 
infrastructural project. Among these themes, the key preoccupation of the study has 
been with the range of techno-environmental knowledges constituted and the 
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political claims they inscribed into the urban fabric. Chapter 4, for example, 
delineated how the state is articulated through urban infrastructures albeit in very 
different ways across Chennai and London. However, far from being defined by their 
positioning in the global South and North, they presented a parallel picture of 
technologically mediated authority built around the ability of water to be governed 
(Meehan et al. 2013). In Chennai, the chapter traced a continuity in water’s illustrious 
history as a vibrant political object imbibed with the state’s technology-aided welfare 
populism – or ‘techno-populism’ (Arabindoo 2011) – to its present assimilation into 
infrastructures of urbanisation and the idiom of rule that it entails. Any 
environmental or technological claims made about water in Chennai were 
automatically political claims as well. In London, the tight and inflexible regulatory 
framework was shown to have, in fact, gone through a trajectory of ‘tacking back and 
forth’ (Star 2010) between different environmental conceptualisations of water, thus 
materialising a technoscientific state. Since the state was the most dominant 
presence in the empirical data I had gathered, this was one of the early chapters I 
had written which gave me the opportunity to think about two important issues as I 
continued with my analysis.  
One was the absence of any overt discussion on environmental sustainability in the 
state’s rhetoric or practices and documentation of water governance and 
engineering. It was almost as if academic and media concerns hadn’t kept up with 
the changing language of techno-environmental engagement in practices of 
infrastructure-making. This language, to be sure, encompassed epistemologies of 
framing human-nature relationships that had implications for how cities shaped the 
natural environment around them, as in the case of London’s Security of Supply Index 
(chapter 6) or Chennai’s land use classification of poramboke (chapter 7). But, this 
process was seemingly far too contingent to occupy the energies of practitioners who 
instead positioned their role in relation to the immediately and intimately 
experienced materiality of water and its indispensability to everyday life. Based on 
this, the analytical approach to data was recalibrated to pay attention to 
conceptualisations of the natural environment and how the human role in shaping it 
may be recast in terms of an ideal of public health or resilience or an imagination of 
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urban cohesiveness. These are, hence, some of the themes that chapters 5 and 6 
address and engage with.  
The second issue that arose from chapter 4 was the matter of urban comparison. This 
chapter, while tracing the common theme of the state’s articulation across the cities, 
clearly told very different stories about the making of urban infrastructures in them. 
This was partly a function of the differences in the nature of the empirical material 
gathered through ethnographic fieldwork, which was discussed in chapter 3. So, how 
best to put the urban comparison to use in generating a ‘cross-pollination’ of 
concepts and identify starting points for theory? The empirical arguments this thesis 
made were structured into chapters based on four conceptual themes. These themes 
were identified through a comparative coding the research data, elaborated in 
chapter 3. It used ideas and patterns emerging from one of the cities, often Chennai, 
to locate processes of interest in the other city.  
So, the regulatory framework overseeing water supply in London, which is usually 
examined within the paradigm of governance, became a starting point for an 
exploration of the state. Similarly, the analysis of risk and resilience in chapter 6 as 
an epistemological convergence was inspired by the multiplicity of engineering 
disciplines and their respective epistemologies in Chennai. Chapter 5, in exploring the 
relationality of infrastructure, builds on the hierarchies of expertise and knowledge 
flows among engineers which has been widely studied in urban geography. But, it 
places the interactions and techniques of ‘agencing’ (Hillier & Abrahams 2013) 
employed by water professionals in London to assert a global expertise in the same 
plane as the highly localised practices of Chennai’s area engineers whose expertise 
was built over shared engineering knowledges with lay residents. In doing this, it 
constructs a narrative of engineering knowledges as simultaneously situated and 
interconnected with a variety of material and imaginative geographies.  
On the whole, what the thesis has achieved through its experimental comparison 
(Lancione & McFarlane 2016) is to draw out the ‘minor geographies’ of cities. That is, 
it has engaged with and brought into the fold of infrastructural study, processes, 
actions, practices and material formations that typically are incidental to the subject. 
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While plans, managerial decisions and financial investments are automatically taken 
to be influential in the development of urban infrastructures, seldom are localised 
trade events; diverse engineering ethics; unsuccessful, forgotten and unclear 
contestations; or obscure government institutions key to unpacking infrastructural 
geographies of cities. This thesis, has, however depended entirely on these sources 
to inform and complicate its arguments, “which cannot be readily understood in the 
terms of a major language of social and political thought” (Barry 2017). Thus, it has 
drawn from the very engineering disciplines it studies to formulate a language of 
osmotic relations that it has employed to make sense of its empirical material in the 
‘minor register’ (ibid). The comparative framework, in fact, created the analytical 
limitation that enabled the narrative here to go beyond paradigmatic accounts of 
urban infrastructure or water supply and engage with cities as they are worked out. 
In doing this, it has not only decentred theory-building from the Euro-American axis 
but also enabled the understanding of infrastructures as they are worked out in the 
everyday messiness of cities, rather than from the top-down rationalities of their 
planning. However, the value of the comparative gesture is limited within a single 
project and demands a longer term epistemological commitment to engaging with 
cities as existing within a world of connections, relations and relationalities that can 
be better explored through conjunctive thinking. This may indeed amplify their 
divergences than lead to any coherent urban theory; which in itself would be a 
contribution towards not only diversifying urban theory but also interrogating the 
process of theory-building without the aid of minor urban geographies.  
Chapter 7, which traces a narrative of political contestations of the infrastructure 
project in Chennai and London, is one such account in the minor register, offering 
only an account of the unruliness of contestation precisely because they are an 
organic politics spurred by a technological intervention. The distributed agencies and 
everyday negotiations involved in the access and use of water and waterscapes in 
Chennai means political contestation is inevitable and often, antagonistic. The 
political formations this chapter traces have emerged out of the entanglements in 
one significant feature of the city’s materiality – its coastline, which however 
presents a case of diverse and contingent political subjectivities. In London, it was 
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the figure of the Mayor and the discretionary power vested in an individualised 
authority that generated a political formation usually associated with popular politics 
unexpected in the technocracy of London government. It was still confined to the 
mechanics of planning approvals, which meant that there was never an opportunity 
to explore how infrastructures were shaped through use in London. This presents a 
possibility for future research on the topic.  
This thesis has developed an understanding of infrastructures as visible in a 
variegated manner and constitutive of negotiated, shifting and technologically 
mediated socio-natural relations, even when they aim for seamless networking as in 
cities of the global North like London. So, the study of the governance structures and 
practices of water managers in London presents only a partial picture of the story. In 
Chennai, this wasn’t as much of an issue as state and engineering practices were 
shaped through constant interactions with users, who have a significant presence in 
the infrastructures of water supply. Additionally, the distributed labour of accessing 
water was conveyed in the ethnographic material because of its visibility in everyday 
urban life. In London, even though there were references to user perceptions and 
subjectivities, and some of the regulatory framings are based on this, there was no 
possibility for ethnographic engagement with this because they are made private by 
the infrastructures of modernity (Gandy 1999).  
In fact, there exists a significant research gap in the limited qualitative engagement 
with everyday infrastructures of water use in London as with several other cities of 
the global North where water supply is assumed to have been made invisible. But, as 
emerging ideas of infrastructural resilience based on the flexibility of its use or the 
figure of the average user incorporated in calculative frameworks demonstrate (Allon 
& Sofoulis 2006, Page & Bakker 2005, Sofoulis 2011), this is a key component of urban 
infrastructures in Northern cities that has not been explored much in academic 
literature.  Thus, the understanding of regulatory politics of water in London sketched 
in this thesis could be expanded and complicated through a study of water users and 
their mediation of private access through a range of household technologies. 
Identifying such research gaps that could lead to development of fully rounded 
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theories of urban infrastructures has also been an outcome of the ‘experimental 
comparison’ (Lancione & McFarlane 2016) that this thesis undertook.  
Similarly, in Chennai, this thesis focused on the use of reverse osmosis filtration in 
the networked supply, although the technology has been prevalent in household 
filtration of groundwater sources for a long time now, which in turn, was fed by the 
rapid adoption of borewells during a phase of the city’s development. This trajectory 
is echoed by other cities in the global South, particularly outside of metonymic 
metropolises like Mumbai (Harris 2012), where technologies of water access are 
overlaid with each other and socialised by the work of professionals and residents. A 
desalination plant, here, isn’t a novel introduction so much as something germinated 
in an already existing techno-political set-up.  As Furlong & Kooy (2017) point out, 
this draws attention to the need to ‘world’ the study of urban water, by engaging 
with the myriad of sophisticated methods by which cities of the global South access 
water, and the complex social and ecological interconnections emergent in the 
process. By recognising historical continuities in the infrastructural systems and 
techno-environmental knowledges that contemporary developments like 
desalination plants engender, this thesis has opened up an avenue for further 
research excavating the layers that make up cities.      
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10. APPENDIX 
Appendix I - Chennai Fieldwork Details 
A. List of Ethnographic Encounters in Chennai 
Code Chennai Ethnographic Encounters 
CE1 Metrowater Head Office, Pumping Station Road  
CE2 Chennai Corporation, Ripon Buildings 
CE3 Tamil Nadu Secretariat - Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department (MAWS) 
CE4 
Tamil Nadu Environment Directorate - housing State Level Environment Impact Assessment 
Authority (SEIAA) and State Coastal Zone Management Authority (SCZMA) 
CE5 Metrowater Area Offices 
CE6 
Tamil Nadu Public Works Department (PWD)- Institute for Water Studies (IWS), State 
Ground and Surface Water Resources Data Centre (SGSWRDC) 
CE7 Office of Former Mayor of Chennai, DMK Party Office, South Chennai 
CE8 Non-Governmental Organisation - Care Earth Trust 
CE9 Non-Governmental Organisation - Coastal Resource Centre 
CE10 Non-Governmental Organisation - Human Rights Advocacy and Research Foundation 
CE11 Coastal communities at Pulicat and Kattupalli 
CE12 Coastal communities at Adyar Estuary 
CE13 Coastal communities at Nemmeli 
CE14 Society of Public Health and Environmental Engineers (SoPHEE) World Water Day Event 
CE15 Water Expo and Watman conference, Chennai Trade Centre 
CE16 Nemmeli Desalination Plant 
CE17 Minjur Desalination Plant 
CE18 Sewage Treatment Plants (at private residential and commercial complexes) 
CE19 Household observations 
 
B. List of Documentary Materials from Chennai  
Code Chennai Document Source Details 
CD1 Chennai Corporation, 2015. Cooum River Eco-restoration Project – a summary note shared 
with the researcher by the Chennai Corporation on 18.03.2015.  
CD2 Tamil Nadu Water Investment Company, 2015. Report on Addressing the Drinking Water 
Security in Ramanathapuram and Thoothukudi Districts through Desalination. Author: K 
Ashok Natarajan, CEO.  
CD3 Environment Directorate, 2008. Detailed Project Report for Nemmeli Desalination Plant 
prepared by Mecon Ltd in association with Adeco – obtained from the TN Environment 
Directorate by researcher.  
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CD4 Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA), 2018. Tamil Nadu Housing and 
Urban Development Department, Government Order (GO) - No. 13 - dated 22.01.2018. 
Available at: http://www.cmdachennai.gov.in/GO.html  
CD5 Government of Tamil Nadu, 2018. Public Works Department Policy Note 2017-18 - Maps of 
TN River Basins & Regions. Available at: http://www.tn.gov.in/documents/dept/42  
CD6 Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, 2016. Establishment – CMDA – Development 
Regulations – Concurrence for design of proposed STPs and NOC for Swimming Pools issued 
by CMWSSB. (Office order No. 17/2016) Available at: 
http://www.cmdachennai.gov.in/pdfs/officeorders/17-2016.pdf  
CD7 Department of Technical Education, 2016. Citizens Charter 2015-16. – Tamil Nadu Ministry 
of Higher Education. Available at: http://www.tndte.gov.in/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/DOTE-CITIZEN-CHARTER-ENGLISH.pdf  
CD8 Tamil Nadu State Planning Commission, n.d.  TN 12th 5 Year Plan - 2007-12. Section 9. Water 
Supply, Sewerage and Sanitation.  
CD9 Tamil Nadu State Planning Commission, n.d.  TN 12th 5 Year Plan - 2012-17. Section 6. Water 
Supply and Sanitation.  
CD10 Municipal Administration And Water Supply Department, 2014. Policy Note 2014-15. 
Available at: http://www.twadboard.gov.in/twad/downloads/Policy%20Note%202014-
2015.pdf  
CD11 Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Act 1978 (as amended in 1997). Tamil 
Nadu Act 28 of 1978. 
CD12 Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2006. State Level Environment Impact Assessment 
Authority Notification (S.O 1533 - Published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part-II, 
and Section 3, Sub-section (ii) ). Available at: http://envfor.nic.in/legis/eia/so1533.pdf  
CD13 Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2012. Tamil Nadu State Coastal Zone Management 
Authority Notification (GO No. 288, From the Director of Environment Letter No. 
P1/1006/2012, Dated 26.4.2012. Gazette Notification No. S.O.(E) 91 dated 18.01.12 ). 
Available at: http://cms.tn.gov.in/sites/default/files/gos/eandf_e_288_2012_D.pdf  
CD14 World Bank, 2004. Implementation completion report on a loan in the amount of US$86.5 
million to India for the second Madras Water Supply Project (CPL-39070 SCL-39076 - Dated 
21 Oct 2004). Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/865341468750544187/pdf/29333.pdf  
CD15 Chennai Metrowater Supply and Sewage Board, 2001. Policy Note 2001-02. Available at: 
http://cms.tn.gov.in/sites/default/files/documents/chennai%20metropolitan%20water%20s
upply%20and%20sewerage%20board_0.pdf  
CD16 Water Resources Organisation, n.d.  Tamil Nadu Public Works Department - Web site and 
documents. Available at:  http://www.wrd.tn.gov.in/  
CD17 Tamil Nadu Water Supply & Drainage Board n.d.  - Web site and documents. Available at: 
http://www.twadboard.gov.in  
CD18 Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, 2008. Master Plan (Volume 3) – Chapter 07 – 
Infrastructure. Available at: 
http://www.cmdachennai.gov.in/Volume3_English_PDF/Vol3_Chapter07_Infrasructure.pdf  
CD19 Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board, n.d. Application For Water / 
Sewer Connection. Available at: http://www.chennaimetrowater.tn.nic.in/pdf/GENERAL.pdf  
CD20 Department of Land Resources, n.d. Standard Classification for Land Use. Available at: 
http://dolr.nic.in/dolr/mpr/mastercodes/landusecodes.pdf  
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C. List of Interviews in Chennai  
Code Interviewee Role Institution/Sector/Location 
C1 Activist Fishers Association, Adyar Estuary 
C2 Activist Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation 
C3 Filmmaker Environmental Issues 
C4 Activist Fishers Association, Adyar Estuary 
C5 Resident South Chennai 
C6 Manager Indo Korean Cultural Centre 
C7 Professor Anna University 
C8 Consultant Academic 
C9 Journalist  
C10 Businessperson Water Tech 
C11 Businessperson Water Tech 
C12 Engineer (Retd.) Metrowater 
C13 Engineer Private company 
C14 Engineer Metrowater 
C15 Engineer Metrowater 
C16 Engineer Metrowater 
C17 PRO Metrowater 
C18 Resident South Chennai 
C19 Consultant Business & Tech 
C20 Resident South Chennai 
C21 Engineer Private company 
C22 Activist/Consultant Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation 
C23 Joint Director Institute of Water Studies (Public Works Department) 
C24 Chief Engineer Institute of Water Studies (Public Works Department) 
C25 Journalist  
C26 Consultant Independent 
C27 Engineer Metrowater 
C28 Engineer Private company 
C29 Engineer (Retd.) Metrowater 
C30 Engineer Metrowater 
C31 Resident South Chennai 
C32 Activist North Chennai Resident 
C33 Engineer Private Company 
C34 Resident Kattupalli (Minjur) 
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C35 Activist Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation 
C36 Engineer Metrowater 
C37 Engineer Metrowater 
C38 Finance Officer Metrowater 
C39 Resident Soolerikadu (Nemmeli) 
C40 Engineer Private Company 
C41 Resident South Chennai 
C42 Activist Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation 
C43 Activist Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation 
C44 Building contractor South Chennai 
C45 Joint Director Dept of Environment 
C46 Resident West Chennai 
C47 Resident South Chennai 
C48 Engineer Metrowater 
C49 Engineer Metrowater 
C50 Superintendent Engineer Dept of Environment 
C51 MD Metrowater 
C52 Professor Madras Institute of Development Studies 
C53 Commissioner Chennai Corporation 
C54 CEO Tamil Nadu Water Investment Company (TWIC) 
C55 Engineer Central Govt. Institution 
C56 Resident Soolerikadu (Nemmeli) 
C57 Panchayat Head Nemmeli 
C58 Panchayat Clerk Nemmeli 
C59 Resident South Chennai 
C60 Former Mayor Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) politician, Chennai 
C61 Administrator (Civil Servant) 
Former Metrowater Managing Director (MD); Former 
Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department 
(MAWS) Secretary 
C62 Engineer Metrowater 
C63 Project Engineer Corporation 
C64 Project Engineer Corporation 
C65 Administrator (Civil Servant) 
Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department 
(MAWS) Secretary 
C66 Engineer Private Company 
C67 Engineer Private Company 
C68 Activist Urban Governance Non-Governmental Organisation 
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C69 Activist Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation 
C70 Writer Coastal & Fishers issues 
C71 Resident Soolerikadu (Nemmeli) 
C72 Engineer Metrowater 
C73 Resident Fishers Association, North Chennai 
C74 PRO Water Tech Business 
C75 MD Water Tech Business 
C76 Activist Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation 
C77 Activist Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation 
C78 Resident Kattupalli (Minjur) 
C79 Resident Kattupalli (Minjur) 
C80 Resident Kattupalli (Minjur) 
C81 Resident Kattupalli (Minjur) 
C82 Area engineer Metrowater 
C83 Resident Ururkuppam (South Chennai) 
C84 Resident Nochikuppam (South Chennai) 
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Appendix II – London Fieldwork Details 
A. List of Ethnographic Encounters in London 
Code London Ethnographic Encounters 
LE1 UK Trade and Investment Seminar - Export Opportunities in International Water Markets 
LE2 Research Councils UK Water Showcase - Water in Future Cities  
LE3 Greater London Authority - Environment Committee Meeting 
LE4 London Sustainable Development Commission 
LE5 Thames Gateway Water Treatment Works (Beckton Desalination Plant) 
 
B. List of Documentary Materials from London 
Code London Document Source Details 
LD1 House of Lords, 2006. Science & Technology Committee - 8th Report of Session 2005-06. 
Available at: https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-archive/lords-
s-t-select/lords-s-t-select-reports-and-publications/  
LD2 Environment Agency, 2007. Areas of water stress: Final classification. Available at: 
https://www.iwight.com/azservices/documents/2782-FE1-Areas-of-Water-Stress.pdf  
LD3 Environment Agency, 2013. Water stressed areas: Final classification. Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140328104527/http://cdn.environment-
agency.gov.uk/LIT_8538_535424.pdf   
LD4 Ofwat. 2015. The Development of the Water Industry in England and Wales 
LD5 Department of the Environment, 1971. The future management of water in England and 
Wales: a report by the Central Advisory Water Committee. Available at: 
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C11753497  
LD6 New Policy Institute, 2013. The water industry: a case to answer. Authors: Adam Tinson and 
Peter Kenway. A report commissioned by UNISON. Available at: 
https://www.npi.org.uk/files/8213/7545/1688/Water_industry_a_case_to_answer_unison
_version.pdf  
LD7 RWE Thames Water, 2004. RWE Group Reorganization: A Step Ahead for Multi Utility. The 
RWE Innogy/RWE Thames Water Perspective. Author: Tim Weller, Member of the Board 
Thames Water. RWE Investor Lunch. Available at: 
http://www.rwe.com/web/cms/mediablob/en/253182/data/213106/1/rwe/investor-
relations/events/archive-2004/blob.pdf  
LD8 Thames Water, 2014. Final Water Resources Management Plan 2015 – 2040 - Executive 
Summary. Available at: https://corporate.thameswater.co.uk/-/media/Site-
Content/Thames-Water/Corporate/AboutUs/Our-strategies-and-plans/Water-
resources/Our-current-plan-WRMP14/WRMP14_Section_0.pdf  
LD9 Thames Water, 2018. Thames Water WRMP19 
Resource Options: Desalination Feasibility Report - Prepared by Mott Macdonald.  Available 
at: https://corporate.thameswater.co.uk/-/media/Site-Content/Thames-
Water/Corporate/AboutUs/Our-strategies-and-plans/Water-resources/Document-
library/Thames-Water-reports/Redacted-Desalination-Feasibility-Report-February-2018.pdf  
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LD10 Thames Water, 2017.  Annual Performance Report 2016-17 Available at: 
https://corporate.thameswater.co.uk/About-us/Our-investors/Annual-Report-2016-2017  
LD11 Ofwat, 2007. Security of supply 2006-07 – supporting information. Available at: 
https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rpt_sos_2006-
07secofsupplyinfo.pdf  
LD12 Ofwat, n.d., Publications. RD 04/10 Regulatory capital values 2010-15. Available at: 
https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/publications/rd-0410-regulatory-capital-values-2010-15/  
LD13 Ofgem, 2009. Fundamental Flaws in the Current Cost Regulatory Capital Value Method of 
Utility Pricing. Contribution to RPI-X@20 review of energy network regulation. Available at: 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/fundamental-flaws-current-cost-
regulatory-capital-value-method-utility-pricing-contribution-rpi-x20-jim-margaret-cuthbert  
LD14 CDP, 2014. From water risk to value creation - CDP Global Water Report 2014.  
LD15 Thames Water, 2006.  Water Resources Plan - December 2006. (Shared with researcher on 
request). 
LD16 London Assembly, 2007. Seventy-Third Mayor’s Report to the Assembly – 18 July2007. 
Available at: 
https://www.london.gov.uk/LLDC/Data/London%20Assembly%20(Mayor's%20Question%2
0Time)/20070718/Agenda/4%20Mayor's%20Report%20RTF.rtf  
LD17 Newham Council, 2004. Regeneration and Development Committee Report (Application 
Ref. P/04/1002) – Published 19 Feb 2009. Available at: https://pa.newham.gov.uk/online-
applications/applicationDetails.do?activeTab=documents&keyVal=ZZZYFCJYXC801   
LD18 Newham Council, 2005. London Borough of Newham - Notice of Refusal of Application for 
Planning Permission (Application Ref. P/04/1002) – Published 19 Dec 2013. Available at: 
https://pa.newham.gov.uk/online-
applications/applicationDetails.do?activeTab=documents&keyVal=ZZZYFCJYXC801   
LD19 London Assembly, 2006. Sixty-Second Mayor’s Report to the Assembly 
Author: The Mayor – 21 Jun 2006. Available at: 
https://www.london.gov.uk/moderngov/Data/London%20Assembly%20(Mayor's%20Quest
ion%20Time)/20060621/Agenda/3%20Mayor&8217s%20Report%20RTF.rtf  
LD20 Planning Inspectorate, 2010. Report to the Secretaries of State for Communities and Local 
Government and Food - Water Resources Management Plan Regulations 2007 Inquiry Into 
The Thames Water Revised Draft Water Resources Management Plan 2010-2035 
September 2009. Available at: http://www.whitehorsedc.gov.uk/node/6548  
LD21 Thames Water, 2014. Final Water Resources Management Plan 2015 – 2040 - Section 8: 
Programme Appraisal. Available at: https://corporate.thameswater.co.uk/-/media/Site-
Content/Thames-Water/Corporate/AboutUs/Our-strategies-and-plans/Water-
resources/Our-current-plan-WRMP14/WRMP14_Section_8.pdf  
LD22 Newham Council, 2014. Newham’s Legacy Story. Available at: 
https://www.newham.gov.uk/Documents/Misc/NewhamsLegacyStory.pdf  
LD23 Greater London Authority Act, 1999. Available at: 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1999/29/contents  
LD24 Greater London Authority, 2004. The London Plan 2004. Available at: 
https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/the_london_plan_2004.pdf 
LD25 Environment Agency, 2016. Managing water abstraction. Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment
_data/file/562749/LIT_4892.pdf  
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LD26 Ofwat, 2007. Memorandum by the Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat) – 
Presented to Parliament. Available at:  
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/ofwat.pdf  
LD27 Environment Agency, 2017. Drought response: our framework for England. Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment
_data/file/625006/LIT_10104.pdf  
LD28 UK Water Industry Research Limited, 2013. Managing through Drought: Code of Practice and 
Guidance for Water Companies on Water Use Restrictions – 2013. Available at: 
https://www.water.org.uk/managing-through-drought-code-practice-and-guidance-water-
companies-water-use-restrictions-%E2%80%93-2013  
LD29 Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2003. Drinking water 2002: A report by the Chief Inspector.  
LD30 Consumer Council for Water, 2007. CCWater response: Environment Agency Identifying 
Areas of Water Stress.  https://www.ccwater.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/CCWater-response-Environment-Agency-Identifying-Areas-of-
Water-Stress.pdf  
LD31 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2001. UK maintains record-
breaking performance for river quality (press release). 
LD32 Environment Agency, 2001. Decade of clean-up brings best-ever river and estuary 
quality results (press release). 
LD33 Atkins, 2012. Future Proofing The UK Water Sector: Positioning the UK water 
industry for long term success. Consultant Report. 
http://www.atkinsglobal.co.uk/~/media/Files/A/Atkins-Corporate/group/sectors-
documents/urban-development/future-proofing-the-uk-sector-leaflet.pdf 
 
C. List of Interviews in London 
Code Interviewee Role Institution/Sector/Location 
L1 Consultant Former Thames Water R&D engineer 
L2 Writer London Water History 
L3 Businessperson Confederation of British Industry 
L4 Policy manager Industry-Expert interface 
L5 Policy manager (resilience) Industry-Expert interface 
L6 Policy manager (environment) Industry-Expert interface 
L7 Policy manager Industry-Expert interface 
L8 Consultant Private 
L9 Consultant Private 
L10 Consultant Private 
L11 Sustainability & Resilience 
manager 
Greater London Authority 
L12 Consultant Private 
L13 Senior engineer Thames Water 
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L14 Research consultant Academic 
L15 Consultant Private 
L16 Consultant Private 
L17 Consultant Private 
L18 Senior planner Thames Water 
L19 Consultant Private 
L20 Sustainability Consultant Independent 
L21 Policy Researcher Greater London Authority 
L22 Journalist The Guardian 
L23 Water manager Asian City 
L24 Water manager Asian city 
L25 Water manager Asian city 
L26 Water manager UK Trade and Investment 
L27 Water manager Asian city 
L28 Consultant Independent 
L29 Consultant Independent 
L30 Former Mayor London 
L31 Engineer Beckton Desalination plant 
L32 Senior engineer Thames Water 
L33 Innovation/Membrane engineer Thames Water 
L34 Consultant Former Thames Water R&D engineer 
L35 Engineer Beckton Desalination plant 
L36 Director of Sustainability Thames Water 
L37 Regulatory consultant Former civil servant 
L38 Water manager Former Thames Water executive 
L39 Asia Editor Global Water Intelligence trade magazine 
 
 
 
 
 
